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Abstract 
In health psychology, judgements of risk (judgements of the probability of a negative 
health outcome) are assessed to test health behaviour theories, understand how 
individuals formulate risk judgements, and assess the accuracy of risk perceptions. 
Almost exclusively, health risk judgements have been investigated by soliciting 
them: participants are posed a specific question about risk and respond on a 
predefined scale. Little is known about risk judgements that are made spontaneously, 
without researcher prompting. Therefore, it remains unclear how representative 
solicited risk judgements are of everyday health-related thinking. This thesis 
addresses this gap in the literature. In Chapter 1, the limitations of existing evidence 
on solicited health risk judgements are outlined. In Chapter 2, it is argued the act of 
soliciting risk judgements, or soliciting them in a particular way, may have reactive 
effects that systematically alter risk judgements; effects which may undermine 
ecological validity. Five empirical studies are reported designed to investigate the 
nature of spontaneous health-related thinking and its relation to researcher-solicited 
risk judgements. Chapters 3 and 4 report qualitative studies of spontaneous health-
related thinking in unsolicited public internet communication. Chapter 5 reports a 
thought-listing study that investigated spontaneous responses to a health warning, 
and effects of framing that warning in positive versus negative terms. Chapter 6 
presents an experimental test of the hypothesis that soliciting risk judgements 
following presentation of a health warning alters responses. Chapter 7 presents a 
study (employing a Latent True Change approach to Structural Equation Modeling) 
that evaluated the ability of solicited risk judgements to predict affective responses to 
a health warning. Findings of these studies include evidence suggesting that 
individuals do judge risk spontaneously but that they almost never articulate these 
judgements in terms of quantitative estimates of probability. Evidence was found 
which suggests that solicited risk judgements likely correlate weakly with 
spontaneous ones. However, evidence was also found that the mere act of soliciting 
risk judgements can have effects on intentions for protective behavioural change; 
these effects suggest that solicitation alters how risk-related information is processed. 
The results provide an evidentiary foundation for improving the ecological validity 
of risk judgment research. 
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Chapter 1 - Literature Review: Judgements of Risk, Health Behaviour, 
Measurement and Methodological Issues 
Much health-related research has examined judgements of risk, that is, 
judgements of the probability of an undesirable outcome. This chapter reviews the 
theoretical basis for studying risk judgements, approaches to their measurement, 
cognitive processes that may be involved, and the evidence that risk judgements have 
a causal effect on health behaviour. This material forms a foundation for the issues 
considered in subsequent chapters. 
1.1 Risk Judgements in Models of Health Behaviour 
There exist within health psychology several theoretical models of the 
determinants of health behaviour1. In this thesis, a health behaviour is defined as any 
behaviour that may affect an individual’s health or that an individual believes may 
affect their health. This includes health-enhancing behaviours (e.g., exercising, 
eating adequate amounts of fruit and vegetables, attending health checks) and health-
compromising behaviours (e.g., smoking, engaging in unprotected sex, eating 
unhealthy food, or failing to engage in a health-enhancing behaviour). For the sake of 
simplicity, the term protective behaviour will be used to encompass both engagement 
in health-enhancing behvaviour or avoidance or reduction of health-compromising 
behaviour. 
Most psychologically oriented health behaviour theories (HBTs) are 
cognitive in nature, in the sense that they focus on cognitive variables (e.g., beliefs, 
judgements, attitudes, intentions) as proximal determinants of behaviour (Armitage 
& Conner, 2000; Sutton, 2001; 2004). Although many non-cognitive factors (e.g., 
                                                
1 In this thesis, technical terms will be italicised when they are first introduced.  
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gender, age, socio-economic status, personality traits) may impact health behaviours, 
it is typically assumed that the effects of non-cognitive variables (e.g., demographic 
variables, personality) are likely to be largely mediated by cognitive factors 
(Fishbein & Middlestadt, 1995; Sutton, 1987). Moreover, it is cognitive factors that 
are most amenable to being changed by the types of interventions that psychologists, 
health educators, and health professionals conduct. Understanding cognitive 
determinants of health behaviours thus has practical utility. 
Notably, most HBTs propose a role for risk judgements in determining health 
behaviours. Specifically, most involve some formulation of a risk motivation 
hypothesis: they propose or imply that, all else being equal, people will be motivated 
to seek protection against ill-health to the extent they believe that ill-health would 
otherwise be likely. Where models differ is in the variables that they propose 
moderate and mediate the relationship between risk judgements and behaviour. They 
also differ in the terminology employed. What follows is a brief review of proposals 
concerning risk judgements in the most commonly cited models. 
1.1.1 The Health Belief Model 
The Health Belief Model (HBM; Janz & Becker, 1984; Rosenstock, 1974), 
one of the first attempts to create a framework for understanding health behaviours, 
was developed in the early 1950s. It drew on general principles of behavioural theory 
to propose four core cognitive variables to explain why individuals do or do not take 
up health protective behaviours. These are perceived susceptibility, perceived 
severity, perceived benefits, and perceived barriers. Later revisions added cues to 
action, demographic variables, socio-psychological variables, health motivation, 
perceived control, and perceived threat as additional mediating and moderating 
variables. Perceived susceptibility was defined simply as “one’s subjective 
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perception of the risk of contracting a condition” (Janz & Becker, 1984) and thus is 
the construct that captures risk judgements. Implicit in later versions of the model is 
the notion that the effect of risk judgements is moderated by the perceived severity of 
the health problem, such that health protective behaviour is more likely to the extent 
that ill-health is judged to be both likely and severe. The combination of perceived 
susceptibility (risk judgements) and perceived severity constitutes perceived threat. 
1.1.2 Protection Motivation Theory 
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT; Rogers, 1975; 1983, and see also Milne, 
Sheeran, and Orbell, 2000) was developed in the context of the literature on fear 
appeals (i.e., attempts to persuade individuals to perform protective behaviours by 
highlighting a risk). This theory holds that fear appeals elicit two types of appraisal: 
an appraisal of threat involving the consideration of judged risk (originally termed 
expectancy of exposure in Protection Motivation Theory) combined with perceived 
severity to form perceived threat. Expectancy of exposure is described by Rogers 
(1975) as an appraisal of “the conditional probability that the [risk] event will occur 
provided that no adaptive behaviour is performed or there is no modification of an 
existing behavioural disposition.” (p. 97). PMT, however, holds that the effect of 
perceived threat is moderated by a coping appraisal, involving consideration of the 
efficacy of the target behaviour for reducing risk (response efficacy) and confidence 
in one’s ability to perform the behaviour (self-efficacy). Thus, high perceived threat 
is held to promote health-enhancing behaviours only to the extent to which one 
perceives one can effectively protect oneself. The effects of the above constructs are 
held to be mediated by protection motivation. 
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1.1.3 Extended Parallel Process Model 
The Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM; Witte, 1994) is similar to the 
PMT in that it was developed to help explain effects of fear appeals. Like PMT, it 
proposes that a threat appraisal (combining perceived susceptibility and perceived 
severity) and a coping/efficacy appraisal (combining response efficacy and self-
efficacy) interact to determine acceptance of a message encouraging health-
enhancing behaviour. Perceived susceptibility judgements are defined as 
“individuals’ beliefs about their risk of experiencing the threat” (Witte, p. 114). The 
EPPM differs from the PMT, however, in that it proposes that when perceived 
efficacy is low, increases in threat promote an increase in fear which leads to 
defensive processing (fear control processes) aimed at reducing this fear. This may 
include, for example, suppression of thoughts about the threat or denial of severity or 
susceptibility. Witte thus suggests that when perceived efficacy is low, fear appeals 
can backfire, reducing the likelihood that the health-enhancing behaviour will be 
performed. This differs from the PMT, because in the EPPM low perceived efficacy 
is proposed not just to attenuate the impact of risk judgements on behaviour, but can 
reverse the direction of their effect. 
1.1.4 Theory of Planned Behaviour 
The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein 
and Ajzen, 1975) (and its predecessor, the Theory of Reasoned Action, TRA) are 
general theories of behaviour, but are often applied to health behaviours. The 
TRA/TPB was developed to clarify issues concerning the relationship between 
attitudes and behaviours. It proposes that behavioural intentions are the most 
proximal determinants of behaviour, with intentions being determined by attitudes 
toward the behaviour, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control. Attitudes 
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are held to be determined by the accessible (i.e., salient) beliefs about the possible 
outcomes of performing the behaviour. Each salient belief is held to have both an 
expectancy and an evaluative component. The expectancy component is described as 
representing “the strength of one's beliefs that the [outcome] is associated with the … 
behavior” (Fishbein & Middlestadt, 1995 & P. 186) and it is recommended that it be 
measured by ratings of the outcome’s likelihood. In the context of a negative 
outcome, therefore, it is equivalent to a risk judgment. The evaluative component 
represents the value the individual places on that outcome, and so for negative 
outcomes is equivalent to the concept of perceived severity. As with the other 
models, the expectancy and evaluative components are held to interact to determine 
behaviours (via attitudes and intentions) such that individuals will be less likely to 
perform a health-compromising behaviour if the risks involved are both severe and 
likely. Subjective norms are individuals’ perception of whether others (particularly 
significant people in their life) believe they should or should not perform the 
behaviour. Perceived behavioural control concerns the perceived ease of performing 
the behaviour. 
1.1.5 The Role of Unrealistic Optimism 
Although existing outside the framework of a formal health behaviour theory, 
a notable proposition concerning risk judgements comes from the literature on 
unrealistic optimism (UO). Numerous studies have shown that most individuals 
typically judge themselves to be less likely to experience negative events and more 
likely to experience positive events than is the average person like themselves; this 
includes in the domain of health (Gold & Aucote, 2003; Weinstein, 1980, 1987; 
Weinstein & Klein, 1996). The phenomenon is termed unrealistic optimism because, 
except where the objective distribution of risk is greatly skewed, a majority cannot 
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logically have better-than-average risk. Interest in UO stems, in part, from the 
proposal that UO may work against health-promoting behaviour above and beyond 
the influence of judgements of own absolute risk (Blalock, DeVellis, Afifi, & 
Sandler, 1990; Klein, 2002; Lipkus, Lyna, & Rimer, 2000; French, Sutton, Marteau, 
& Kinmouth, 2004). 
1.1.6 Summary 
In summary, it is seen that judgements of risk are held to be important 
determinants of health behaviour across theories, with a broad consensus on the risk 
motivation hypothesis. Where the theories differ is in the terminology used and the 
proposed moderators and mediators of the relationship between risk judgements and 
behaviour. Two of the HBTs (PMT and the TPB) explicitly conceptualise behaviour-
determining risk judgements as being judgements of conditional probability (the 
probability of harm if the behaviour is or is not performed); the others do not 
explicitly deal with the issue of conditionality. In most cases it is absolute 
judgements of risk that are held to determine behaviour. However, there is also the 
suggestion that comparative judgements (specifically, comparisons of one’s own risk 
relative to that of the average person) may explain unique variance in behaviour. 
Although not the focus of this thesis, most HBTs also involve a proposal that 
perceptions of the magnitude of a negative outcome combine with risk judgements to 
affect behaviour. In this thesis, perceptions of the magnitude of a negative outcome 
will be referred to as severity judgements. Beliefs about the ease and costs of 
performing a behaviour, and the effectiveness of a behaviour for achieving its 
intended purpose, are also held to influence behaviour.  
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1.2 Dual-process Models of Judgement and Decision Making 
To understand how individuals make judgements of health-related risk, and 
the factors that may complicate measurement of these judgements, it is necessary to 
understand some of the basic cognitive systems that are involved in judgement and 
decision making generally. Dual-process models provide a useful framework in this 
regard. 
Dual-process theories (e.g., Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory, Epstein, 
1998; the Elaboration Likelihood Model, Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; the Heuristic 
Systematic Model, Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; the MODE model, Fazio, 1990, Fazio, & 
Towles-Schwen 1999; Fuzzy-trace theory, Reyna & Brainerd, 1995) are increasingly 
influential in cognitive and social psychological theory. Although formulated for 
somewhat different purposes, and employing different terminology, these models 
have in common the proposal that judgement and decision making involve two semi-
independent cognitive systems. In this thesis, these will be referred to as System 1 
and System 2, following the convention suggested by Stanovich and West (2000).  
There is consensus about many of the properties of the two systems 
(Kahneman, 2003). System 1 is held to be an evolutionarily older system (or set of 
sub-systems) than System 2. System 1 processes occur quickly, effortlessly, 
automatically, and in parallel; and are based on mental associations. Further, they are 
relatively inaccessible to conscious awareness and conscious control. In lay terms, 
System 1 processes could be described as intuitions. System 2 processes, on the other 
hand, involve working memory, occur more slowly, effortfully, and in series; and are 
‘rule-based’. These processes occur under conscious awareness and conscious 
control. System 2 processes could be described as deliberations. 
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Dual-process models hold that these two systems interact to determine 
judgements. Under one broad framework described by Kahneman (2003), the role of 
System 2 is to monitor and modify System 1 responses. When a judgement is 
required, an initial intuitive response comes quickly to mind via System 1 processes. 
System 2 processes evaluate this response and, if it is deemed unacceptable, inhibit it 
and formulate an alternative. (This alternative may, however, be based on that 
provided by System 1, and thus represent an adjustment to it.) In this way the two 
systems collaborate to determine judgements. Because System 2 thinking requires 
effort, the degree to which a judgement is determined by System 1 or System 2 
depends, in part, on the individual’s motivation to expend this effort: they must be 
motivated to monitor and correct System 1 responses. 
1.3 Likely Sources of Bias in Judgements of Risk 
Research on biases in probability judgements illustrates several important 
principles concerning the cognitive processes involved in making risk judgements. 
This literature also highlights the circumstances under which such judgements are 
likely to differ systematically from objective estimates. This section describes two 
key judgement processes: attribute substitution heuristics (specifically, the 
representativeness, availability, and affect heuristics), and motivated reasoning.  
1.3.1 Attribute Substitution Heuristics  
Depending on the specific risk being estimated, individuals have numerous 
sources of information to select from and integrate to arrive at a risk judgement. This 
information may be internal (e.g., memories of past instances of one’s own or others’ 
experience of ill-health, feelings about risk, symptoms being experienced, and 
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knowledge concerning risk factors, warning signs, or the etiology of disease); or 
external (e.g., statistics presented in a newspaper article or on a warning label). 
Accessing and integrating this information, however, is subject to some 
important constraints. First, individuals’ working memory capacity is limited 
(Baddeley, 2003; Miller, 1956). Second, in everyday situations there is often a need 
or desire to make judgements quickly (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 
2004). A characteristic of human judgement therefore is reliance on heuristics – 
cognitive strategies that allow judgements to be made relatively quickly and easily. 
However, a consequence of the use of heuristics is that they can introduce biases 
leading to systematic errors.  
Three common heuristics that have received extensive research attention can 
be explained from a dual-process perspective in terms of attribute substitution 
(Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Because System 1 processes 
occur relatively automatically when individuals attend to stimuli, certain properties, 
associations, categorisations, or evaluations of those stimuli come quickly and 
effortlessly to mind. These automatic assessments have been termed natural 
assessments (Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002); they include physical 
properties, such as impressions of the size or distance of an object, but also abstract 
properties such as similarity, familiarity, and affective valence.  
Natural assessments allow people to judge and act on these useful variables, 
and to do so quickly and easily. However, people may also make heuristic use of 
natural assessments when required to make more complex judgements, by 
substituting a naturally assessed attribute for the target attribute (Kahneman, 2003; 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). For example, if one is asked to rate the quality of 
one’s life, one may simply use a natural assessment of one’s current mood, rather 
  
11 
than carefully consider and weight all aspects of one’s life. Or a juror who is asked to 
nominate a dollar amount for damages to be awarded in a lawsuit, and who has no 
good rational basis for doing this, may simply convert their feelings of outrage or 
sympathy into a dollar value. In a similar way, certain natural assessments can serve 
as heuristic for judging probability. These heuristics are described next. 
An early contribution to the 
heuristics and biases literature was Kahneman and Tversky’s (1972) proposal that 
individuals often base probability judgements on the apparent representativeness 
(i.e.,  similarity) of particular events or instances to their parent population or 
generating process. For example, the estimated probability of an individual’s 
belonging to a particular group may be based on the similarity of that individual to 
the stereotypical member of that group; similarly, the estimated probability of an 
event’s occurring under a given set of circumstances may be based on how 
representative that event would be of those circumstances.  
Although representativeness judgements will often provide a good 
approximation of true probability, Kahneman and Tversky (1972) argued that the 
representativeness heuristic produces certain biases because of factors that determine 
representativeness but are not indicative of probability. For example, asked to judge 
the likelihood of two specific sequences of boys and girls born in a family, 
participants judged the sequence GBBGBG to be more likely than BBBGGG. 
Although both sequences are equally likely, the authors suggested that the former is 
judged more likely because it appears less patterned and thus more representative of 
a random process. 
An example from the domain of health is Kahneman and Tversky’s (1984) 
demonstration that medical practitioners exhibited biased judgement concerning the 
1.3.1.1 The representativeness heuristic.  
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probabilities of diagnoses. Given a description of a hypothetical patient with 
pulmonary embolism, medical practitioners typically rated the patient as more likely 
to experience both dyspnea and hemiparesis rather than simply hemiparesis 
(regardless of the presence of absence of dyspnea). Participants thus exhibited the 
conjunction fallacy, that is, they rated the conjunction of two events as being more 
likely than either one of those events. This violation was explained by the fact that 
the combination of dyspnea and hemiparesis is particularly representative of the 
prototypical experience following pulmonary embolism. 
In another seminal contribution, Tversky 
and Kahneman (1973) hypothesised that individuals often use availability to judge 
the frequency of instances of a class. They reasoned that because associative bonds 
in memory are strengthened with repeated activation, a class with numerous 
instances will be more easily and quickly accessed from memory. Because of this 
correlation, they argued, individuals can use availability as a valid cue for class size.  
Although availability of instances is often strongly correlated with the actual 
number of instances, and is therefore useful as a heuristic, Tversky and Kahneman 
(1973) argued that the availability heuristic is susceptible to certain biases due to the 
other factors which impact on availability. They demonstrated one such bias by 
asking participants about the frequency of certain letters appearing in the first versus 
the third position in words. Participants judged most letters to be more likely to 
appear in the first position, even for letters where the opposite is the case. They 
reasoned that because it is easier to retrieve words from memory based on the first 
than the third letter, individuals will be biased towards overestimating the frequency 
of the former if they make their judgement using the availability heuristic.  
1.3.1.2 The availability heuristic.  
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The availability heuristic may also bias judgements of health-related risks, 
and indeed has often been used to explain biases evident in these judgements. For 
example, it has been found (e.g., Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1981), that 
people tend to overestimate the risk of death by sensational causes and underestimate 
the risk of death by unsensational ones. This may occur because past instances of 
sensational deaths are more available because of their sensational nature and because 
these events receive more media attention (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).  
Weinstein (1980) cited the availability heuristic as a possible explanation for 
the phenomenon of unrealistic optimism. He pointed out that one’s own goal-
directed behaviours (i.e., behaviors that facilitate positive events, or prevent negative 
ones) are likely to be more salient in memory than instances of the same behaviours 
performed by others. This is because of the personal effort typically involved (e.g., 
the effort involved in exercising, or studying to achieve good grades). In using the 
availability heuristic, individuals may therefore conclude that they perform these 
behaviours more often than others, and on this basis decide that they are at less than 
average risk. 
It is well established that every stimulus 
evokes a readily accessible sense of the degree to which it is positive/good versus 
negative/bad (Slovic et al., 2004; Zajonc, 1980). A global evaluation of this type is 
termed an attitude within the attitude literature (Ajzen, 2001). In other frameworks 
(e.g., Damasio, 2003; Slovic et al., 2004; Zajonc, 1980), a stimulus is said to be 
associated with positive or negative affect, on the argument that these evaluations 
involve emotional systems, and may be measured with a question of the form, “How 
do you feel about X?” For the sake of simplicity, the term affective evaluations will 
be used to refer to this notion in what follows. 
1.3.1.3 The affect heuristic.  
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The affect heuristic is a cognitive shortcut whereby individuals draw on 
affective evaluations for making a variety of judgements (Slovic et al., 2004; see also 
Forgas, 1995, 1994; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988, for similar proposals).  Applied 
to judgements of risk, this means that judgement objects associated with greater 
negative affect are taken to involve greater risk. Use of the affect heuristic can bias 
judgements of risk in several important ways. First, it may mean that risk (i.e., 
probability) is confounded with severity. Normatively, risk and severity are 
independent dimensions: a negative event may be highly likely, but not severe in its 
consequences; or unlikely, but very severe. Affective evaluations, however, are 
sensitive to both factors; individuals may thus overestimate the probability of severe 
consequences and underestimate the probability of non-severe ones. Indeed, the 
affect heuristic has been offered as an alternative explanation for why the probability 
of sensational risk is often overestimated. For instance, Slovic, Fischhoff and 
Lichtenstein (1981) found, using factor analytic techniques, that ratings of risk 
loaded on a factor they labelled “dread”.  
Second, individuals’ affective state at the time they make a judgement may 
influence their judgements of probability to the extent they employ the affect 
heuristic. In certain contexts individuals may fail to distinguish between how they 
feel about a stimulus and how they feel at that moment for other reasons (Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983). A negative affective state may thus lead individuals to overestimate 
risk; likewise, a positive affective state may lead individuals to underestimate risk. 
1.3.2 Motivated Reasoning 
Judgements may also be biased by individuals’ desire to arrive at a particular 
conclusion, be it to defend against anxiety or to protect against threat to self-esteem 
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(Kunda, 1990). This may bias risk judgements in a direction individuals find more 
congenial.   
One view of motivated reasoning, the quantity of processing view (Ditto, 
Munro, Apanovitch, Scepansky, Lockart, 2003; Ditto, Scepansky, Munro, 
Apanovitch, & Lockhart, 1998; Lopez, Ditto, & Waghorn, 1994), suggests that 
desire to arrive at a particular conclusion biases judgements by influencing the effort 
put into weighing evidence using System 2. For many judgements, the process of 
weighing evidence for and against a conclusion has no natural stopping point; there 
are many factors that could be considered. Because System 2 processes occur in 
series within the limited capacity of working memory, individuals will only cease 
their deliberations when they are no longer motivated to continue. However, they 
may be more inclined to cease deliberating when the balance of evidence favours 
their preferred conclusion. This may occur in conjunction with System 1 judgements. 
For example, if a System 1 heuristic provides an intuitive sense that one is at low 
risk, one might feel no motivation to engage in an effortful search for evidence to the 
contrary, and that conclusion may be adopted as the final conclusion; by contrast, if 
System 1 heuristics suggest one is at high risk, then an effortful search may be more 
likely to proceed until a less threatening conclusion can be justified. 
Motivated reasoning has been offered as an explanation for several biases in 
judgements of health-related risk. The phenomenon of unrealistic optimism has been 
attributed to motivated distortions, on the grounds that individuals will feel greater 
desire to underestimate their own risk than that of others (Weinstein, 1980). Valence 
framing effects on health-related risk judgements have also been explained in 
motivational terms. Gold and Martyn (2003, 2004) and Gold and Brown (2009) 
framed the same health threats in either negative terms (i.e., the risk of developing 
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the disease) or positive terms (i.e., the probability of avoiding the disease). 
Normatively, judgements of the probability of an event’s occurring and not occurring 
ought to be complementary (i.e., sum to 1), but in these studies it was found that 
individuals were more optimistic in judging their own and comparative risk when 
negative framing was used. The authors suggested that this effect is explicable in 
terms of the combination of Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and 
motivated reasoning. Prospect Theory holds that people evaluate prospective 
outcomes as involving either gains or losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky 
& Kahneman 1981). However, prospective gains and losses are not weighted 
equally: losses are more aversive than objectively equivalent gains are desirable 
(Galanter, 1990; Tversky & Kahneman). If a positively framed event is interpreted as 
a gain, while a negatively framed event is interpreted as a loss, the latter may make a 
greater psychological impact. Individuals may thus feel greater motivation to 
underestimate their risk in relation to a negatively framed event.  
1.4 Measures of Health-Related Risk Judgements 
In empirical studies, health-related risk judgements have been measured for 
several purposes, including to evaluate their relationship to behaviour (e.g., those 
reviewed by McCaul, Bransetter, Schroeder, & Glasgow, 1996), to investigate their 
determinants (e.g., Avis, Smith, & McKinlay, 1989; Robb, Miles, & Wardle, 2004), 
to evaluate their accuracy (e.g., those reviewed by Weinstein, 1998), and to test the 
efficacy of interventions designed to affect them (e.g., those reviewed by Witte & 
Allen, 2000). Almost exclusively, health studies have employed a single explicit self-
report item, asking participants to give an estimate or rating of a specified risk. 
However, the type of question posed and the response formats employed have varied 
greatly, with no consensus on a standard approach to measurement (Diefenbach, 
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Weinstein & O’Reilly, 1993; Weinstein, Kwitel, McCaul, Magnan, Gerrard & 
Gibbons, 2007) Indeed, it has been remarked that there are almost as many different 
measures of risk judgement as studies that use them (Diefenbach, Weinstein & 
O’Reilly). Below are documented some of the important dimensions (seven question 
dimensions and three response format dimensions) on which risk judgement 
measures can differ.  
1.4.1 Question Dimensions 
Measures of risk judgements can vary in the question (or instructions) that 
prompt participants to report a risk perception. In this section, seven dimensions 
related to these questions are described. 
Measures of risk judgement can vary in the 
term used to refer to the concept of risk. For example, participants may be asked to 
judge the probability, possibility, likelihood, chance, or risk of an event, or to report 
their certainty or confidence that an event will occur. Table 1.1 presents some 
examples.  
1.4.1.1 Term used for risk.  
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HBTs hold that individuals’ judgements of their 
risk influence their health behaviours. For this reason, risk questions most commonly 
ask participants to estimate their own risk. However, studies may also ask them to 
judge the risk of someone they know, the average person from a group to which they 
do (or do not) belong, or a hypothetical person described to them; the target 
individual could also remain unspecified. Table 1.2 presents some examples.  
1.4.1.2 Target individual.  
Table 1.1 
Example risk questions varying in term used for risk 
Example study Risk question Term used  
Facione (2002) “How do you estimate your 
risk for breast cancer 
compared with other women 
like yourself (higher/lower).” 
Risk 
Witte (1994) “How possible is it for you to 
get AIDS?” 
Possibility 
Witteman, Renooij, & Koele 
(2007) 
 
“Given that the patient has 
only one of the following 
illnesses, how likely do you 
think that illness is?” 
Likelihood 
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A risk question can be framed either in negative terms (i.e., 
the probability of a negative event) or in positive terms (i.e., the probability of 
avoiding that negative event).  See Table 1.3 for examples.  
 
1.4.1.3 Valence.  
Table 1.2 
Example risk questions varying target individual. 
Example study Risk question Target individual 
Furnham & Lovett (2001) “Acupuncture leads to a high 
risk of Hepatitis B (from 
unsterile needles).” (Participants 
rate agreement) 
Unspecified target 
Viscusi (1993)  “The average life expectancy 
for a 21-year-old male(female) 
is that he(she) would live for 
another 53(59) years. What . . . 
is the life expectancy for the 
average male(female) smoker?” 
Average 21 year 
old smoker (of the 
same gender as 
participant) 
Witte (1994) “How possible is it for you to 
get AIDS?” 
Participants 
themselves 
 
Table 1.3 
Example risk questions varying valence. 
Example study Risk question Valence 
Gold & Brown (2009) “What do you think is your 
likelihood of developing 
homocysteine-related heart 
problems later in life?” 
Negative 
Gold & Brown (2009) “What do you think is your 
likelihood of avoiding 
homocysteine-related heart 
problems later in life?” 
Positive 
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Whereas an unconditioned question simply asks 
participants to rate the probability of an event’s occurrence, a conditioned question 
asks participants to rate the probability given a particular hypothetical scenario. Most 
commonly, questions are conditioned on the participant’s performing (or not 
performing) a behaviour. See Table 1.4 for examples. 
 
Risk questions may differ in the time frame specified 
for the target outcome’s occurrence. For example, one can ask about the risk of a 
negative outcome in the following day, month, year, or sometime in the future; the 
timeframe may also remain unspecified.  See Table 1.5 for examples.  
1.4.1.4 Condition.  
1.4.1.5 Time frame.  
Table 1.4 
Example risk questions varying in condition. 
Example study Risk question Condition 
Kristiansen (1983) Given that a person is a smoker, 
“How likely.., it is that [he] will 
die of lung cancer?” 
Being a smoker 
Madhavan (2003) “If I don't get immunised, there is 
a high chance of me getting flu.” 
Not getting 
immunised 
Strecher (1995) "Compared to others of your 
same age and sex, how would 
you rate your risk of heart 
attack/cancer/stroke?" 
None 
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Participants can be asked to rate risk in absolute or 
comparative terms. A comparative risk question may, for example, directly ask 
participants to rate the risk for one target individual relative to another target 
individual, risk of one outcome relative to another, risk under one condition relative 
to another, or risk for one time frame relative to another. Alternatively, a comparison 
may be elicited indirectly, by posing two separate questions; a comparative estimate 
is then inferred from the difference between the estimates given. See Table 1.6 for 
examples.  
 
1.4.1.6 Comparison.  
Table 1.5 
Example risk questions varying in time frame. 
Example study Risk question Time frame  
Chapman & Coups (2004) “Given that you have had no 
shot, what would say is the 
likelihood that you would get 
the flu this winter?” 
This winter 
Eibner, Barth, Helemes, & 
Bengel (2006) 
“In your opinion, what do you 
think your chances are that 
you will get breast cancer 
some day?” 
Sometime in the 
future 
Zimmerman (2003) “A person who does not get 
the flu shot will probably get 
the flu” 
None specified 
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A question may provide cues 
that indicate to participants how they should go about making a judgement. For 
example, a question may ask participants what they think, believe, judge, or estimate 
1.4.1.7 Cues on how to make the judgement.  
Table 1.6 
Example risk questions varying in use of comparison. 
Example study Risk question Comparison 
Bond, Aiken, & Somerville 
(1992) 
“How likely are you to have 
an amputation? (Asked of 
adolescents with diabetes)” 
None 
Doyle (1997)  “Suppose that the probability 
that a woman using a 
particular contraceptive 
method will experience no 
unwanted pregnancies at all 
during a period of use of 1 
year is .995. Please estimate 
the probability … if she used 
the method for a period of: 1 
month, 1 year, 5 years, 10 
years, 15 years, 25 years.” 
Indirect 
comparison 
across various 
time frames  
Gold (2008) ‘‘What do you think is the 
likelihood that you will 
develop homocysteine-related 
heart problems later in life?’’ 
and ‘‘What do you think is 
the likelihood that the average 
Deakin University student 
will develop homocysteine-
related heart problems later in 
life?’’  
Indirect 
comparison with 
other students 
from the same 
university 
Weinstein (1984) “Compared to other Cook 
[University] males/females, 
my chances of having...in the 
future are…” 
Direct 
comparison with 
other students 
from the same 
university of the 
same gender.  
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the risk to be –  terms which may imply that participants ought make their judgement 
in a rational manner. Alternatively, they may be asked what they feel, perceive, or 
guess the risk to be – terms which may imply that a more intuitive judgement is 
desired (or at least permitted).  See Table 1.7 for examples.  
 
1.4.2 Response Format Dimensions 
Measures of risk judgements also vary in the type of response format 
participants are required to use to report their judgement. Three important response 
format dimensions are described below.  
Response formats can vary 
in how many response options participants are limited to or expected to discriminate 
between. Rating scales may have anywhere from two options to over 100. 
Alternatively, tasks which require participants to speak a response aloud, or write a 
response in a box, can leave the possible response options unconstrained. For 
example, if simply asked to provide a percentage probability, participants are free to 
1.4.2.1 Number of response options imposed.  
Table 1.7 
Example risk questions varying in cues on how to make the judgement. 
Example study Risk question Cue 
Taylor et al., 2002 “On a scale from 0% to 100%, 
what percentage of 
men/women your age in the 
general population do you 
think will be diagnosed with 
cancer in their lifetime?” 
Think 
Weinstein, Kwitel, Magnan, 
Gerrard, & Gibbons, 2007 
“With no flu shot, I would feel 
that I’m going to get the flu 
this year” 
 Feel 
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round to the nearest 10%, specify a range (5-10%), or provide a response to any 
decimal place they choose.  
Although a continuous visual analogue scale could be considered to have an 
infinite number of response options, requiring responses on such a scale does impose 
some constraints depending on the physical size of the scale. Participants can only 
indicate as many levels of risk as they can separate on the page or screen; further, a 
continuous scale may suggest that participants are required to discriminate small 
differences in probability. See Table 1.8 for examples.  
Rating scales can also vary in 
how many points on the scale are given a verbal or numerical label. At least two 
points, the maximum and minimum points, must be labelled to indicate which 
1.4.2.2 Number of response option labels.  
Table 1.8 
Example risk judgement scale formats varying in number of response options. 
Example study Risk item Number of 
response 
options 
Ayanian & Cleary (1999) “Do you think your risk of a 
heart attack (or cancer) is 
higher, lower, or about the same 
as other (men/women) your 
age?” 
3 
Frijlin et al. (2004) Patients were asked to estimate 
their 10-year risk of myocardial 
infarction and stroke along a 
100 mm visual analogue scale 
with 0 and 100% at the ends of 
the continuum 
Continuous 
Weinstein, Kwitel, Magnan, 
Gerrard, & Gibbons (2007) 
“If I don’t get a flu shot, I think 
I am...” (1  unlikely to get the 
flu this year or 2  likely to get 
the flu this year) 
2  
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directions correspond to greater and lesser risk. Labelling other response options on 
the scale may help control how individuals map their risk judgements on to the scale, 
for example, by encouraging participants to interpret the scale as a ratio, interval, or 
ordinal scale. See Table 1.9 for examples.  
 
 
The labels 
assigned to response options define the meaning of responses. These vary in their 
characteristics (see Table 1.10 for some examples), but can usefully be subdivided 
into two categories. In this thesis, the term probability estimate will refer to a 
response that, without additional information, can meaningfully be interpreted  in 
terms of a frequency, because there is a clear numerical nominator and denominator. 
For example, “a 20% probability” can be interpreted as meaning 20 occurrences (the 
1.4.2.3 Response option label type / response definition.  
Table 1.9 
Example risk judgement scale formats varying in number of response option labels 
Example 
study 
Risk scale Number of 
response option 
labels 
Gold & 
Brown 
(2009) 
‘What do you think is your likelihood of 
developing homocysteine-related heart problems 
later in life?’ 
 
 
2 verbal labels; 7 
numerical labels 
Woloshin 
et al., 
2000 
 
2 verbal labels; 
11 frequency 
labels; 11 
percentage 
labels. 
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nominator) out of every 100 applicable cases (the denominator); “4:1 odds” is 
interpreted as meaning four occurrences (the nominator) out of every five applicable 
cases; frequencies themselves (e.g., 200 in every 1000) give the nominator and 
denominator the most explicitly. Even if an estimate is imprecise (e.g., “10% - 20% 
probability”), it nevertheless can be converted to an equivalent range of frequencies 
(e.g., “10 – 20 out of every 100”).  
Further, because responses of this kind have a frequency interpretation, their 
accuracy is amenable to evaluation. If an individual estimates that they have a 50% 
likelihood of experiencing a certain disease, it is meaningful to compare this estimate 
to the proportion of individuals with similar risk characteristics who experience that 
disease. Thus, it can meaningfully be stated that a given  person overestimated or 
underestimated a probability. For this reason, it may be that such response formats 
motivate individuals to put more effort into judging risk carefully. It may also make 
participants more likely to rely on frequency information in arriving at risk estimates, 
because such information can be more easily mapped on to the response format.  
By contrast, the term probability expression is a response without a clear 
frequency interpretation. Responses of this kind cannot be converted to a frequency 
or compared with an objective estimate, without invoking assumptions about how 
participants interpret the scale. For example, a response indicating that an event is 
“very unlikely” has no normative basis for being converted to a frequency without 
additional information or assumptions about what “very unlikely” means. Indeed, 
much research has shown that there is a great deal of both inter-individual and intra-
individual variance in how individuals interpret probability expressions (Wallsten & 
Budescu, 1995; Wallsten, Filenbaum, & Cox, 1986; Zimmer, 1983). Thus, the same 
individual will map the term “very unlikely” to a range of different estimates 
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depending on the context; also, individuals vary in the size and location of the range 
of estimates onto which they map the term. Knowing that probability expressions 
have this ambiguity may mean that individuals are less motivated to ensure 
judgements are accurate when this response format is required. 
 
1.5 Criteria for Evaluating Risk Judgement Measures 
It is seen from Section 1.4 that there are numerous ways to measure health-
related risk judgements. In a few studies, some of these different approaches have 
been compared with regard to how they perform on several criteria. The findings are 
discussed below. 
Table 1.10 
Example risk judgement scale formats varying in type of response option labels 
Example study Risk scale Response 
option label 
type 
Gellin, Maibach, & 
Marcuse (2000)  
Respondents were asked to rate the 
likelihood of infection if their child 
is not immunized, using a 0 (not at 
all likely) to 10 (extremely likely) 
scale. 
Probability 
expression  
(verbal anchors, 
integers) 
Schapira, Davidis, 
McAuliffe, & Nattinger 
(2004) 
“Picture yourself in a room with 100 
women exactly like you. How many 
of you will get breast cancer in your 
lifetime?” 
Probability 
estimate  
(frequency) 
Weinstein, Kwitel, 
Magnan, Gerrard, & 
Gibbons (2007) 
‘“If I don’t get the flu shot, I think 
my chances of getting the flu this 
year would be ...” (1  almost zero, 2 
 very small, 3  small, 4  
moderate, 5  large, 6  very large, 7 
 almost certain) 
Probability 
expression 
(verbal) 
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1.5.1 Test-Retest Reliability 
Three studies have compared the test-retest correlations of different measures 
assessing judgements of health-related risks. Diefenbach, Weinstein, and O’Reilly 
(1993) examined the 2-week test-retest reliability of six different scales (described in 
Table 1.11). Participants judged their own “chance” of developing each health 
problem; the judgements were negatively valence-framed, unconditioned, and 
without a time frame. Woloshin, Schwartz, Byram, Fischhoff, and Welch (2000) 
compared the 2-week test-retest correlations of four measures. Participants estimated 
the risk of health problems occurring to them within the next 10 years; again, the 
judgements were negatively valence-framed and unconditioned. Janssen, van Osch, 
de Vries, and Lechner (2010) examined test-retest reliability of seven risk judgement 
measures across approximately two and a half weeks; these measures varied 
primarily in the type of questions used.  Participants made judgements of their own 
risk of getting skin cancer at any point in the future, and gave responses on five-point 
scales with the end points verbally defined; each measure comprised two such items.  
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Table 1.11 
Measures compared by Diefenbach, Weinstein, and O'Reilly (1993); Woloshin, 
Schwartz, Byram, Fischoff, and Welch (2000); and Janssen, van Osch, de Vries, 
and Lechner (2010) 
Measures compared by Diefenbach, Weinstein, and O’Reilly (1993) 
Two verbally labeled response options (“real chance” versus “little chance”) 
Five verbally labeled response options (“no chance”, “unlikely”,”moderate chance”, 
“likely”, “certain to occur”) 
Seven verbally labeled response options (“no chance”, “very unlikely”, 
“unlikely”,”moderate chance”, “likely”, “very likely”, “certain to occur”) 
Nine response options; end-points verbally defined (“no chance”, “certain to 
happen”); intermediate options labeled with odds (“1 in 200”, “1 in 100”, “1 in 50”, 
“1 in 2”, “1 in 10”, “1 in 5”, and “1 in 2”) 
11 response options; all labeled options 0-10; additional verbal labels for 0 (“No 
chance”), 2 (“Probably will not happen”), 5 (“50/50 chance”), 7 (“probably will 
happen”), and 10 (“Certain to happen”). 
12 response options; end-points verbally defined (“no chance”, “certain to 
happen”); all options labeled 1 to 12. 
Measures compared in Woloshin, Schwartz, Byram, Fischhoff and Welch 
(2000) 
Visual analogue scale; five points verbally labeled (“no chance”, “very unlikely”, 
“unlikely”, “moderate chance”, “likely”, “very likely”, “certain”). 
Visual analogue scale; 11 points labeled; end points verbally defined (“no chance”, 
“certain to happen”);  intermediate options labeled with both percentages and 
frequencies. 
As above, but with region representing 0-1% probability magnified. 
Participants asked to fill in the blank: “1 in _____ chance I will have X in the next 
10 years” 
Measures compared in Janssen, van Osch, de Vries, and Lechner (2010) 
3 comparative, 4 non-comparative measures; two conditional, five unconditioned 
questions; three with cues to make rational/cognitive judgements, four to make 
intuitive/affective judgements. 
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In these studies, the correlations recorded ranged from .45 to .76.  The highest 
were obtained for measures offering at least five response options.  Increasing the 
number of options beyond five neither increased nor decreased the correlations. 
Presenting response options as odds was associated with lower correlations. Janssen, 
van Osch, de Vries, and Lechner (2010) found that conditioned, non-comparative 
risk questions were associated with low test-retest reliability. 
It should be noted that the magnitude of a test-retest correlation depends on 
both the amount of measurement error associated with the scale and the stability of 
the construct being measured (Heise, 1969). When the construct is relatively stable 
(e.g., a personality trait), a test-retest correlation reflects just measurement error. 
However, because beliefs about risk may change somewhat over time, a test-retest 
correlation may reflect both factors. Because construct instability will weaken the 
correlation, it follows that observed correlations should be interpreted as providing 
upper-bound estimates of the contribution of measurement error (e.g., an observed 
correlation of .8 means that at least 64% of the variance is construct-related and no 
more than 36% is error variance). 
1.5.2 Extent to Which Scale-Derived Rankings Resemble Direct Rankings 
Another criterion for assessing the adequacy of risk judgement measures is 
their ability to predict individuals’ responses when they are asked to rank threats 
directly in order of risk. A direct-ranking task does not impose any assumptions 
either about the number of levels of risk which can be discriminated or the response 
format that should be used. Therefore, to the extent that scale-derived rankings differ 
from direct rankings, it suggests that the risk judgement measure in question may not 
present a true picture. A limitation of this approach, however, is that direct-ranking 
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tasks may be unnatural, in that they require participants to compare threats’ risks 
rather than judge them in isolation.  
Diefenbach et al. (1993) and Woloshin et al. (2000) employed this method to 
evaluate the measures described in Section 1.5.1 (see Table 1.11). Rank-order 
correlations ranged from .64 to .78.  Again, the highest correlations were obtained for 
measures offering at least five response options, but increasing the number beyond 
five neither increased nor decreased correlations. Further, in Woloshin et al.’s study, 
measures involving odds were associated with lower correlations.  
1.5.3 Ease of Use 
A simple criterion for evaluating risk judgement measures is how easy 
participants find them to use. If a measure is found particularly difficult, this may 
suggest it requires cognitive processes that are atypical in everyday thinking. 
(However, if a measure is particularly easy to use, this may be because it does not 
convey much useful information. For example, the question “Is your chance of 
experiencing heart disease greater than zero?” is easily answered, but will convey 
little of interest.) Two studies – those summarized in Table 1.11 – have compared 
measures of health risk judgements in terms of ease of use. Diefenbach et al. (1993) 
found that the nine-point odds scale was rated as the most difficult. In Woloshin et 
al.’s (2000) study, most participants rated all scales as easy/very easy to use.  
1.5.4 Correlations with Behaviour 
One might propose that the ability of a risk judgement measure to predict 
behaviour would be a central indicator of its validity. After all, interest in risk 
judgements is based largely on their theorised effect on behaviour. However, there 
are considerable problems in interpreting a correlation between a risk judgement and 
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behaviour as due to an effect of the former on the latter. These problems will be 
covered in detail shortly, in Section 1.6. Leaving aside the issue of causality for that 
discussion, the issue addressed here is merely that of whether some measures predict 
behaviour better than others.     
Two studies have compared the predictive ability of different measures of 
risk judgements for the same health behaviour in the same sample. Weinstein, 
Kwitel, McCaul, Magnan, Gerrard, and Gibbons (2007) compared the ability of 
different measures to predict vaccination against influenza. Participants estimated 
their risk of contracting influenza that year if they did not get the flu vaccine; they 
did this on eight different scales (see Table 1.12). The correlations found ranged 
from .21 to .41.  A 4-point ‘feeling at risk’ scale performed better than all other 
measures; of those phrased in terms of probabilities, the 7-point verbal scale 
performed best.  
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Janssen, van Osch, de Vries, and Lechner (2010) compared seven risk 
judgement measures (those described in Section 1.5.1) on their ability to predict 
current and future suncreen use. Correlations ranged from .16 to .43, with 
conditioned questions phrased in terms of “affective risk” performing best.  
Table 1.12 
Measures compared in Weinstein et. al. (2007) 
2-point verbal 
estimate scale 
Question: “If I don’t get the flu vaccine this year, I think I 
am…” Two verbally labelled response options (“unlikely to get 
the flu this year” versus “likely to get the flu this year”) 
7-point verbal 
estimate scale  
Question: “If I don’t get the flu vaccine this year, I think my 
chances of getting the flu this year would be” Seven verbally 
labelled response options (“almost zero”, ”very small”, ”small”, 
”moderate”, ”large”, ”very large”, ”almost certain”) 
13-point, 
percentage 
estimate scale 
Question: “If I don’t get the flu vaccine this year, I think my 
chances of getting the flu this year would be” 13 response 
options, labeled with percentages 0-100% 
6-point verbal 
estimate scale 
Question: “Without a flu shot, do you think you’re likely to get 
the flu this year?” Six verbally labelled response options 
(“extremely likely”, ”very likely”, ”somewhat likely”, 
”somewhat unlikely”,” unlikely”, ”very unlikely”) 
4-point verbal 
agreement 
scale 
Question: “Without a flu shot, I’m sure I would get the flu this 
year”. Four verbally labelled response options (“agree strongly”, 
“agree mildly”, ”disagree mildly”, ”disagree strongly”) 
4-point verbal 
agreement 
scale 
Question: “With no flu shot, I would expect to get the flu this 
year.” Four verbally labelled response options (“agree strongly”, 
“agree mildly”, ”disagree mildly”, ”disagree strongly”) 
4-point verbal 
agreement 
(‘feeling at 
risk’) scale 
Question: “With no flu shot, I would feel that I’m going to get 
the flu this year.” Four verbally labelled response options 
(“agree strongly”, “agree mildly”, ”disagree mildly”, ”disagree 
strongly”) 
4-point verbal 
agreement 
(‘feeling 
vulnerable) 
scale 
Question: “With no flu shot, I would feel very vulnerable to the 
flu.” Four verbally labelled response options (“agree strongly”, 
“agree mildly”, ”disagree mildly”, ”disagree strongly”) 
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1.5.5 Summary 
The studies reviewed above illustrate that there are several criteria on which 
risk judgement measures can be measured. They also provide some clues as to the 
disadvantages of certain approaches. Dichotomous scales were associated with lower 
test-retest correlations and less agreement with direct rankings than scales with five 
or more response options. There was also some suggestion that odds-based measures 
are problematic, being rated as difficult to use and being associated with lower test-
retest correlations and less agreement with direct rankings of risk.  
However, these studies, and the criteria they use, provide a limited basis for 
choosing among risk judgement measures. Only a small number of the possible 
measures have been compared with regard to threats to health. Also, the criteria 
above – whether alone or in combination –  do not provide a strong basis for 
assessing the validity of risk judgement measures for the purposes for which they are 
used. In particular, it is unclear which measures, if any, capture judgements that have 
a causal effect on behaviour.  It is this issue that is addressed next. 
1.6 Methodological Issues in Testing the Risk Motivation 
Hypothesis Using Correlational Designs 
Empirical tests of the risk motivation hypothesis have typically involved 
correlational designs. If people take protective action to the extent that they believe 
ill-health is otherwise likely, this implies a relationship between risk judgements and 
protective behaviour, such that greater perceived risk will predict more protective 
behaviour. On this logic, researchers have commonly interpreted positive 
correlations between risk judgements and protective behaviour as evidence 
supportive of this causal link (Brewer, Weinstein, Cuite, & Herrington, 2004; Sutton, 
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2005; Weinstein, 2007). However, there are several methodological problems which 
threaten the validity of the interpretation. These problems are examined below. 
 
1.6.1 Judgements of Risk Versus Judgements of Susceptibility 
Rather than measuring judgements of likelihood of experiencing illness, some 
studies measure judgements of constitutional resistance/vulnerability to illness 
(Brewer, Chapman, Gibbons, Gerard, McCaul, & Weinstein, 2006). The latter 
concept, referred to in this thesis as susceptibility, is one of the factors that may 
influence risk, but is not itself synonymous with risk.  For instance, an individual 
may be highly susceptible to an infectious disease because of a compromised 
immune system, but nevertheless be unlikely to encounter it and thus be at low risk. 
Appropriate tests of the risk motivation hypothesis should be careful to assess 
judgements of risk rather than susceptibility.  
1.6.2 Controlling for the Influence on Behaviour on Risk Judgements 
Tests of the risk motivation hypothesis 
have often involved cross-sectional designs. In these studies, participants report their 
current judgement of risk and their recent or typical health-protective behaviour (e.g., 
“Do you think you are at risk of contracting HIV?” and “Do you practise only safe 
sex?”).  
It might be thought that, in such studies, a positive correlation between the 
judgements and the behaviour would reflect a causal effect of the former on the 
latter. However, such a correlation can plausibly be explained by causation in the 
reverse direction (Weinstein, 2007). First, on the basis of Self Perception Theory 
(Bem, 1967), participants may be expected to infer their risk judgements from their 
1.6.2.1 Cross-sectional studies.  
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behaviour: those who have taken protective action may reason that they did so 
because they judged themselves to be at risk, and those who have not, may conclude 
the reverse (Weinstein). Second, Cognitive Dissonance Theory (Festinger, 1957) 
predicts that individuals will modify beliefs to make them congruent with 
behaviours; the risk judgements participants report may thus reflect a desire to justify 
behaviour. Third, those who have failed to perform health-protective behaviours may 
be more inclined to employ motivated reasoning and underestimate their risk in order 
to reduce anxiety. For all of these reasons, it is possible to obtain positive 
correlations between risk judgements and behaviour even without a causal effect of 
the former on the latter. 
Effects of behaviour on risk judgements may also reduce a positive 
correlation (or even produce a negative correlation). This is because individuals 
would be expected to base their risk judgements, in part, on the effect their behaviour 
has presumably had on their risk (Brewer et al., 2004; Brewer et al., 2006; Weinstein, 
2007). For instance, those who have consumed adequate amounts of fruit and 
vegetables may conclude on this basis that they are now at low risk of heart disease. 
Here a causal effect of behaviour on risk judgements may obscure that of risk 
judgements on behaviour. In cross-sectional designs, therefore, neither the presence 
nor the absence of a positive correlation can be taken as strong evidence for or 
against the risk motivation hypothesis. 
In an attempt to address these problems, some 
studies have employed prospective designs. In these studies, risk judgements at one 
time (t1) are related to behaviour at a later time (t2). However, there remains a 
potential problem if the target behaviour is an ongoing one (Weinstein, 2007). Such 
behaviours (e.g., smoking, diet, seat belt use) are likely to be stable over time due to, 
1.6.2.2 Prospective studies.  
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for example, the influence of habit, personality, or stable situational factors (e.g., 
income, social influences, etc.); behaviour at t1 will thus tend to correlate strongly 
with that at t2 (Oulette & Wood, 1998). If the recorded correlation actually reflects 
the relationship between risk judgements and behaviour at t1, the interpretation will 
be bedevilled by the same problems as noted in the preceding section for cross-
sectional designs. In effect, a correlation between risk judgements at t1 and behaviour 
at t2 may be due simply to the effect of behaviour at t1 on both of these.  
Another approach to testing the risk 
motivation hypothesis is to relate risk judgements at t1 to change in behaviour 
between t1 and t2. Alternatively, one could statistically control for behaviour at t1 
using, for example, multiple hierarchical regression or partial correlation. 
(Statistically, these procedures are identical to using change scores; Allison, 1990; 
Werts & Linn, 1970). Both methods control for behaviour at t1 and thus circumvent 
the problems described previously.  
However, behaviour change may fail to show a relationship with risk 
judgements even when there is a causal effect. This is so because for most threats to 
health, behaviour change due to risk judgements will have already occurred prior to 
recruitment into the study (Weinstein, 2007). Unless the threat is a novel one, risk 
judgements will often have been held for some time, so there will have been ample 
opportunity to change behaviour in response prior to recruitment. Thus, it becomes 
less likely that there will be any further behavioural change between t1 and t2 , at least 
due to risk judgements. In the absence of behavioural change, there can be no 
correlation of the risk judgements with behavioural change. Thus, to the extent that 
this situation holds, an effect of risk judgements on behaviour may go undetected. 
(For example, many individuals who judge their risk of heart disease to be high at t1 
1.6.2.3 Predicting behaviour change.  
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are likely to have had a similar judgement weeks, months, or even years earlier. If 
this risk judgement were going to motivate them to change their diet, the behaviour 
change would probably have occurred before t1. With no further change in diet after 
t1, risk judgements at t1 will not be predictive.)  
The problem noted in the previous section can be circumvented by measuring both 
change in risk judgements and change in behaviour, and examining the correlation 
between the two. To the extent that behaviour is influenced by risk judgements, one 
would expect that changes in risk judgements between t1 and t2 would be followed by 
changes in behaviour during that period (assuming it is sufficiently long to permit 
behaviour change to manifest). This would be reflected by a positive correlation 
between the two change scores. However, this approach introduces new problems. 
Although changes in risk judgements may have a causal effect on change in 
behaviour, change in behaviour may also have a causal effect on change in risk 
judgements, via the same mechanisms noted in relation to cross-sectional designs 
(see Section 1.6.2.1). These include mechanisms which would produce a positive 
correlation as well as those that would produce a negative correlation (or decrease a 
positive one). Therefore, it is seen that, as with cross-sectional designs, neither the 
presence nor the absence of a positive correlation can be taken as strong evidence for 
or against the risk motivation hypothesis. 
It is seen that it is 
difficult to test the risk motivation hypothesis while appropriately controlling for the 
influence of behaviour on risk judgments. One situation, however, when an 
appropriate test may be more easily conducted is when risk judgments can be related 
to subsequent performance of a newly available behaviour (Brewer et al., 2004; 
1.6.2.4 Predicting behaviour change from change in risk judgements.  
1.6.2.5 Predicting uptake of newly available behaviour.  
  
39 
Weinstein, 2007). This becomes possible, for example, when a new vaccination, 
medication, or treatment is first made available. Risk judgements are measured just 
prior to the behaviour becoming available, then behaviour is assessed after 
participants have had adequate opportunity to perform it. In this circumstance, past 
behaviour is effectively controlled for, because all participants are equal with regard 
to this variable, having had no opportunity to perform the behaviour in the past. 
Here, the presence or absence of a correlation between risk judgements and 
behaviour cannot be explained in terms of past behaviour, thus providing stronger 
evidence for or against the risk motivation hypothesis. 
1.6.3 Controlling for Behavioural Intentions 
Just as behaviour can have effects on risk judgements which can mislead with 
regard to the risk motivation hypothesis, so can behavioural intentions. The same 
mechanisms as discussed in Section 1.6.2.1 apply. Individuals may infer their risk 
judgements from their intentions, may seek to make their risk judgements consistent 
with their intentions to reduce cognitive dissonance, or may employ motivated 
reasoning to distort risk judgements in order to reduce the anxiety that is produced by 
intentions. These factors could plausibly explain a positive correlation between risk 
judgements and behaviour. Circumventing this problem would require measuring 
risk judgements before participants were aware of the availability of the relevant 
behaviour, and therefore could not have formed intentions towards it. 
Second, effects of intentions on risk judgements may also reduce a positive 
correlation or produce a negative correlation. This is because in responding to a 
question of the form, “What is your chance of experiencing X in the future?”, 
individuals may base their judgement, in part, on their intentions to take protective 
action against X (Brewer et al., 2004; Brewer et al., 2006). In fact, for a question of 
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this form, it is rational to do this, on the grounds that the intended behaviour will 
indeed reduce risk. To overcome this problem, the risk measure should be 
conditioned on not taking protective action; the question needs to be of the form, “If 
you do not perform behaviour Y, what is your chance of experiencing X in the 
future?” It is seen that, without appropriately controlling for intentions, neither 
positive nor negative correlations can be taken as strong evidence for or against the 
risk motivation hypothesis.   
1.6.4 Assessment of Actual Behaviour 
Many health-related studies report either correlations between risk 
judgements and intentions, and also between intentions and behaviour; or just 
correlations between risk judgements and intentions (on the logic that intentions are 
in any case typically strongly predictive of behaviour). However, this approach can 
be misleading. This is because there can be correlations between risk judgements and 
intentions, and between intentions and behaviour, without there being any between 
risk judgements and behaviour (Weinstein, 2007). This will be so if risk judgements 
and behaviour share different (i.e., non-overlapping) components of variance with 
intentions. One way this might occur, for example, is if the causal relationships 
involved are very different for different subgroups, with some individuals basing 
their intentions on their risk judgements, but not their behaviour on their intentions; 
and others exhibiting the reverse causal pattern.  
1.6.5 Considering Relevant Moderators  
One should not expect a strong relationship between risk judgements and 
behaviours in certain cases (Brewer et al., 2006). First, some behaviours (e.g., 
exercise or diet) have a whole range of health consequences and may therefore 
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depend on judgements of risk concerning more than one threat. In such cases, any 
one specific risk judgement is likely to have only a small effect on the behaviour. 
The range of consequences of a behaviour would thus be a moderator of the 
magnitude of the relationship. Second, most HBTs hold that perceived severity 
moderates the influence of risk judgement (see Section 1.1); therefore, risk 
judgements should be less important when a sample perceives that an outcome is not 
overly severe. Similarly, HBTs propose a moderating role for self-efficacy (or 
perceived behavioural control); therefore, risk judgements should be less important 
when a behaviour is difficult to perform, or is so perceived. The action of these 
moderating variables may explain why in some cases risk judgements fail to predict 
behaviour. Tests of the risk motivation hypothesis are best carried out for behaviours 
which have specific consequences and are easy to perform, and where the threat is at 
least moderately severe.   
1.6.6 Correspondence Between the Risk Question and Behaviour 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) argued in relation to behavioural attitudes that 
when measures of attitudes do not closely correspond to the behaviour at issue, this 
can explain weak attitude-behaviour correlations. Applying the same principle, poor 
correspondence between measures of risk judgements and behaviours may obscure a 
causal link that is in fact present. For example, a measure asking individuals the risk 
of smokers in general may very well not predict their own smoking behaviour; here, 
there is poor correspondence of target individual. As another example, a measure 
asking individuals to judge their HIV risk for the next 6 months may not predict safe 
sex behaviour beyond that period; here, there is poor correspondence of time frame.  
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1.6.7 Summary 
It is seen that there are many methodological problems associated with testing 
the risk motivation hypothesis. Some of the problems may lead correlations between 
risk judgements and behaviours to be significantly positive even if there is actually 
no causal effect of the former on the latter. Other problems may weaken correlations 
and therefore conceal a genuine causal effect. Of course, often researchers are not 
interested only in whether a causal effect is present or not: they may be more 
interested in the magnitude of the effect, because they assume this indicates the 
amount of behaviour change that could be achieved by interventions targeting risk 
judgements (Sutton, 2005). However, for all the reasons indicated above, correlations 
can greatly over- or underestimate the importance of risk judgements. All too often, 
then, neither the significance (or its absence), nor the magnitude of a correlation, 
provides valid information with regard to the risk motivation hypothesis. Indeed, this 
has been acknowledged as a problem in the evaluation of HBTs more broadly 
(Hagger, 2009). 
1.7 Methodological Issues in Testing the Risk Motivation 
Hypothesis with Experimental Designs 
To a lesser extent, researchers have sought to test the risk motivation 
hypothesis using experimental designs: here, risk judgements are an independent 
variable that is manipulated, with the aim of identifying any effect on behaviour. 
These studies, by their nature, circumvent some of the problems associated with 
correlational designs, in particular, the potential for behaviour to influence risk 
judgements. Nevertheless, other methodological issues remain. In this section, these 
are reviewed. 
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1.7.1 Appropriate Manipulation Checks 
In an experimental design, researchers can attempt to manipulate risk 
judgements in a number of ways, for example, by providing risk-related statistics. It 
is possible, however, for these attempts to have little or no effect on  risk judgements, 
since individuals may forget the information or give it little weight. Therefore, it is 
important to measure risk judgements after any attempt to manipulate them, in order 
to check that the manipulation was successful. Without such checks, the absence of 
an effect on behaviour cannot be taken as strong evidence against the risk motivation 
hypothesis. 
The timing of the manipulation check is also important. If risk judgements 
are measured immediately post-intervention, they may show an effect of the 
manipulation. But that effect may be short-lived, such that risk judgements return to 
normal soon after the intervention; in this case they cannot have any effect on 
behaviour. To check that the manipulation had a lasting effect, risk judgements need 
to be measured after some delay. However, if manipulation checks are conducted 
with too long a delay, such that they reflect risk judgements post-behaviour change, 
there is the possibility that they will themselves be shaped by the behaviour. This 
may occur for the same reasons as were noted in Section 1.6.2.  
1.7.2 Appropriate Mediational Tests 
Even when an attempt at manipulating risk judgements has been found to be 
successful, and there is also an effect of behaviour, it cannot be assumed that the 
effect of behaviour was mediated by the effect on risk judgements. It is possible, for 
example, that the experimental manipulation also affected another variable (e.g., 
judgements of severity) which in turn influenced behaviour. Futher, it is possible that 
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the effect of the manipulation on risk judgements was mediated by behaviour, rather 
than that the effect on behaviour was mediated by risk judgements. 
It is important therefore to conduct appropriate mediation tests. In the context 
of an experimental study, mediational tests examine the extent to which the effect of 
a manipulated variable on a dependent variable is reduced if the variance associated 
with a mediator is controlled for (e.g., entered as a covariate) (Baron & Kenny, 1986; 
Green, Ha, & Bullock, 2010; Judd & Kenny, 1981). If, for instance, risk judgements 
mediate the effect of a manipulation on behaviour, then entering risk judgements as a 
covariate should significantly reduce the magnitude of the effect. However, 
mediational tests rely on the assumption that no other variables that are correlated 
with the hypothesized mediator could themselves be acting as mediators (Judd & 
Kenny, 1981; Green, Ha, & Bullock, 2010). For example, consider a situation where 
a manipulation affects severity judgements, and severity judgements have separate 
effects on risk judgements and behavour, yet there is no actual effect of risk 
judgments on behaviour. In this case severity judgements and risk judgements will 
be correlated. Here, a mediational test that ignores severity judgements would appear 
to support the risk motivation hypothesis, because entering risk judgements as a 
covariate would reduce the size of the effect. Yet this would be so only because risk 
judgements are correlated with the true mediator, viz, severity judgements.   
Avoiding inappropriate interpretation of mediational analyses, then, requires 
measuring and examining all other possible mediators. In practice, this makes it 
difficult to obtain strong evidence for an effect of risk judgements on behaviours, 
even using an experimental design. 
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1.7.3 Additional Issues 
Some of the issues mentioned in relation to correlational designs also apply 
for experimental designs. Measures of risk judgements employed for manipulation 
checks and meditational tests ought to avoid measuring susceptibility (see Section 
1.6.1), be conditioned on not performing the behaviour in question (see Section 
1.6.3), and have appropriate correspondence with the behaviour (see Section 1.6.6). 
Further, actual behaviour ought to be used as the dependent variable (see Section 
1.6.4), and circumstances where behaviour is theoretically unlikely to be influenced 
by risk judgements should be avoided (see Section 1.6.5). 
1.8 Quality of Empirical Studies Relating Risk Judgements to 
Health Behaviour 
Although numerous studies have examined correlations between risk 
judgements and health behaviours, very few adequately address all of the 
methodological issues described in Section 1.6. For example, a meta-analysis on the 
relationship between risk judgements and breast cancer screenings identified 19 
studies relating these variables (McCaul, Bransetter, Schroeder, Glasgow, & 1996). 
The pooled correlation was r = .16 (p < .001), indicating a small positive 
relationship. However, of these, only six studies employed prospective designs, and 
of those, two used intentions as the predicted variable, two used judgements of 
susceptibility as the predictor variable, and the remaining two (Montano & Taplin, 
1991; Rimer, Keintz, Kessler, Engstrom, & Rosan, 1989) did not report a correlation 
controlling for the influence of past behaviour. Thus none of the studies included in 
this meta-analysis adequately addressed the key methodological issues described in 
this chapter. 
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Similarly, in Brewer et al.’s (2004) meta-analysis of studies relating risk 
judgements to vaccination behaviour, the authors were able to locate only 12 studies 
(three of them unpublished) that met the criteria of having appropriately conditioned 
questions and using behaviour rather than intentions as the predicted variable. The 
pooled correlation calculated for these studies was moderate (r = .26, p < .001). But 
only half of them employed prospective designs. Further, of the three of these that 
were published, two (Cummings, Jette, Brock, & Haefner, 1979 ; Nexoe, Kragstrup, 
& Sogaard, 1999), both concerning influenza vaccination, ought to have statistically 
controlled for past vaccination, but did not.  
Therefore only one study in this meta-analysis, that of Brewer et al. (2004), 
was of high quality. This study related judgements of the risk of Lyme disease to 
uptake of a new Lyme disease vaccine in US states where the vaccine had been 
introduced only very recently. Because the behaviour was only recently available, 
none of the participants had had an opportunity to be vaccinated at the time of 
reporting risk judgements. They were posed the conditioned risk question, “Let’s say 
that you do not get the Lyme vaccine. What do you think the chance would be that 
you would contract Lyme disease at some point in the future?” Responses were given 
on a dichotomous scale: “likely” or “unlikely”. Six months later they were asked 
whether they had received at least one of the injections constituting the vaccine 
regimen. Of those who had initially responded that contracting the disease was 
likely, 10% had been vaccinated; of those who had initially responded that 
contracting the disease was unlikely, 2% had been vaccinated. This positive 
association was significant (OR = 5.81, r = .16, p < . 001). Although this study was 
well designed, it may nevertheless have underestimated the causal impact of risk 
perceptions. Vaccination behaviour was assessed over a 6 month period, whereas 
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participants judged their risk of contracting Lyme disease at any time in the future. 
Some participants may have judged their lifetime risk to be high, but not their 6-
month risk, and may have delayed vaccination on that basis. Thus, this study lacked 
precise correspondence of time frame. 
A comprehensive meta-analysis of PMT studies (see Section 1.1.2) 
conducted by, Milne, Sheeran, and Orbell (2000), also highlights the lack of high 
quality evidence. Of the studies identified by this review, only 4 were identified 
reported correlations between risk judgements and future behaviour. The pooled 
correlation for these studies was r = .12 ( p < .01). However, the meta-analysis did 
not report on whether any of these studies controlled for confounding effects of 
intentions (see Section 1.6.3).  
These example meta-analyses support the argument of some researchers (e.g., 
Weinstein, 2007) that correlational studies rarely provide appropriate tests of the risk 
motivation hypothesis or estimates of the magnitude of the effect of risk judgements 
on behaviours. Even the best designed studies seem likely to have some degree of 
bias. (It must be added, however, that in many cases, the studies’ limitations are 
inevitable, given practical constraints.) 
In contrast, a comprehensive meta-analysis of experimental studies, that of 
Witte and Allen (2000), suggests that experimental tests of the risk motivation 
hypothesis are rarely conducted at all2. Witte and Allen identified 99 experimental 
health behaviour studies in their review of the literature on fear appeals; however, 
only 11 involved attempts to manipulate risk judgements and test for effects on 
behaviour. The pooled effect size for these studies was r = .14 (p < .05). This is 
                                                
2 Peters, Ruiter, and Kok (2012) have conducted a more recent meta-analysis of experimental studies. 
The focus of this review, however, was on interactions between perceived threat and perceived 
efficacy (both response efficacy and self-efficacy). The authors did not conduct analyses specific to 
the risk judgement component of perceived threat and its link to behaviour. Witte and Allen’s (2000) 
provides a better sense of attempts to specifically manipulate risk judgements.  
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consistent with the risk motivation hypothesis, but the meta-analysis did not report 
on mediation in any way. Therefore it remains unclear whether these attempts to 
manipulate risk judgements did in fact influence behaviour via these judgements. 
1.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter reviewed some of the foundations of risk judgement research in 
health psychology. It was seen that there is consensus among HBTs on the risk 
motivation hypothesis: the notion that health risk judgements motivate protective 
behaviour. Although HBTs themselves say little about the cognitive processes 
involved in health risk judgments, it was seen that risk judgements may involve both 
System 1 (intuitive) and System 2 (deliberative) processes, including attribute 
substitution heuristics and motivated reasoning; the involvement of these processes 
may bias risk judgements in certain circumstances. 
It was further seen that measuring health risk judgements and testing their 
impact on behaviour both pose significant unresolved challenges. There are a great 
variety of ways risk judgements can be measured, but it is unclear which are the most 
valid or how their validity should be established. Even ignoring this problem, there is 
a lack of strong empirical evidence on the risk motivation hypothesis, due to 
numerous methodological problems which undermine health risk judgement studies. 
Overall, then, this chapter highlights a problematic state of affairs in the 
health risk judgement literature. There is a broad theoretical consensus on the 
importance of a construct, and as a consequence, a great number of studies which 
assess it. Yet there remains a lack of consensus on how to measure this construct and 
a lack of strong evidence for its importance. Moreover, resolving these issues 
appears to be quite difficult. 
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It may be that research on health risk judgements would benefit from a shift 
in focus. Thus far, this thesis has focused on the standard paradigm for researching 
such judgements. An assumption of this paradigm is that risk judgements can 
legitimately be accessed by soliciting them, that is, by explicitly asking people to 
estimate a specific risk and to report their judgement. Almost exclusively, risk 
judgements have been studied in this way. Yet rarely are risk judgements solicited in 
everyday life. The risk judgements made in everyday circumstances – and therefore 
the ones that would most affect health behaviour – are formed by individuals 
spontaneously. However, almost no research has been conducted on spontaneous 
health risk judgements. Therefore very little is known about how, when, and why 
individuals spontaneously appraise risk, and whether researchers adequately capture 
these processes using explicit measurement approaches. The next chapter therefore 
turns to these issues.  
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Chapter 2 - Risk Judgement Solicitation Effects as 
Threats to Ecological Validity 
 
2.1 Ecological Validity and Health Risk Judgements 
Central to this thesis is the notion of ecological validity, that is, the relevance 
of research findings to everyday life – a topic that has been raised in several other 
psychological literatures and has a long history in psychological thought 
(Schmuckler, 2001). The term “ecological validity” was introduced by Brunswick 
(1947, 1955), who was concerned that laboratory-based experiments were 
increasingly focusing on unnatural psychological processes (Dhami, Hertwig, & 
Hoffrage, 2004). During the 1970s, a movement towards ecological approaches to 
memory research arose as a reaction against the view that laboratory research on 
memory had failed to produced significant discoveries of practical use. Proponents of 
ecological approaches (e.g., Neisser, 1978) argued that the generalisability of 
traditional memory research was severely limited by the unnatural settings 
(laboratories) and unusual materials (e.g., unrelated lists of words) typically 
employed (Kvavilashvili & Ellis, 2004). Questions about the relevance of research to 
everyday life were similarly raised in response to the proliferation of studies on 
causal attribution conducted by social psychologists during the 1970s (Weiner, 
1985). These studies, typically involving experimental designs, investigated the types 
of causes participants attribute to certain outcomes, and how certain features of those 
outcomes (e.g., success versus failure, expected versus unexpected outcomes) 
influence causal attribution. But because these studies explicitly asked participants to 
attribute cause, some researchers questioned whether people in fact engage in causal 
attribution spontaneously (Weiner). Measurement approaches which risk eliciting 
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‘unnatural’ responses have been termed ‘reactive’ and ‘obtrusive’ measures by a 
number of authors in various other literatures (e.g., Kazdin, 1979; Webb, Campbell, 
& Schwartz, 1966).  
Ecological validity would also seem important for the study of health risk 
judgements. If risk judgements do indeed impel health protective behaviour, it is the 
judgements that occur in everyday life that necessarily fulfill this role. In the 
literature on health risk judgements, ecological validity has not received extensive 
attention, yet there are good reasons to question the ecological validity of much 
health risk judgement research. Almost exclusively, researchers study risk 
judgements by soliciting them: an explicit question about risk is posed (e.g., “What is 
the likelihood that you will experience X in the future”) and participants respond in a 
specified format. In everyday life, risk judgements are rarely solicited, but are made 
by individuals spontaneously for their own purposes. It may be, however, that the 
mere act of soliciting a risk judgement alters that judgement, because it provokes 
cognitive processes that would not otherwise occur.  
An analogy may be made with the phenomenon of white-coat hypertension 
(Verdecchia et al., 1995).  Medical research has established that when blood pressure 
is measured by a doctor in a clinic it tends to be higher than when it is measured 
covertly by a monitor worn by the patient during the day.  It seems that the very act 
of measuring blood pressure increases it (presumably because the patient feels 
anxious about the procedure). Measured blood pressure is thus often not 
representative of everyday blood pressure. In much the same way, solicited risk 
judgements may not be representative of everyday risk judgements. Yet there is very 
little evidence available on this issue, because almost no research has assessed health 
risk judgements as they occur spontaneously (although see Section 2.3 for some 
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exceptions). It is spontaneous health risk judgements – those that are not solicited – 
that are the central concern of this thesis. 
This chapter discusses the possibility that the mere act of soliciting health risk 
judgements may threaten ecological validity. It is argued that soliciting such 
judgements may have effects on cognitive processes; these are termed solicitation 
effects. In what follows, several reasons why solicitation effects may occur are 
presented. The key questions concerning the nature of spontaneous health risk 
judgements to be addressed in this thesis are then outlined. 
2.2 Mechanisms that Could Produce Solicitation Effects 
When a risk judgement is solicited, there is an ambiguity about when the 
judgement came into being. In response to the question, “How likely are you in the 
future to experience X”, an individual may report a previously formulated 
conclusion, accessed from memory.  This conclusion may have been formulated 
days, weeks, months, or even years prior; or moments earlier, in response to some 
experimental stimulus. It is also possible, however, that the individual may construct 
a new conclusion on the spot. The latter may apply if there is no prior conclusion 
available to report (perhaps because the individual has avoided even thinking about 
the issue, as a defensive strategy); in this case, the individual would be forced to 
construct a judgement. Alternatively, even if a prior conclusion is available, asking 
about risk might provoke a re-evaluation of that conclusion, because the individual 
may decide that it is no longer appropriate. 
To the extent that individuals construct (or reconstruct) a judgement in 
response to researchers’ questions about risk, the act of soliciting the judgement may 
alter what information they consider and how they process it. The conclusion that is 
reported may thus speak more to the context and manner in which it was accessed, 
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than to the individual’s belief prior to being questioned.  In this way, the solicited 
risk judgement may differ in important ways from a spontaneous one. There are 
several possible interrelated mechanisms that could produce solicitation effects; these 
are presented next. 
2.2.1 Increased Involvement of System 2 Processes  
As described in Section 1.2, dual-process models hold that judgements are 
determined by the interaction of the intuitive (System 1) and deliberative (System 2) 
cognitive systems. As was also described in Section 1.2, the degree to which System 
2 is involved can be influenced by various factors. 
It seems possible that soliciting a judgement may generate greater motivation 
to employ System 2. This is because participants may feel that their reasoning is 
under scrutiny; indeed, they may suspect that they will be asked to explain the 
reasons behind their judgement. They may, accordingly, feel obligated to ensure that 
their judgement does not violate any logical principles or contradict a judgement they 
reported elsewhere. They may thus assume that their probability judgement should 
be formulated on the basis of careful deliberation. If they suspect that their intuitive 
response is subject to bias, they may seek to correct for this. Thus, when risk 
judgements are solicited, the greater involvement of System 2 may lead to different 
conclusions than would otherwise be the case.  
The involvement of System 2 may be further enhanced, to some extent, by 
aspects of the risk question used (see Section 1.4.1).  Certain terms used to refer to 
the concept of risk may seem to demand a more rational, System 2-based judgement 
than would occur naturally. For example, the terms “chance” or “likelihood” may 
have statistical connotations, and thus appear to call for greater involvement of 
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System 2. Similarly, researchers may cue greater System 2 thinking by using terms 
such as “think”, “believe”, “estimate”, or “judge” when soliciting risk judgements. 
Certain response formats (see Section 1.4.2) may also enhance involvement 
of System 2. For example, asking participants to discriminate between more levels of 
risk than they do spontaneously may lead them to assume a more accurate answer is 
required; and this may provoke greater System 2 thinking. Further, numerical labels 
(in the form of, for example, percentages, frequencies, or odds) may have statistical 
connotations and so elicit more System 2 thinking than do, for instance, verbal 
labels.  
2.2.2 Choice Among Attribute Substitution Heuristics 
There are a number of System 1-based natural assessments (see Section 1.3.1) 
which may serve as the basis for a judgement of risk. Individuals’ choice of attribute 
to draw on may be influenced by the type of question asked or the response format 
required. For example, a question phrased in terms of “feeling” may invite reliance 
on the affect heuristic. On the other hand, a question phrased in terms of frequencies 
(e.g., “How many people in 100 will develop cancer”?) may invite use of the 
availability heuristic. If a judgement is solicited in terms that differ from how it is 
conceptualised spontaneously, it may be changed accordingly. 
2.2.3 Amplification of Motivated Reasoning 
As discussed in Section 1.3.2, research suggests that judgements can be 
influenced by motivated reasoning, whereby people selectively tailor their reasoning 
to bring themselves comfort. By focusing individuals’ attention on risk, soliciting 
risk judgements may heighten their anxiety about the threat and, in turn, amplify 
motivated reasoning. If a response to a risk judgement question is required, 
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individuals cannot merely avoid thinking about a threat avoid anxiety. Thus, 
participants may search for, and focus on, considerations that allow them to 
underestimate their risk, more than they otherwise would. Furthermore, if soliciting 
risk judgements promotes greater involvement of System 2 thinking, and if the 
quantity of processing view of motivated reasoning holds, then this may create the 
conditions which allow motivated distortions to occur to a greater extent.  
Motivated reasoning may be amplified particularly strongly when a risk 
question focuses on certain target individuals (see Section 1.4.1.2). In particular, if 
the question concerns the individual’s own risk, rather than that of one or more other 
people, anxiety associated with the judgment may be heightened, increasing 
motivated reasoning. Additionally, if there is particular stigma associated with being 
at greater comparative risk than others, questions such as, “What is your risk relative 
to the average person?” may also heighten anxiety and thus elicit greater motivated 
reasoning. 
The valence of the risk question (see Section 1.4.1.3) may also impact 
motivated reasoning. As noted, evidence suggests that motivated reasoning may 
occur to a greater extent if a threat is framed in negative than in positive terms. This 
means that a risk question phrased in terms different from how the judgement is 
spontaneously framed may produce either greater or less motivated reasoning than 
would naturally occur. 
2.2.4 Self-Presentation Biases 
Solicited health risk judgements may be susceptible to self-presentation 
biases. Some individuals may feel that claiming themselves to be at low risk of a 
health problem would imply that they are ill-informed or do not take the issue 
seriously. On the other hand, others may feel that claiming themselves to be at high 
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risk would imply that they engage in risk-taking behaviour (Weinstein, 1987). 
Because participants are being asked to report their risk perceptions, desire not to 
appear foolish may thus impact on their motivation to reach certain conclusions; via 
motivated reasoning, they may be more likely to arrive at these conclusions. The fact 
that the researcher is likely to be viewed as an authority figure would enhance these 
effects. 
2.2.5 Increased Cognitive Load 
If soliciting a risk judgement can heighten reliance on System 2 processes 
(see Section 2.2.1), it could also make it harder to use these processes. Certain risk 
questions, because of their complexity, may impose particularly high cognitive load. 
High cognitive load is likely to interfere with System 2 processing, because it taxes 
the working memory capacity and attentional resources that System 2 processes 
require (Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 2000, 2008). For 
example, if a risk question is conditioned on some hypothetical future event (e.g., 
“What is your likelihood of X, assuming that Y does not occur”; see Section 1.4.1.4), 
imagining this scenario and its implications may tax working memory, more than 
would occur for a naturally-occurring risk judgement. Similarly, if a long time frame 
is mentioned in a risk question, this may impose considerable cognitive load, because 
of the greater number of possible future scenarios that would need to be considered; 
again, this may interfere with System 2 processing.  
2.2.6 Effects of Time and Place 
If soliciting a risk judgement provokes a new, on-the-spot judgement, then 
the judgement reported will be made at a time and place different from that in which 
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it would be made naturally. There are a number of ways in which this may affect the 
processes involved. Four in particular are mentioned here. 
First, when researchers solicit risk judgements, they almost invariably do so 
in contexts in which appetitive desire is likely to be low. For instance, risk 
judgements relating to alcohol use are not typically solicited in bars and risk 
judgements relating to diet are not typically solicited in the presence of high-calorie 
foods. Solicited judgements are thus less likely to reflect the strong desires – and 
therefore motivated distortion of reasoning – that these high-temptation cues are 
likely to produce (Ariely & Lowenstein, 2006; Ditto, Pizarro, Epstein, Jacobson, & 
Macdonald, 2006; Nordgren, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2008).  
Mood (i.e., affective state) is another example of a contextual variable that 
may differ between the context in which risk judgements are solicited versus the 
context in which they occur naturally. For example, certain risk behaviours are likely 
to occur at times of celebration or excitement, when mood is relatively positive. 
Examples include alcohol consumption, drug use, or unprotected sex. There are 
several possible mechanisms by which mood could affect judgements (including risk 
judgements). First, the presence of a positive mood may make positive thoughts and 
memories particularly salient, due to mood congruent memory (Blaney, 1986; Isen & 
Geva, 1987; Mayer, McCormick, & Strong, 1995); these thoughts may then have 
undue impact on judgements. Second, to the extent that individuals employ the affect 
heuristic, but fail to distinguish between their feelings toward the specific threat and 
their overall mood, the latter may influence judgements of risk (Schwarz & Clore, 
1983; also see Section 1.3.1.3). Third, when individuals are in a positive mood, 
desire to preserve this state may lead them to avoid thinking about a threat as much 
as possible or avoid thinking about reasons why their risk may be high, because 
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dwelling on such considerations may threaten their mood (Wegener & Petty, 1994, 
2001; Wegener, Petty, & Smith, 1995); thus risk judgements made under these 
conditions may underestimate risk. Finally, positive moods have been found to 
promote greater reliance on System 1 processes (Bless, 2001; Gasper & Clore, 2001; 
Ruder & Bless, 2003). This has been explained in some cases by positive moods 
imposing greater cognitive load and therefore decreasing capacity of System 2 
processes (Mackie & Worth, 1989). Other models hold that a positive mood reduces 
motivation for System 2 processing (Bless, 2001; Schwarz, 1990; Wegener & Petty, 
1994).  
The salience of others’ behaviour may also be an important contextual 
variable. In an everyday context, a risk judgement may be made in a context where 
others’ risk taking (e.g., smoking, use of alcohol or drugs) is particularly salient. This 
may impact particularly on judgements of comparative risk, making it particularly 
easy for the individual to conclude that they are at less risk than others (see Section 
1.1.5). It also seems possible that individuals may infer that if others frequently 
engage in a given behaviour then it cannot be overly risky, on the logic that others 
would cease the behaviour if it were truly risky; in this way, risk judgements might 
be subject to something akin to observational/social learning (Bandura, 1977).  
2.2.7 Effects of Questions that Precede Risk Judgement Solicitation 
Typically, questions about risk are posed among other, related questions. 
Thus, solicited risk judgements are made in a context that includes any prior 
questions. It seems possible that any such questions (especially, those that 
immediately precede the risk questions) will affect the risk judgement made. This 
may occur for several reasons. First, the prior questions may highlight certain 
considerations that may otherwise be given less weight. For example, if participants 
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were asked, “How many cigarettes do you smoke per day?” and then, “What is the 
likelihood that you will contract lung cancer in the future?,” it would be unsurprising 
if the two responses were strongly correlated. Second, the prior questions may 
impose certain demand characteristics. For example, if asked to judge both the 
average person’s risk and their own, individuals may well feel that they ought not 
give the same response to both questions, on the assumption that different responses 
are expected. Third, prior questions may incline individuals towards either System 1 
or System 2 thinking, depending on the nature of the earlier questions. Examples of 
studies demonstrating effects of question order on health risk judgements include 
Gold and Barclay (2006), Gold (2008), and Taylor et al. (2002).  
2.2.8 Conclusion  
It is seen from Section 2.2 that there are many ways in which solicitation 
effects might conceivably occur. It should be noted that the mechanisms presented 
here are suggested merely as theoretical possibilities. It remains to be established 
which, if any, do in fact play a role, and the extent to which they do so. Nevertheless, 
the variety of ways in which the act of soliciting judgements of health risk might 
plausibly alter those judgements suggests that ecological validity cannot be taken for 
granted here. Empirical research into whether spontaneously occurring risk 
judgements differ from solicited ones seems warranted. Several studies that have 
gone at least some way towards circumventing the problems of solicitation effects 
are described next.  
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2.3 Previous Studies Which Circumvent Some Potential 
Solicitation Effects 
Within the literature on health risk judgements few studies have attempted to 
mitigate some of the types of solicitation effects described in Section 2.2. Even these 
few studies have addressed only a small subset of the potential problems. Two 
examples of such studies follow 
Hogarth, Portell, and Cuxart (2007) used an experience sampling 
methodology to ensure that risk judgements were assessed at a time and place 
representative of everyday life. Participants were sent text messages at random 
intervals during the course of their normal activities. On receipt of a prompting 
message, they were asked to describe their current activity and affective state; and to 
nominate the worst possible consequence of that activity. They were then asked to 
judge the risk, severity, and overall threat for that consequence (on 7-point scales). 
The most common consequences nominated were short-term in nature, and 
concerned either loss of time/materials due to work activities; or injury/illness due to 
transport, work, food, or drink. 
Although this study ensured generalisability of  time and place, solicitation 
effects may still have been acting. The risk judgements were still solicited and 
participants were required to use a specific response format. Further, because 
participants were asked to report just on risks that were possible consequences of the 
current activity, the results may not have captured judgements that are less strongly 
associated with any single activity.  
Another study that attempted to circumvent some potential solicitation effects 
was that of Gold (2007). Gay men were asked to “think aloud about their risk of 
HIV”; the comments they made in response were not constrained in any other way. 
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This study thus circumvented solicitation effects that might arise due to the inclusion 
of specific comparisons, time frames, or conditions in a risk question; or from 
imposition of a specific response format. Among the findings were: just over half the 
men spontaneously mentioned others’ risk of HIV; others’ risk was usually 
characterised as being higher than own risk; and there was often evidence that a 
comparison was being made between own and others’ risk. 
In this study, however, participants were explicitly asked to think aloud about 
their own risk; therefore, although they were not constrained in how they responded, 
judgements of own risk were solicited. Moreover, participants were required to think 
aloud about their risk of HIV at length; thus they were required to dwell on the topic 
for longer than they may have done of their own accord. The thoughts recorded may 
well have been a product of these requirements.  
2.4 Questions to be Addressed in this Thesis.  
If the act of soliciting risk judgements has the potential to bring into being 
judgements that would not typically occur spontaneously, then it seems important to 
learn more about spontaneous risk judgements. This is the central aim of the 
empirical studies reported in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. In these studies, a 
variety of methodologies are employed. Studies 1 and 2 involve the analysis of 
health-related content in unsolicited public internet communication. Study 3 
examines responses to positive and negatively framed versions of a health warning 
using a thought-listing methodology. Study 4 involves an experimental test of the 
hypothesis that soliciting risk judgements has ‘downstream’ effects on behavioural 
intentions. Study 5 employs a Latent True Change approach to Structural Equation 
Modeling to examine the correlations between affective responses to a health 
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warning and solicited judgements of risk. Together these studies shed light on a 
family of interrelated questions:  
 
1) Do individuals make spontaneous health-related risk judgements and, if so, 
when? If risk judgements are indeed relevant to everyday health behaviour, then 
there should be evidence that risk judgements are indeed made spontaneously. To the 
extent that such evidence can be found, HBTs become less reliant on the assumption 
that, simply because health risk is normatively relevant to decisions about health 
behaviour, judgements of health-related risk feature in spontaneous health-related 
thinking. Answering this question was a key aim of Studies 1- 3.  
 
2) What do spontaneous health risk judgements look like? If researchers can 
solicit risk judgements in such a variety of ways, as shown in Section 1.4, it seems 
plausible that spontaneous risk judgements may also take different forms. Evidence 
on the forms spontaneous judgements take provides a basis for researchers to choose 
risk judgement measures that maximise ecological validity. Studies 1- 3, in 
particular, shed light on this question.  
 
3) Is the act of soliciting risk judgements psychologically inert? To the extent 
that solicited risk judgements lack ecological validity, it is because the act of 
soliciting such judgements itself alters cognitive processes. Evidence for effects of 
solicitation helps establish when, why, and the extent to which the act of solicitation 
threatens ecological validity. Study 4 was designed specifically to test for solicitation 
effects.  
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4) How closely do spontaneous judgements correlate with solicited ones? If 
health-related risk judgements do occur spontaneously, confidence in risk judgement 
measures would be bolstered by evidence that the responses given when risk 
judgements are solicited correlate with the conclusions individuals reach 
spontaneously. Study 5 was designed to seek evidence for such correlations by using 
affective responses to a health warning as a proxy for spontaneous risk judgements.  
 
 
  
64 
 
Chapter 3 - Study 1: Health-Related Twitter Messages 
 
In Chapter 2, it was argued that there are numerous reasons to question the 
ecological validity of findings obtained through solicitation of risk judgements. It is 
of concern, then, that almost all empirical studies on health-related thinking to date 
have involved such solicitation. This chapter reports the first of two studies designed 
to provide evidence on spontaneous health-related thinking by analysing pre-existing 
written material that had arisen in a non-research context. The material chosen for 
this initial study was public communication occurring on the internet messaging 
service Twitter.com. The aim was to identify messages related to health and 
document the nature of the thinking evident in these messages. Analyses then turned 
to examining evidence specifically for spontaneous health risk judgements. 
3.1 Public Internet Communication as a Source of Data on 
Spontaneous Thinking. 
The rise of the internet in everyday life presents an especially good 
opportunity for unobtrusive research on thinking. It is estimated that there are over 
527 million users of the internet worldwide, with a majority of North Americans, 
Europeans, and Australians having internet access (ACNielsen, 2007). Although 
there are still demographic differences between those who use the internet and those 
who do not (internet users are somewhat more likely to be young, white, university-
educated, middle/upper class, and male) the gap is fast closing in regions where 
internet penetration is high (including in North America where the majority of 
internet users reside) (Chen, Boase, Wellman, 2008). Moreover, the integration of 
the internet in daily life has grown greatly, with approximately 52% of North 
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American users using the internet daily, and doing so for a broad range of purposes 
(Madden, 2003). 
In this thesis, the phrase public internet communication refers to material that 
the internet user has made available to anyone with internet access to view, without 
any need for the viewer to meet any specific criteria or seek permission. 
Communication of this kind can include conversations occurring in online chat 
rooms, online forums, material on personal webpages or online diaries (‘blogs’), or 
public communication on social networking sites (e.g., Twitter or Facebook). 
Although publicly viewable, it should be noted that such material may or may not be 
targeted at specific audiences: an individual may post material to the internet aimed 
at a specific individual or group, or with no particular audience in mind.  
A number of studies in various psychological literatures have made use of 
public internet communication as a source of data. For example, Stone and 
Pennebacker (2002) monitored and analysed chat room conversations in the hours 
and weeks following the death of Princess Diana in 1997. By analysing how chat 
room content changed over time, the study aimed to address issues about 
psychological coping mechanisms that had previously only been investigated using 
self-report measures. In the domain of health, Rhodes (2004) monitored and analysed 
online communication occurring in the context of a chat room-based HIV prevention 
intervention for men who have sex with men; the types of comments made were 
identified as a way of exploring the nature and effectiveness of the intervention.  
For the present study, the key advantages of public internet communication as 
a source of data on everyday thinking are three. First, such data can be collected 
easily and unobtrusively in large volumes. Second, because these communication 
mediums are used for many purposes, the material available varies greatly on 
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numerous dimensions, including, topic, intended audience, characteristics of the 
interlocutors, formality, and time and place the communication was posted. 
Therefore, although some topics and purposes may be overrepresented, a sufficiently 
large and broad sampling of online public communication is likely to capture a broad 
range of everyday thinking, which one might expect would sometimes include 
health-related thinking. Third, and most importantly, by using such material, it can 
be guaranteed that any trends that are evident have not come about simply due to 
researchers’ methodologies. The material cannot be contaminated by solicitation 
effects, because it is unsolicited. This creates an opportunity to investigate the 
thought processes that occur spontaneously in everyday life.  
3.2 Advantages of Twitter as a Source of Data 
Social networking sites currently represent the most common media for public 
internet communication (Pew Research, 2005). One such website is Twitter.com. 
Twitter provides a free messaging service that allows internet users to post short text 
messages (up to 140 characters long) to the internet; posts can then be viewed by the 
user’s social network, and if the user elects, by the general public. Users interact with 
the service in a variety of ways, including via the Twitter website, email, instant 
messaging services, text messages, mobile web, or using one of a number of third-
party software applications. As of April 2007 (less than a year before data were 
collected for the present study) Twitter had over 60,000 registered users and received 
approximately 1 million new posts per day (Java, Finin, Song, & Tseng, 2007). At 
that time, Twitter appeared to be used for a variety of purposes, including conversing 
with others; notifying others of one’s activities or whereabouts; sharing information; 
meeting new people; commenting on news and current events; and recording daily 
thoughts, feelings, and activities. Of those users who provide information on their 
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location, most resided in North America (56%), Europe (20%), and Asia (18%) (Java 
et al.). A useful characteristic of Twitter communication is that, because of the casual 
nature of the communication, it likely represents relatively top-of-the-head thinking. 
Furthermore, because messages can be posted from both internet-connected 
computers and mobile phones, the thinking exhibited likely occurs in a broad range 
of everyday contexts. Moreover, the short length of each message makes it relatively 
easy to code and classify. To the best of the author’s knowledge, however, the 
present study is the first to study health-related thinking using Twitter 
communication. 
3.3 Method 
A custom computer script was programmed to download the 20 most recent 
public Twitter posts from the Twitter.com server at 60 second intervals (on some 
retrieval attempts, server errors meant that fewer than 20 messages were 
downloaded). The script was run continuously over a period of 24 hours, 
commencing on January 4th, 2008 at 3:00am GMT. During this period 27,495 
messages were downloaded. Of these, 17,196 messages were written in languages 
other than English; these were removed prior to analysis. This left 10,299 messages, 
contributed by 6,906 different users. The total word count was 128,383; the mean 
number of words per message was 12.47 (SD = 7.12). Because Twitter messages are 
short in length, analysis and coding of messages was  conducted manually. 
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3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Frequency of Health-Related Messages 
The first concern was with identifying the subset of Twitter messages that 
were in any way health-related. A very broad definition of what constitutes a health-
related comment was employed. A Twitter message was deemed to be health-related 
if it made any reference to health (including positive or negative health, and physical 
or mental health). Messages were included regardless of whether they concerned 
own or others’ health; and whether they concerned past, present, future, hypothetical, 
or counter-factual health. Comments were only included if they appeared to concern 
the health of a non-fictional human; comments clearly concerning the health of pets 
or other animals were excluded, as were comments clearly concerning fictional 
characters. Messages were also excluded if they appeared to be a simple restatement 
of a news headline, or if the health reference was merely part of a turn of phrase 
(e.g., “I am sick and tired of doing house work”). 
Of the 10,299 Twitter messages examined, 267 (2.6%) were coded as being 
health-related. The great majority (84.6%) were posted using the Twitter website;  
the remainder were posted via mobile phone text messages. The full set of health-
related messages is included in Appendix A. These messages were subjected to 
further analysis, as described next.  
3.4.2  Taxonomy of Health-Related Messages 
Health-related messages having been identified, the next task was to develop 
a taxonomy for classifying them. The full set of health-related messages was read 
numerous times with the aim of inductively developing a taxonomy to capture the 
important features that were represented in them. With each pass, categories and 
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subcategories were identified and coded for, beginning with the most salient and 
broad categories, and moving to more nuanced and specific sub-categories.  
The taxonomy that emerged encompassed four major aspects of the 
messages: target (whose health was referenced), health states (whether the message 
referenced good health or bad health, and when this health state occurred), type of 
health condition (actual health problems referred to) and behaviours (behaviours 
linked to health). For each of the categories and subcategories in this taxonomy, 
classifications were confirmed by an independent rater. Inconsistencies were then 
resolved through discussion. 
 Relationships between categories were further explored through the creation 
of proportional Venn diagrams using the Venn Master software package (Müller & 
Kestler, 2012). In these diagrams, the size of each circle and the size of their 
intersections is (roughly) proportional to the number of messages with those 
characteristics. 
Health-related messages varied in whose health was being 
referred to; all the messages were therefore classified by “target”. First, messages 
were categorised in terms of whether they addressed the user’s own health or the 
health of one or more other people; messages that fitted neither of these categories 
were classified under “non-specific/unclear target”. There was agreement between 
the author and the independent second rater with regard to these categories for 263 
(98.5%) of the messages. Table 3.1 presents descriptions of these categories; and, for 
each one, an example, the number of messages included, and the percentage of 
health-related messages this represents. (Because seven messages were included in 
more than one category, the numbers of messages across categories sum to more than 
the total number of health-related messages.) It is seen that over three-quarters of 
3.4.2.1.    Target.   
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health-related messages referenced the user’s own health, and just under a quarter 
referenced others’ health; a very small number did not specify any target. 
Figure 3.1 presents a proportional Venn diagram showing the overlap of these 
categories. It is seen that only seven messages (2.6%) made reference to both own 
and others’ health. Thus, only a small minority of messages concerning own health 
(3.3%) also referred to others’ health; and only a small minority of messages 
concerning others’ health (11.5%) also referred to own health.  
Table 3.2 presents the full text of the seven messages that concerned both 
own and others’ health. It is seen that none of these messages involved a clear 
comparison of the type that might be expected on the basis of the literature on 
unrealistic optimism (see Section 1.1.5): none stated that own risk was lower than 
that of others.3 Rather, most involved users noting that others were having similar 
experiences or behaviours to themselves. (Four involved users noting that both they 
and one or more others were currently unwell, and one involved a user taking 
inspiration from others’ positive health behaviour to change their own behaviour.)   
                                                
3 In a borderline case (“Quick update: confirmed that mum has meningitis…. Now see if any of us 
caught it. Seems doubtful though”), the individual implied that their own risk was low, but that their  
mother actually currently has the illness (meningitis) with certainty. Although this may represent an 
implicit comparison of health status, it was not deemed to be a comparison of risk per se.  
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Table 3.1 
Target mentioned, number of messages per category, and percentage of health-
related messages accounted for. 
Category Number of 
messages 
% of 
health-
related 
messages 
Own health. (e.g., “Feeling vomity”) 209 78.3 
Others’ health. (e.g., “Nathan has a cold”) 61 22.8 
Non-specific / unclear target. Concerns 
neither own nor others' health specifically, or 
target is unclear. (e.g., “my top-secret migraine 
remedy: 2 extra-strength Excedrin, a can of 
Coke (not diet), and a Snickers bar, followed by 
a 30 minute nap”) 
4 1.5 
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Figure 3.1. Proportional Venn diagram depicting frequencies of messages 
referencing own health, others' health, or involving a non-specific or unclear target. 
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The 61 messages concerning others’ health were further classified based on 
the apparent relationship to the user. Six subcategories were identified. There was 
agreement between the author and the independent second rater with regard to these 
subcategories for 57 (93.4%) of the messages classified under “others’ health”. Table 
3.3 presents descriptions of these subcategories; and, for each one, an example, the 
number of messages included, and the percentage of others’ health and health-related 
messages accounted for. Although a message could be included in more than one of 
these subcategories, none in fact were, and therefore there is no overlap between 
subcategories.  
It is seen that the most common subcategories were “known others” 
(including family, friends, and colleagues) and those “known through the media” 
Table 3.2 
Messages referencing both own and others' health. 
Messages 
“A coworker has bronchitis. He said my symptoms sound like his. Do not want!” 
“Twitter poll: I have a cold and so do @kemics and @danavictoria. Anyone else 
feeling ill??” 
“Friday morning. Hobbitt has a upper respiratory infection, and I am suffering 
from a bad cold....lots of sitting at the house this weekend.” 
“At home with stinking cold and have little boy with stinking cold, if I felt better 
I'd play snap” 
“Ok did my 20 minutes about an hour and a half ago. Got it in! If @mobasoft 
can quit smoking, I can do 20 min on the treadmill daily.” 
“Is it wrong of me to want to die before my mom...I don’t think I can handle it...I 
can’t handle my dad's passing.” 
“Quick update: Confirmed that mom has meningitis, but treatment going well. 
Now to see if any of us caught it. Seems doubtful though.” 
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(e.g., celebrities or individuals featured in the news). It is of interest that, although 
health studies often ask participants to make judgements about general groups (or the 
average person from a general group;  see Section 1.4.1.2), only one message, in fact, 
referred to the health of a general group.  
 
Table 3.3 
Type of other mentioned, number of messages per category, and percentage of 
others' health and health-related messages accounted for. 
Category Number 
of 
messages 
% of 
others’ 
health 
messages 
% of 
health-
related 
messages 
Known other. Family member, friend, 
colleague, or person known by first name. 
(e.g., “One of my co-workers has 
mono...fabulous”) 
31 50.8 11.6 
Known through media. A celebrity or 
other person known only via the 
media.(e.g., “Very sad news. Learned 
Henri Chopin died last night.”) 
19 31.1 7.1 
Twitter user. Refers to another Twitter 
user. (e.g., “@amandarie is twittering to 
me that she is sick too.”) 
6 9.8 2.2 
Stranger. A person not known by name. 
(e.g., “Just pulling into NYC. Guy finally 
stopped yapping about being sick.”) 
2 3.3 0.7 
Specific person, but who is unclear. (e.g., 
“kdot is feeling a little behind, but is 
running on high. I think that she needs 
some cough medicine.”) 
2 3.3 0.7 
General group. (e.g., “if you have a heart 
condition, I'd recommend *not* driving on 
280 today.”) 
1 1.6 0.4 
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The overwhelming majority of health-related 
messages (255 or 95.5%) made reference to a health state. These references varied in 
whether the state referred to was negative (e.g., an illness or health problem, or 
symptoms thereof) or positive (e.g., the absence of an illness, feeling well, or 
improving health) and in temporality: whether the state was current, past, or 
prospective. The categories used were past ill-health, current ill-health, prospective 
ill-health, past good health, current good health, and prospective good health. There 
was independent agreement between the author and second rater with regard to these 
categories (and also which health-related messages did or did not involve health 
states) for 253 (94.7%) of the health-related messages. Table 3.4 presents 
descriptions of these categories; and, for each one, an example, the number of 
messages included in it, and the percentage of state-related and health-related 
messages accounted for. (Because 30 messages were included in more than one 
category, the numbers of messages across categories sum to more than the total 
number of messages.)  
It is seen that, overall, references to ill-health dominated over references to 
good health. Furthermore, it is seen that references to current health states dominated 
over references to past and prospective states. More specifically, references to 
current ill-health were very dominant among health-related messages: over four-
fifths of health-related messages referenced current ill-health, and only a small 
minority of messages fell in the other categories. In particular, no messages at all 
referenced past good health. 
 
3.4.2.2 Health states.  
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Table 3.4 
Types of health states mentioned, number of messages per category, and percentages 
of state- and health-related messages accounted for. 
Category Number 
of 
messages 
% of state-
related 
messages 
% of 
health-
related 
messages 
Ill-Health 251 98.4 94.0 
Current Ill-Health.  (e.g., “Head hurts... 
throat is sore... sinus pressure... sneezing 
fits... sniffles... I think I'm sick... :|”) 
216 84.7 80.9 
Past Ill-Health (e.g.,  “Off to Temple, 
since I skipped with sickness last week. 
Picking up Sheryl afterwards...need an 
adult beverage.”) 
35 13.7 13.1 
Prospective Ill-Health.  (e.g. “my 
biggest fear is getting cancer”)  
14 5.5 5.2 
Good Health 31 12.2 11.6 
Current Good Health. (e.g., “Feeling 
great after seeing my new chiropractor”) 
23 9.0 8.6 
Prospective Good Health. (e.g., “Love 
working out to Eminem. Getting healthy 
in 08.”) 
8 3.1 3.0 
Past Good Health.  0 0 0 
    
Current Health 228 89.4 85.4 
Past Health 35 13.7 13.1 
Prospective Health 22 8.6 8.2 
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Figure 3.2. Proportional Venn diagram depicting frequencies of messages 
referencing health states 
Figure 3.2 presents a proportional Venn diagram showing the overlap of 
categories. It is seen that with regard to ill-health, there was little overlap between 
references to past, current, and prospective ill-health. This is of interest, as it might 
have been expected that thoughts about current ill-health might prompt one to 
consider its future course. One might also have expected reasoning about prospective 
ill-health to be informed by memories of past ill-health. Both of these patterns were 
rare, however. References to prospective and current good health were also 
independent, with no messages included in both these categories. Yet one might have 
expected that thoughts about current good health would prompt thoughts about 
whether good health would continue into the future.  
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There was overlap, however, between references to good health and ill-
health. Almost all messages referencing prospective good health also referenced 
current ill-health. Table 3.5 presents the full text of the seven messages concerned. It 
is seen that in all cases, references to prospective good health involved alleviation or 
recovery from current ill-health; thus it seems that thoughts about prospective good 
health are prompted by current ill-health. Similarly, references to current good health 
were linked to ill-health. Over four-fifths of messages referencing current good 
health also referenced past ill-health, and just under half referenced current ill-health. 
Table 3.6 presents the full text of messages referencing current good health and 
either current or past ill-health. It is seen that all messages that also mentioned past 
or current ill-health involved noting a partial or full recovery from ill-health. Health-
related messages thus appear strongly linked to ill-health. 
Table 3.5 
Messages referencing both prospective good health and current ill-health. 
Messages 
“Going to take a nap & hope to feel better when I wake up....” 
“Sick from the weather for the first time in like three winters :( ... gonna get some 
sleep and some good meds - might feel better tonight.” 
“Looking at clip with the Britney drama. I hope she will get better and that she find 
some peace and equilibrium.” 
“Bad episode/reaction to OTC meds - can't wait to be 100% - still sick of being 
sick” 
“Get well soon Barb!” 
“My psoriasis is for some reason, really slowing down. Haven't used my 
prescriptions for days. I hope this trend keeps up.” 
“Took Coma In A Bottle (Herbal MD w/ 8 different herbal sedatives) so hopefully 
I'll be sleeping soon” 
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Table 3.6 
Messages referencing current good health and current or past ill-health. 
Messages Additional 
Categories 
“well, the stress has finally been melted away for a few 
hours at least“ 
Past Ill-Health 
“feeling great after seeing my new chiropractor” Past Ill-Health 
“My plan to `sleep thru the pain` has failed. I still have a 
headache but at least my stomach is feeling better.” 
Past Ill-Health, 
Current Ill-Health 
“Going out with Nick to get him some paints. Feeling 
better today.” 
Past Ill-Health 
“Big plans again tonight: Sleep and sleep. Getting better 
but am a long way from healthy still. “ 
Past Ill-Health, 
Current Ill-Health 
“Just woke up...feeling TONS better....doubtful I will see 
the light of day today though. Stomach doesn't hurt 
anymore though.. that’s good” 
Past Ill-Health 
“Getting better ... Work Tylenol Cold Rapid Release, 
work!” 
Past Ill-Health, 
Current Ill-Health 
“took Saab in for muffler fix (finally). Had a good talk 
with Sherri. Feeling better. :) “ 
Past Ill-Health 
“working from home all day today. Felt ill this morning; 
slightly less ill now, but shivering. Have I told you how 
much I hate winter?” 
Past Ill-Health, 
Current Ill-Health 
“his fever has come down to 102.6 now at least.” Past Ill-Health, 
Current Ill-Health 
“Cold-Eeze seems to be helping, but am still REALLY 
tired“ 
Past Ill-Health, 
Current Ill-Health 
“Working from home due to Jess' sickness. Her near 104 
fever at 4:30 AM was not a good thing. I think she's better 
now. Sleeping, at least.” 
Past Ill-Health, 
Current Ill-Health 
“Pleased to find that Cyst-hole 2: Electric Boogaloo 
stopped bleeding sometime during the night. In less gross 
news, Go Obama Go! ” 
Past Ill-Health 
“Writing email ... not feeling all depressed after quite 
awhile. WTF me?” 
Past Ill-Health 
“Feeling a bit better. Totally sucked at pool. Ah well, can't 
win every time. LOVE my new washer & dryer!!!!” 
Past Ill-Health, 
Current Ill-Health 
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Messages Additional 
Categories 
“breaking my fever” Past Ill-Health, 
Current Ill-Health 
“My psoriasis is for some reason, really slowing down. 
Haven't used my prescriptions for days. I hope this trend 
keeps up.” 
Past Ill-Health, 
Current Ill-Health 
“About to go home hope the members show went great and 
you had lots of and watcher is feeling better love u hugs 
and kisses Diamond” 
Past Ill-Health 
“Oh yeah @darkgracie I got the mean nasty sick on Xmas 
morning.... yuck, glad thats over... Are you feeling better 
now?” 
Past Ill-Health 
Finally getting over my New Year's Cold. Hurrah! Past Ill-Health, 
Current Ill-Health 
 
Given that most health-related 
messages (95.5%) referenced a health condition (involving ill-health or good health), 
the next concern was with classifying the type of condition referenced. 
Categorisations were based on how the user labelled or characterised the health 
condition, rather than with regard to objective medical diagnoses. There was 
independent agreement between the author and second rater with regard to 
categorisation of conditions for 240 (94.1%) of the messages referencing a condition. 
Table 3.7 presents descriptions of these categories; and, for each one, an 
example, the number of messages included, and the percentage of condition- and 
health-related messages accounted for. Eight messages were included in two or more 
categories because they made references relevant to both; therefore the numbers of 
messages across categories sum to more than the total number of messages. It is seen 
that the most common references were to “non-specific” illnesses involving general 
terms (e.g., “sick”, ‘ill”, “unwell”); these accounted for almost one-third of 
messages. The next most common were references to cold, flu and related symptoms.  
3.4.2.3 Type of health condition.  
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Table 3.7 
Health conditions mentioned, number of messages per category, and percentage of 
condition- and health-related messages accounted for. 
Category Number 
of 
messages 
% of 
condition-
related 
messages 
% of 
health-
related 
messages 
Non-specific illness. (e.g., “I’m so sick!”) 76 29.8 28.5 
Cold, flu, respiratory infection, fever. (e.g., 
“Warm fire, blankets, bones rerun and a 
decongestant haze.”) 
52 20.4 19.5 
Mental health/wellbeing. (e.g., “I’m feeling 
like a stress storm coming on here. I hate that. 
One thing goes bad, and its a domino effect- 
Stop it already”) 
25 9.8 9.4 
Death. (e.g., “waiting on news of my 
grandfather. he's not expected to make it 
through the night.”) 
14 5.5 5.2 
Injury. (e.g., “My sister had her nose broken 
today.”) 
12 4.7 4.5 
Headache. (e.g., “Ugh, headache. Someone 
bring me some tylenol and whiskey.”) 
12 4.7 4.5 
Gastrointestinal disorders or complaints. 
(e.g., “I think chili's tried to poison me. I've 
never had that immediate of a violent reaction 
to food before.”)  
11 4.3 4.1 
Eye and vision disorders or complaints. 
(e.g., “my eye infection makes me look like I 
got in a brawl. Viral too so it'll take a few 
weeks :/”) 
6 2.4 2.2 
Allergy. (e.g., “Found out that I am allergic to 
roses today, i feel like hell.”) 
4 1.6 1.5 
Insomnia. (e.g., “Took Coma In A Bottle 
(Herbal MD w/ 8 different herbal sedatives) so 
hopefully I'll be sleeping soon.”) 
5 2.0 1.9 
 
Cancer. (e.g., “my biggest fear is getting 
cancer”)  
2 0.8 0.7 
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Category Number 
of 
messages 
% of 
condition-
related 
messages 
% of 
health-
related 
messages 
Dizziness. (e.g., “Head is dizzy.”) 2 0.8 0.7 
Hangover. (e.g., “Still so hungover after food 
and 10 water bottles. WHY ME”) 
2 0.8 0.7 
Other (specific). Specific conditions 
mentioned in only one message. (e.g., “my 
wrist hurts. NOT a good sign 4 days before 
castoff”) 
30 11.8 11.2 
 
 
 
In 88 health-related messages (33.0%), a behaviour was 
mentioned and was characterised as being one that could influence health. These 
messages were first categorised in terms of whether the behaviour was characterised 
 
3.4.2.4 Behaviour.  
Table 3.8 
Positive and negative health-related behaviours, number of messages per category, 
and percentages of behaviour- and health-related messages accounted for. 
Category Number of 
messages 
% of 
behaviour-
related 
messages 
% of 
health-
related 
messages 
Positive Behaviour. Characterises a 
behaviour  as being good for or protective 
of health. (e.g., “Love working out to 
Eminem. Getting healthy in 08”) 
66 75.0 24.7 
Negative Behaviour. Characterises a 
behaviour as being bad or dangerous for 
health. (e.g., “I guess all that partying on 
New Years caught up with me 'cuz now I'm 
sick…”) 
33 37.5 12.4 
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as being positive or negative for health. There was independent agreement between 
the author and second rater with regard to these categories (and also which health-
related messages did or did not involve health-related behaviours) for 261 (97.8%) of 
the health-related messages. Table 3.8 presents descriptions of these categories; and, 
for each, an example, the number of messages included in it, and the percentage of 
behaviour- and health-related messages accounted for. (Eleven messages were 
included in both categories; therefore, the numbers of messages across categories 
sum to more than the total.) It seen that references to positive behaviours were twice 
as common as references to negative behaviours.  
 
Figure 3.3. Proportional Venn diagram depicting frequencies of messages 
referencing positive and negative health-related behaviours  
Figure 3.3 presents a proportional Venn diagram showing the overlap of 
categories. It is seen that one-sixth of messages referencing positive behaviours 
(16.7%) also referenced negative behaviours, and one-third of messages referencing 
negative behaviours (33.3%) also referenced positive behaviours. Table 3.9 presents 
the 11 messages referencing both. It is seen that the first eight messages involved 
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separate negative and positive behaviours. In these messages, a positive behaviour 
was characterised as being designed to address problems caused by a negative 
behaviour. The last three messages, however, involved a single behaviour that was 
intended to have positive effects, but which appeared to have negative side effects as 
well.  
Table 3.9 
Messages referencing both positive and negative behaviours. 
Messages 
“Apparently standing is more detrimental to ankle than walking is. time to brace 
the damned thing - why did I not do this before? *headslap*” 
“Headache! Suffered various degrees of 'caffeine hangover' during the holiday 
season! More water and less Pepsi for me!” 
“My healthy eating plan for 2008 is being derailed by the cookies 1-800-Flowers 
sent me for the holidays. Better distribute this weekend.” 
“Injury toll: whanged my left elbow in two places, whanged my left knee and right 
ankle, scraped my knuckles. tylenol take me away.” 
“Can't sit in front of the PC because his legs ache. They stop aching when he 
walks through the room.” 
“Damn I really need to stop staying up so late. This can't be good for me at all.” 
“Guaranteed headache recipe: 1 Iced Mocha, `Bros` on repeat for two hours. Ulgh, 
I'm lying down for a while...” 
“I think I overdid it and caught spinal bifida in class tonight. I think I might need 
to look into medical marijuana.” 
“Received my shots for the indian trip, feeling pretty nauseous at the moment.” 
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Messages 
“Gave up on venture out. Sitting here feeling vaguely naseous instead. Damn 
Healthy Choice meals.” 
“Bad episode/reaction to OTC meds - can't wait to be 100% - still sick of being 
sick.”  
 
Messages referencing positive behaviours were further classified based on 
whether the behaviour was characterised as having been performed, intended, or 
something which the user simply recommended. There was independent agreement 
between the author and second rater with regard to these subcategories for 59 
(89.4%) of the messages referencing a positive behaviour. Table 3.10 presents 
descriptions of these categories; and, for each one, an example, the number of 
messages included, and the percentage of positive behaviour- and health-related 
messages accounted for. Two messages were included in more than one category; 
therefore, the numbers of messages across categories sum to more than the total 
number of messages. It is seen that approximately half of the references to positive 
behaviours involved behaviours that had already been performed, and another third 
were behaviours that were intended. A small number of messages involved 
recommending a behaviour. 
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Table 3.10 
Classification of positive behaviours mentioned, number of messages per 
subcategory, and percentages of positive behaviours and health-related messages 
accounted for. 
Category Number of 
messages 
% of 
positive 
behaviour 
messages 
% of 
health-
related 
messages 
Positive Behaviour - Performed. 
States or implies that the behaviour 
has already been performed. (e.g., “ok 
did my 20 minutes about an hour and 
a half ago. Got it in! If @mobasoft 
can quit smoking, I can do 20 min on 
the treadmill daily.”) 
34 51.5 12.7 
Positive Behaviour - Intends. States 
or implies an intention to perform a 
positive health behaviour. (e.g., 
“going to grab something healthy to 
eat.. and lay down for 12 minutes....”) 
24 36.4 9.0 
Positive Behaviour - Recommends. 
Recommends a behaviour to others 
(e.g., “OH MY GOD cold/flu season 
is a BITCH!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Would 
GA legislation mandate that all kids 
wear latex gloves and surgical masks 
....”) 
5 7.6 1.9 
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Figure 3.4. Proportional Venn diagram depicting frequencies of messages 
referencing positive behaviours 
 
Figure 3.4 presents a proportional Venn diagram showing the overlap of these 
subcategories. It is seen that the only overlap involved two message involving both a 
performed and intended positive behaviour (“Love working out to Eminem. Getting 
healthy in 08” and “I am getting way too cranky....gotta meditate more. Let go.....”); 
in these, the behaviour was one that was ongoing, and therefore was both performed 
and intended. 
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Messages referencing negative behaviours were also further classified in 
terms of whether the behaviours were performed or intended. There was independent 
agreement between the author and second rater with regard to these subcategories for 
24 (72.7%) of the messages referencing negative behaviours. Table 3.11 presents 
descriptions of these subcategories; and for each, an example, the number of 
messages included, and the percentage of negative behaviour- and health-related 
messages accounted for. Six messages referencing negative behaviours were not 
included in either category because their nature was unclear. There were no messages 
included in both subcategories. It is seen that just over four-fifths of messages 
referencing negative behaviours concerned behaviours which had already been 
performed; in contrast, only two messages out of 33, referenced a behaviour that was 
intended. 
 
Table 3.11 
Behaviours mentioned, number of messages per category, and percentages of 
negative behaviour and health-related messages accounted for. 
 
 
Category Number 
of 
messages 
% of 
negative 
behaviour  
messages 
% of 
health-
related 
messages 
Negative Behaviour - Performed. States 
or implies that the behaviour has already  
been performed. (e.g., “Drinking way too 
much”) 
25 75.7 9.4 
Negative Behaviour - Intends. States or 
implies an intention to perform a negative 
health behaviour. (e.g., “Going to meet 
Sara and the kiddos at McDonalds for 
some unhealthy chow.”) 
2 6.1 0.7 
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Messages referencing health behaviours were further categorised with regard 
to the specific type of behaviour mentioned. There was independent agreement 
between the author and second rater with regard to these categorisations for 76 
(86.4%) of the behaviour-related messages. Table 3.12 presents descriptions, the 
number of messages included, and an example of each category. There were 14 
messages that were included in multiple categories because they mentioned more 
than one behaviour. It is seen that the most common behaviours involved 
medications, rest, and diet. 
Table 3.12 
Specific health behaviours mentioned, number of messages per category, and 
percentages of behaviour- and health-related messages accounted for. 
Category Number 
of 
messages 
% of 
behaviour-
related 
messages 
% of 
health-
related 
messages 
Medications. (e.g., “Dosing myself 
liberally with generic Nyquil. FYI, 
flying with a head cold is a special kind 
of torture.”) 
23 26.1 8.6 
Rest or restricting activity. (e.g., “Big 
plans again tonight: Sleep and sleep. 
Getting better but am a long way from 
healthy still.”) 
15 17.0 5.6 
Diet. (e.g., “My healthy eating plan for 
2008 is being derailed by the cookies 1-
800-Flowers sent me for the holidays. 
Better distribute this weekend”) 
12 13.6 4.5 
Medical procedure or consultation. 
(e.g., “Pre-operation appointment 
complete. Prepared to play with the 
frickin' lasers on Monday. Kidney 
stone, say 'allo to my little friend!”) 
10 11.4 3.7 
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Category Number 
of 
messages 
% of 
behaviour-
related 
messages 
% of 
health-
related 
messages 
Alternative treatments and home 
remedies. (e.g., “Headed to emergency 
acupuncture appointment. Coughing up 
green stuff. I have GOT to stop getting 
sick.”) 
9 10.2 3.4 
Alcohol consumption. (e.g., “The 
brain is not happy, probably because I 
drank quite a bit of Cobra beer tonight 
and I'm starting to remember it.”) 
5 5.7 1.9 
Exercise. (e.g., “Love working out to 
Eminem. Getting healthy in 08.”) 
4 4.5 1.5 
Drinking water. (e.g., “back, that was 
kinda fun, kidney kinda hurts, i'll be ok 
i just need to drink a lot of water and i 
forget to”) 
3 3.4 1.1 
Other behaviours. (e.g., “so much 
gaming. I already have a sore spot on 
my thumb! ”) 
22 25.0 8.2 
 
3.4.3 Evidence for Health-Related Risk Judgements 
So far, analyses have been inductive in nature, focusing on the most salient 
characteristics of health-related messages. This section now turns to the question of 
what evidence can be found specifically for spontaneous judgements relating to 
health risk. 
 
If it were assumed 
that spontaneous judgements of health risk take a form similar to how they are 
conceptualized in HBTs or are measured in empirical studies, then one might expect 
Twitter messages to include statements taking certain forms. Most typically, HBTs 
3.4.3.1 Messages concerning prospective ill-health.  
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and empirical studies focus on judgements about the likelihood of a prospective 
negative outcome, if a given behaviour is (or is not) performed; typically, these 
judgements concern own health.  That being the case, one might expect a 
prototypical risk judgement to be of the form, “If I perform behaviour X, there is a 
probability P that negative outcome Y will result.”  
In the taxonomy described previously, statements of this kind would be 
classified under “own health”, “prospective ill-health”, and “negative behaviour”. 
Figure 3.5 presents a proportional Venn diagram of the overlaps among these 
categories. It is seen that only one message met these criteria. This message was, 
“Headed to the airport. I've got a feeling that my ears are not going to pop on this 
trip. Pain...” The message concerns the prospective ill-health (in this case, pain) of 
the user, with a link to a behaviour (air travel). Although the user does not explicitly 
say, “If I fly”, the very linking of the behaviour and the outcome contains an implicit 
suggestion that the latter is conditional on the former. While there is no explicit 
probability estimate, a sense of probability is conveyed by the uncertainty inherent in 
the phrase, “I’ve got a feeling”.  
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Figure 3.5. Proportional Venn diagram depicting frequencies of messages 
referencing own health, prospective ill-health, and negative behaviours 
 
Is there any evidence of messages that have a similar form to that just 
discussed, but concerning, not the self, but someone else?  Such a judgement would 
be of the form, “If someone else performs behaviour X, there is a probability P that 
negative outcome Y will result.” Statements of this kind would be classified under 
“others’ health”, “prospective ill-health”, and “negative behaviour”. Figure 3.6 
presents a proportional Venn diagram of the overlaps among these categories. It is 
seen that only one message met these criteria. This message was, “My prediction: 
less than 1 year before Brittney Spears dies of an OD of something.” It is seen that 
this message concerns the prospective ill-health (death) of someone else (a celebrity) 
due to a behaviour (drug use). Once again, although the user does not explicitly say, 
“If she continues taking drugs”, conditionality is implicit in the linking of the 
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behaviour and the outcome.  A sense of probability is implicit in the use of the word 
“prediction” and the breadth of the timeframe mentioned (“less than a year”).  
 
Figure 3.6. Proportional Venn diagram depicting frequencies of messages 
referencing others' health, prospective ill-health, and negative behaviours 
 
Thus far, very few messages meet the criteria for spontaneous risk 
judgements. What happens if those criteria are broadened?  Often, measures of health 
risk judgements do not explicitly reference behaviour (see Section 1.4.1.4). A 
spontaneous risk judgement (about the self or others) might therefore be evident in 
statements that simply reference prospective ill-health. Of the messages in the data 
set, 14 – including the two already discussed – made reference to prospective ill-
health. Table 3.13 presents these 14 messages; the two already considered are 
numbered 3 and 10. 
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Table 3.13 
Messages referencing prospective ill-health. 
Message Threat to 
self 
Threat to 
other(s)  
1. “My date of death... Sunday, February 19, 2051 - 
found it at http://deathclock.com” 
Death  
2. “Feel like I am getting sick just in time for the 
weekend.  Let this work day end!!” 
Non-
specific 
 
3. “Headed to the airport. I've got a feeling that my 
ears are not going to pop on this trip.  Pain...” 
Other  
4. “thanks!  don't drown!”  Death 
5. “My biggest fear is getting cancer.”  Cancer  
6. “wondering when Britney Spears is going to die. 
She is almost getting to the point of being too nuts to 
live.” 
 Death 
7. “Marci is looking forward to the big party 
tomorrow. Hopefully the kids don't get sick!” 
 Non-
specific 
8. “This has just become heartbreaking. I remember 
feeling contempt for her as a teenager- now I fear for  
her life!!”  
 Death 
9. “Submitting to the fact that I will catch some 
percentage of my patients' colds & flus this winter, 
and there's nothing I can do about it” 
Cold, flu  
10. “My prediction: less than 1 year before Brittney 
Spears dies of an OD of something.” 
 Death 
11. “Is it wrong of me to want to die before my 
mom...I don’t think i can handle it...i cant handle my 
dad's passing.” 
Death Death 
12. “I've heard a few peeps predict her death in 08.”  Death 
13. “Quick update: Confirmed that mom has 
meningitis, but treatment going well. Now to see if 
any of us caught it. Seems doubtful though.” 
Meningitis Meningitis 
14. “Waiting on news of my grandfather.  He's not 
expected to make it through the night.” 
 Death 
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It is seen that, like the messages already considered, the others in the table do 
not include any explicit statement about probability. Nevertheless, the use of words 
or phrases such as “feel like”, “a feeling”, “wondering”, “hopefully”, “doubtful”, 
“now to see”, and “expected” give a sense of probability. Considering all 14 of the 
messages listed, several trends are evident. Seven messages referenced a threat to the 
self, while nine referenced a threat to others (with two messages involving a threat to 
both). References to others tended to involve specific individuals, typically a known 
other or a celebrity. None of the messages seem to concern either a general group of 
people, or a comparison of self and others. It is also evident that the prospective 
health threats considered are relatively serious; indeed, just over half concern death. 
This stands in contrast to the overall trend in health-related messages; as was seen in 
Section 3.4.2.3, non-specific illness and cold and flu were the most common 
outcomes referenced overall.  
Even if one seeks 
to see messages about prospective ill-health per se as reflecting judgements of health 
risk, such messages seem relatively rare. However, before concluding that risk 
judgements are scarce, perhaps one should look even further afield. For instance, 
might individuals express judgements of risk in positive terms, that is, in terms of the 
likelihood of prospective good health? A statement that good health is likely to 
continue/result due to a particular behaviour implies, tacitly at least, that prospective 
ill-health is likely if that behaviour were not carried out. Therefore, one might expect 
to find statements of the form, “If I perform behaviour X, there is a probability P that 
positive outcome Y will result”.  
In the present taxonomy, statements of this kind would be classified under 
“own health”, “prospective good health”, and “positive behaviour”. Figure 3.7 
3.4.3.2 Messages Concerning Prospective Good Health.  
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presents a proportional Venn diagram of the overlap among these categories. It is 
seen that four messages were classified this way. These messages were, “Love 
working out to Eminem. Getting healthy in 08”, “bad episode/reaction to OTC meds 
- can't wait to be 100% - still sick of being sick”, “Sick from the weather for the first 
time in like three winters :( ... gonna get some sleep and some good meds - might 
feel better tonight.”, and “Took Coma In A Bottle (Herbal MD w/ 8 different herbal 
sedatives) so hopefully I'll be sleeping soon.” Here there are no indications that the 
users were thinking about whether to engage in the behaviours – that choice had 
already been made – but there is at least a tacit assertion that in the absence of the 
behaviour ill-health might result/continue. There is no explicit quantification of 
probability; rather, a sense of probability is conveyed by the use of terms like “hope’, 
“hopefully”, and “might”. 
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Figure 3.7. Proportional Venn diagram depicting frequencies of messages 
referencing own health, prospective good health, and positive behaviours 
  
Alternatively, individuals may make statements concerning others’ 
prospective good health, that is, statements of the form, “If someone else performs 
behaviour X, there is a probability P that positive outcome Y will result.” Statements 
of this kind would be classified under “others’ health”, “prospective good health”, 
and “positive behaviour”. Figure 3.8 presents a proportional Venn diagram of the 
overlap among these categories. However, it is seen that no messages at all met these 
criteria. 
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Figure 3.8. Proportional Venn diagram depicting frequencies of messages 
referencing others' health, prospective good health, and positive behaviours 
 
What if the criteria are broadened to cover any messages referencing 
prospective good health? There were eight messages classified in this category, 
including those previously discussed. Table 3.14 presents these messages; the four  
already considered are numbered 1, 2, 7, and 8. It is seen that, again, the messages do 
not include any explicit statement about probability, but do include words or phrases 
such as “hope”, ‘hopefully”, and “might“. Considering all 8 of the messages listed, it 
is seen that six of the eight concerned the self. The two references to others tended to 
involve specific individuals. None of the messages concern either a general group of 
people or a comparison of self and others. It is also evident that the prospective good 
health states were referred to just in non-specific terms (e.g., “feeling better”).  
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Table 3.14 
Messages referencing prospective good health. 
Message Prospective 
Good Health 
for Self 
Prospective 
Good Health 
for Others 
1. “Going to take a nap & hope to feel better 
when I wake up.” 
Non-specific  
2. “Sick from the weather for the first time in 
like three winters :( ... gonna get some sleep 
and some good meds - might feel better 
tonight.” 
Non-specific  
3. “Looking at clip with the Britney drama. I 
hope she will get better and that she find 
some peace and equilibrium.” 
 Non-specific 
4. “Bad episode/reaction to OTC meds - can't 
wait to be 100% - still sick of being sick” 
Non-specific  
5. “Get well soon Barb!”  Non-specific 
6. “My psoriasis is for some reason, really 
slowing down. Haven't used my prescriptions 
for days. I hope this trend keeps up.” 
Other (reduced 
psoriasis) 
 
7. “Love working out to Eminem. Getting 
healthy in 08” 
Non-specific  
8. “Took Coma In A Bottle (Herbal MD w/ 8 
different herbal sedatives) so hopefully I'll be 
sleeping soon.” 
Recovery from 
insomnia 
 
 
It appears then, 
that whether risk judgements are looked for in statements about prospective ill-health 
or prospective good health, they appear rare among health-related messages on 
Twitter. Could one look still elsewhere? Might messages linking behaviour to past or 
current ill-health reflect thinking that, although not actually to do with risk – since 
the behaviour and its consequences have already occurred – at least lays the 
foundation for future risk judgements? This would be so in the sense that, if 
3.4.3.3 Messages concerning current or past ill-health.  
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individuals attribute past or current ill-health to a behaviour, they tacitly imply that if 
they perform that behaviour in the future, the same outcome may follow. Messages 
of this type would be of the form, “I performed behaviour X and negative outcome Y 
resulted”. Such messages would be classified under “own health”, “negative 
behaviour”, and either “past ill-health” or “current ill-health”. Figure 3.9 presents a 
proportional Venn diagram of the overlap among these categories. It is seen that 24 
messages met these criteria. Examples of these messages include, “I think chili's tried 
to poison me. I've never had that immediate of a violent reaction to food before”, “I 
guess all that partying on New Years caught up with me 'cuz now I'm sick :-(”, and 
“so much gaming. I already have a sore spot on my thumb!”).  
What of similar messages concerning others’ health, of the form, “Someone 
else performed behaviour X and negative outcome Y resulted”? Statements of this 
kind would be classified under  “others’ health”, “negative behaviour”, and either 
“current ill-health” or “past ill-health”. Figure 3.10 presents a proportional Venn 
diagram of the overlap among these categories. It is seen, however, that only two 
messages met these criteria (“uh-oh. some little girl died as a result of copying Go 
Diego Go. its all gone a bit crazy here” and “If you have a heart condition, I'd 
recommend *not* driving on 280 today. That is some scary-ass rain.”)   
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Figure 3.9. Proportional Venn diagram depicting frequencies of messages 
referencing own health, current ill-health, past ill-health, and negative behaviours 
 
Figure 3.10. Proportional Venn diagram depicting frequencies of messages 
referencing others' health, current ill-health, past ill-health, and negative behaviours 
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What of 
messages where current or past good health is attributed to a behaviour, of the form, 
“I performed behaviour X, and positive outcome Y resulted?” Statements of this kind 
would be classified under “own health”, “positive behaviour”, and either “current 
good health” or “past good health”. As noted in Section 3.4.2.2, no messages 
concerned the last of these; accordingly, Figure 3.11 presents a proportional Venn 
diagram of the overlap among the other three categories. It is seen that three 
messages met the criteria: “feeling great after seeing my new chiropractor”, “Getting 
better ... Work Tylenol Cold Rapid Release, work!”, and “Cold-Eeze seems to be 
helping, but am still REALLY tired”. In making these statements, individuals tacitly 
imply that the same behaviours may produce the same outcomes in the future.   
3.4.3.4 Messages concerning current or past good health.  
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Figure 3.11. Proportional Venn diagram depicting frequencies of messages 
referencing own health, current good health and positive behaviours 
 
Figure 3.12. Proportional Venn diagram depicting frequencies of messages 
referencing others' health, current good health and positive behaviours 
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A similar statement may concern others’ health, and would take the form, 
“Someone else performed behaviour X and positive outcome Y resulted.” Statements 
of this kind would be classified under “others’ health”, “positive behaviour”, and 
either “current good health” or “past good health”. As seen in Section 3.4.2.2, no 
messages concerned the last of these; thus, Figure 3.12 presents a proportional Venn 
diagram of the overlap among these others categories. It is seen, however, that no 
messages met these criteria. 
In summary, whereas judgements of risk might have been expected to be very clearly 
evident in spontaneous health-related thinking on Twitter, this was not the case.  Of 
the 10,299 messages sampled, and the 267 health-related messages identified, none 
involved an example of a user spontaneously articulating a risk estimate paralleling 
the type of question used to solicit risk judgements in empirical studies. Only one 
message (0.4%) linked own prospective ill-health to a behaviour, and only one linked 
others’ prospective ill-health to a behaviour. In the case of 12 additional messages, 
prospective ill-health was mentioned but not linked to a behaviour; of these, six 
concerned own prospective ill-health (2.2%), eight concerned others’ prospective ill-
health (3.0%). Even when the criteria were broadened to include messages more 
tangentially related to risk (including those concerning good health, and past and 
current health) still very few messages qualified.  
3.5 Discussion 
The present study has documented, in detail, one source of evidence on 
spontaneous health-related thinking. By randomly sampling communication already 
occurring on Twitter, this study circumvented the solicitation effects that might be 
introduced by survey, interviews, or other research methodologies. One might have 
3.4.3.5  Summary of Evidence for Health-Related Risk Judgements.  
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supposed that the study would have shown that the constructs central to HBTs (in 
particular, risk judgements) are frequently in the minds of individuals in everyday 
life, spontaneously, without being solicited by researchers’ questions. However, in 
many ways the picture that emerged is rather different. On Twitter, health-related 
comments are dominated by references to the user’s own current ill-health, typically 
non-specific illnesses or cold- and flu-related symptoms. Explicit evidence for risk 
judgements was almost entirely absent; even messages in which risk judgements 
could be argued to be implicit were not very common.  
Nevertheless, an absence of evidence for spontaneous risk judgements in 
Twitter messages may not necessarily imply an absence of risk judgements in 
everyday thinking. There are important limitations of data from Twitter which must 
be considered. Of central importance is the fact that the length of Twitter messages is 
greatly constrained. One consequence of this is that users can easily post many 
messages per day. This, in turn, makes it likely that users see Twitter primarily as a 
means of posting news updates about matters important to them. Presumably, these 
matters would have two features. First, they would stand out from what is normally 
the case. There being no need to give updates about states that are already well-
known, the messages are likely to concern exceptions to or changes from those 
states. Second (and connectedly), the matters communicated are likely to concern 
anything that is particularly salient to the user at that moment. These two 
characteristics go a long way to explain the nature of the most common messages 
found in this study. Generally, fairly good health is likely to be the norm, with ill-
health being a departure from this default state. Further, what is most salient is likely 
to concern the self, rather than others. And the symptoms that are present at the time 
of ill-health are likely to be particularly salient because they are intrusive. This may 
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explain why most health-related messages concern the user’s own current ill-health. 
It may be that thoughts about risks of future outcomes are in the minds of users, but 
are saved for other mediums (e.g., emails, in-person conversations, or personal 
diaries). 
If a focus on what is being experienced by the user at that moment is directly 
at odds with thinking about risk about future outcomes, there may also be an indirect 
effect of the same nature. Temporal Construal Theory (e.g., Liberman & Trope, 
1998; Trope & Liberman,  2003) proposes a link between the temporal distance of an 
event and the abstractness of thoughts concerning it. Specifically, it holds that 
individuals think about immediate events in more concrete terms than more distant 
events. For example, Liberman and Trope (1998) found that when asked to imagine a 
scenario (e.g., reading a book) and to describe what that would involve, participants 
were more likely to make concrete statements (e.g., “I will read by turning pages”) 
when the scenario was imagined as happening the next day, but more likely to make 
abstract statements (e.g., “I will learn by reading”) if imagining the scenario as 
occurring in a year’s time. As another example, Liberman, Sagristano, and Trope 
(2002) asked participants to imagine an event (e.g., a camping trip) occurring in the 
near or distant future and then classify a set of objects related to that event (e.g., tent 
and toothbrush) into groups. Participants were found to use more groups when the 
event was imagined as occurring in the near future, suggesting that they construed 
the objects in terms of narrower, more concrete categories. Risk is by its nature an 
abstract concept, since the notion that there is a probability of something occurring in 
the future requires representing the future as a set of possible states, only one of 
which will come to pass. If  Twitter messages tend to focus on what is experienced 
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currently, and if this promotes a more concrete mode of thinking, this may in part 
explain why thoughts about health risk are so rare. 
It also seems likely that, if Twitter messages are constrained in length, this 
would encourage users to be more economical with their words. Therefore users 
referencing states of ill-health may tend to omit details and implications which can 
be assumed.  For example,  in the case of common illnesses, users may expect that 
simply by mentioning the illness or its symptoms, any associated risks will be well 
known by their readers, so that mentioning them would be redundant. For instance, if 
a user describes having a cold or flu, the audience may be assumed to understand that 
there is some risk of a secondary chest infection developing; this risk may not 
therefore need to be explicitly mentioned. Similarly, users may not feel it is 
necessary to explicitly mention the risks associated with certain behaviours (e.g., 
smoking), if the audience can be assumed to understand the possible consequences. 
For the same reason, the probability of a common illness may not need to be 
explicitly quantified because the intended audience can be assumed to have a shared 
understanding of this.  
To examine whether the trends evident in this study are unique to health-
related communication on Twitter, it seems important to examine an alternative 
source of evidence on spontaneous health-related thinking. The next chapter, 
therefore, presents the results of a study examining the health-related thinking that is 
evident in online public diaries (blogs). Like Twitter communication, blog posts are 
publicly viewable and concern a variety of topics. Unlike Twitter, however, they are 
not constrained in length. It is conceivable, therefore that thinking about health-
related risk may be more evident in blogs. The study reported in Chapter 4 analyses 
blog entries in terms of the same characteristics as Study 1 did. 
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Chapter 4 - Study 2: Health-Related Blog Entries 
 
This chapter reports a study devised to follow up that reported in Chapter 3. 
The aim was to provide further evidence on spontaneous health-related thinking 
through the analysis of pre-existing public internet communication. The data were 
entries in online personal diaries (“blogs”). This chapter documents the nature of the 
health-related thinking evident in these entries, and compares this with the results of 
Study 1. First, analyses focus on the general trends evident in the data; second, 
evidence specifically for spontaneous judgements of health risk is examined. The 
similarities and differences between health-related comments in blog entries and 
Twitter messages, and their implications, are then discussed. 
4.1 Advantages of Blogs as a Source of Data 
“Blogs” (an abbreviation of “weblog”) are a popular medium by which 
internet users publish written material on the internet. The availability of websites 
offering free bloging services has seen a large number of individuals use blogs as a 
way of keeping a public online diary for recording daily thoughts, feelings and 
activities. As of 2004, it was estimated that over 7% of U. S. adults had created a 
blog (Pew Research, 2005). Like Twitter messages, individuals use blogs to write 
about a broad range of topics; one would expect that this would sometimes include 
health-related concerns. Importantly, like Twitter messages, blog entries can be 
collected unobtrusively because they are typically publicly available. Unlike Twitter 
messages, however, blog entries are not constrained in length. Therefore, blog entries 
may be more likely to go beyond simply conveying the most salient and immediate 
experience; they may also involve abstract thinking, and greater elaboration of 
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details and implications of the matters discussed. For these reasons, the present study 
of spontaneous health-related thinking evident in blogs complements the study of 
Twitter messages reported in Chapter 3. 
In the psychological literature, blogs have been used as a source of data in 
several studies. Gill, Nowson, and Oberlander (2009) examined blog entries and 
sought to identify links between bloggers’ scores on the personality dimensions of 
the five factor model (Costa & McCrae, 1992) and the content and style of their 
writing.  Within the health and medical literature, Lagu, Kaufman, Asch, and 
Armstrog (2008) analysed blog entries written by physicians and nurses. That study 
sought to document revelations of own or patients’ identities, descriptions of 
interactions with patients, or product promotion. To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, however, no study has yet analysed blog entries in relation to 
spontaneous health-related thinking. 
4.2 Method 
The blog entries collected for this study were those posted on Vox.com 
during a 24-hour period in September 2008. From 2006 to 2010, Vox.com provided a 
free blogging service to internet users, one that claimed to be easy to use for the 
average user. Although the service is no longer available, at the time of the study 
Vox.com saw thousands of public entries posted each day, all of which were 
available for automated download via an RSS feed. 
Using an automated computer script, all English-language public entries 
posted on Vox.com in the 24-hour period commencing 4:50am GMT on September 
1st, 2008 were downloaded via the Vox.com RSS feed. In this period, 38,446 blog 
entries were downloaded. To reduce the dataset to a manageable size, 10,000 of these 
were randomly selected. The total word count for these entries was 1,993,866; the 
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mean number of words per entry was 213.18 (Median = 76, SD = 450.02). The 
number of users contributing to these entries was not able to be determined. 
However, it seems reasonable to assume that most individuals would post only one 
entry in a given 24-hour period. Except where noted, analysis and coding of entries 
was conducted manually. 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Frequency of Health-Related Entries  
The first concern was with identifying entries that could be considered in any 
way health-related. Because the data set was so large, it was necessary to employ an 
automated process to reduce the number of entries to be examined manually. The 
textual analysis software, Lingustic Analysis and Word Count (LIWC), was used for 
this purpose. LIWC automatically analyses samples of text and provides the 
frequencies of words that fall into predefined categories (Pennebaker & Francis, 
1999).  The LIWC dictionary categories were formulated to be predictive of manual 
ratings of the same content. Among the broad categories defined in the standard 
LIWC dictionary are “health” and “death”; the category “health” comprises 236 
words (e.g., “clinic”, “flu”, “pill”), and the category “death” comprises 62 words 
(e.g., “bury”, “coffin”, “kill”). LIWC word frequencies for these categories were 
used to identify those blog entries most likely to concern health and therefore to be 
worth coding by hand: entries were excluded if they did not include any of the words 
in these two categories. This reduced the data set from 10,000 to 3,533 entries. These 
entries were then randomly sampled from and read by the author until 120 health-
related entries were identified with the same broad definition of “health-related” as 
had been used for Twitter messages (see Section 3.4.1). This was achieved after 
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1,189 blog entries were examined. Therefore, 10.1% of the LIWC-identified entries 
were deemed health-related, and 35.3% of blog entries were identified by LIWC. 
Thus, health-related entries accounted for approximately 3.6% of all English-
language blog entries posted in the sampling period. This is very slightly more than 
the 2.6% of Twitter messages that were found to be health-related, in Study 1. 
The health-related content of these 120 entries was then identified and 
“unitised”. A “unit” of health-related content was defined as any contiguous series of 
health-related comments concerning either the same health issue, individual, or time 
period; or a series of health-related comments about different issues, individuals, or 
times, but linked by drawing of comparisons, similarities, or causal relationships. 
Therefore, if health-related comments were separated by discussion of other topics, 
or there was no clear link between them, they were deemed to be separate units. In 
total, 143 units were identified. There was one entry with three units, and twenty 
entries with two units; the remaining entries comprised only a single unit. The full 
set of health-related entries is included in Appendix A. These were subjected to 
further analysis, as described next.  
4.3.2 Taxonomy of Health-Related Blog Entries 
Each health-related entry was coded first in terms of the taxonomy developed 
for Twitter messages in Study 1 (see Section 3.4.2).  Thus, four major aspects were 
coded: target (whose health was referenced), health states (whether the message 
referenced good health or bad health, and when this health state occurred), type of 
health condition (actual health problems referred to), and behaviours (behaviours 
linked to health). Categories and subcategories were added or removed in some cases 
to better suit the nature of the blog content. Classifications were confirmed by an 
independent rater and inconsistencies were resolved through discussion. As for Study 
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1, relationships between categories were further explored through the creation of 
proportional Venn diagrams using the Venn Master software package (Müller & 
Kestler, 2012).   
Health-related entries were first classified according to 
whether they concerned own or others’ health; entries that fitted neither category 
were classified as “non-specific/unclear target”. There was agreement between the 
author and the independent second rater with regard to these categories for all 120 
entries. Table 4.1 presents descriptions of these categories; and, for each one, a short 
example extract, the number of entries included, and the percentage of health-related 
entries this represents. (Sixteen entries were included in more than one category; 
therefore the numbers of entries across categories sum to more than the total number 
of health-related entries.)  
Broadly, the pattern that emerged was similar to that seen in Study 1 (see 
Section 3.4.2.1). Three-quarters of health-related entries referenced the user’s own 
health; this is similar to the proportion of Twitter messages referencing own health. 
A rather larger proportion of blog entries referenced others’ health than did Twitter 
messages (36.7% versus 22.8%), but as with Twitter messages, references to others’ 
health were appreciably less common than references to own health. Moreover, as in 
Study 1, a very small number of entries did not specify any target.  
Figure 4.1 shows the overlap of the three categories. It is seen that 16 entries 
(13.3%) made reference to both own and others’ health. This is greater than the 
corresponding proportion (2.6%) found in Study 1. Less than one-fifth of entries 
concerning own health (17.8%; 3.3% in Study 1) also referred to others’ health; and 
approximately one third of entries concerning others’ health (36.4%; 11.5% in Study 
1) also referred to own health.  
4.3.2.1 Target.  
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Closer examination of the 16 entries concerning both own and others’ health 
revealed that none involved a clear statement that own risk was lower than that of 
others. In the case of two entries, however, there were comparisons of own and 
others’ health: one commented on, and appeared to take comfort from, the fact that 
others also experience depression (“It's strange, but other's people misery can help 
lift you out of depression.”); another noted that someone else with the same illness 
had more severe symptoms (“I've only ever actually met one other person with it and 
she was more severe than I am.  Mine only flares up if I do too much!”).  
 
Table 4.1 
Target mentioned, number of entries per category, and percentage of health-related 
entries accounted for. 
Category Number of 
entries 
% of 
health-
related 
entries 
Own health. (e.g., "I have a cold…") 90 75.0 
Others’ health. (e.g., "One of my childhood friends 
died in a car wreck…") 
44 36.7 
Non-specific / unclear target. Concerns neither 
own nor others' health specifically, or target is 
unclear.  
3 2.5 
 
 
  
114 
 
Figure 4.1. Proportional Venn diagram depicting frequencies of entries referencing 
own health, others' health, or involving a non-specific or unclear target 
 
The 44 entries concerning others’ health were classified into subcategories. 
There was agreement between the author and the independent second rater with 
regard to these subcategories for all these entries. Table 4.2 presents descriptions of 
these subcategories; and, for each one, a brief example extract, the number of entries 
included, and the percentage of others’ health and health-related entries accounted 
for. (Because five entries were included in more than one category, the numbers of 
entries across categories sum to more than the total.)  
As with Twitter messages, the most common subcategory was “known other” 
(see Section 3.4.2.1) . However, compared with Twitter messages, references to a 
general group accounted for a greater proportion of entries referencing others’ health 
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(22.7% versus 1.6%). However, “known through media” accounted for 31.1% of 
other-related Twitter messages, but only 11.7% of other-related blog entries.  
 
Table 4.2 
Type of other mentioned, number of entries per category, and percentage of others' 
health and health-related entries accounted for. 
Category Number 
of 
entries 
% of 
others' 
health 
entries 
% of 
health-
related 
entries 
Known other. Family member, friend, 
colleague, or person known by first name. 
(e.g., “Kevin is so out of it-- he's just 
laying on the couch. He got 4 stitches in 
his arm today from the doctor removing a 
mole.”) 
26 59.1 21.7 
General group. (e.g., "… officially, 
there's no swimming allowed.  But every 
hot day brings scads of folks to the falls, 
jumping from cliffs, swimming, wading.  
Many are teens and college kids who have 
that high teflon-invincibility quotient.")  
10 22.7 8.3 
Known through media. (e.g.,   “Amy 
Winehouse was singing for Nelson 
Mandela's birthday party... Her addiction 
(to things much much worse than pot) has 
crested…”)  
5 11.7 4.2 
Specific person, but who is unclear. 
(e.g., "I've only ever actually met one 
other person with it and she was more 
severe than I am.  Mine only flares up if I 
do too much!") 
5 11.7 4.2 
Stranger. A person not known by name. 
(e.g., “Couldn't even see any people once 
I'd got past the group of teens holding 
their friend's hair as she vomited over the 
wall into someone's garden.")  
2 4.5 1.7 
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Almost all health-related entries (117 or 97.5%) 
referenced a health state. As with Twitter messages, these references varied in 
whether the state referred to was negative (e.g., an illness or health problem, or 
symptoms thereof) or positive (e.g., the absence of an illness, or feeling well), and in 
temporality. The categories used were the same as in Study 1. There was independent 
agreement between the author and second rater with regard to these categories (and 
also which health-related entries did or did not involve health states) for 112 (93.3%) 
of the health-related entries. Table 4.3 presents descriptions of these categories; and, 
for each one, an abbreviated example, the number of entries included, and the 
percentage of health state-related and health-related entries accounted for. (Fifty 
entries were included in more than one category; therefore, the numbers across 
categories sum to more than the total.)  
 
Table 4.3 
Types of health states mentioned, number of entries per category, and percentages of 
state- and health-related entries accounted for. 
Category Number 
of entries 
% of 
health 
state 
entries 
% of 
health-
related 
entries 
Ill-Health  115  98.3 95.8 
Current Ill-Health. (e.g., “My stomach is 
killing me.  It's been sore all day.”) 
84 71.8 70.0 
Past Ill-Health. (e.g., “Thursday I had 
food poisoning”) 
48 41.0 40.0 
4.3.2.2 Health states.  
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Category Number 
of entries 
% of 
health 
state 
entries 
% of 
health-
related 
entries 
Prospective Ill-Health.  (e.g., “fine, I said, 
but if your leg turns black and falls of, or 
you think that water is acid, you're dead in 
the water hun.”) 
31 26.5 25.8 
Good Health 23 19.7 19.2 
Current Good Health. (e.g., “Not only did 
I live to type this post, but I managed not to 
fall or injure myself in any way.”) 
17 14.5 14.2 
Prospective Good Health. (e.g., “Maybe 
I'll feel better tomorrow.”) 
9 7.8 7.5 
Past Good Health. (e.g., “Yesterday it 
wasn't too bad but today it's practically 
unbearable.”) 
3 2.6 2.5 
    
Current Health 89 76.1 74.2 
Past Health 49 41.9 40.8 
Prospective Health 37 31.6 30.8 
 
As with Twitter messages (see Section 3.4.2.2), references to ill-health 
dominated over references to good health, and references to current health states 
dominated over references to past and prospective states. References to current ill-
health were the most common, with over two-thirds of all entries included in this 
category, although they accounted for rather fewer state-related blog entries (71.8%) 
than Twitter messages (84.7%). However, references to past and prospective ill-
health were more common among blog entries (41.0% and 26.5%, respectively) than 
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Twitter messages (13.7% and 5.5%). References to past and prospective good health 
were also somewhat more common among blog entries (7.8% and 2.6%) than 
Twitter messages (3.1% and 0%). 
 
Figure 4.2. Proportional Venn diagram depicting frequencies of entries referencing 
ill-health states 
Figure 4.2 presents a proportional Venn diagram showing the overlap of 
categories concerning current, prospective, and past ill-health. Compared with 
Twitter messages (see Section 3.4.2.2), there was more overlap between these three 
categories. Approximately three-quarters of entries referencing prospective ill-health 
also mentioned current ill-health, compared with less than one-fifth for Twitter 
messages. Just under half the entries referencing past ill-health also mentioned 
current ill-health, compared with less than one-third for Twitter messages.  
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Figure 4.3 presents a proportional Venn diagram showing the overlap of 
categories concerning good health and current ill-health. Similar to Twitter messages 
(see Section 3.4.2.2), almost two-thirds of entries referencing current good health 
also referenced current ill-health. Examination of the 11 entries concerned revealed 
that around half involved an individual having recovered partially from ill-health, 
such that they were experiencing current good health relative to past ill-health, but 
nevertheless remained ill to some extent. Two of the eleven entries involved 
individuals comparing their own good health to others’ ill-health. The remaining four 
entries concerned: a medication which had both benefits and side effects; the good 
health of one side of the body compared to the other; an observation that a current 
illness could be worse; and the description of one person’s recovery and another’s 
illness (but with no explicit comparison being made). 
Whereas almost all Twitter messages referencing prospective good health 
also referenced current ill-health, all blog entries referencing prospective good health 
did so. In seven of the nine entries concerned, the link involved the author 
anticipating recovery from current ill-health. Of the remaining two, one referenced 
the small likelihood of the author being cured of a speech impairment, and the other 
involved the unrelated current illness of the author and the prospective recovery of a 
colleague (without any link being made without the two).  
There were two entries referencing past good health and current ill-health. 
This entry referred to another’s past good health and own current ill-health, but 
without any comparison being made. No Twitter messages in fact referenced past 
good health. 
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Figure 4.3. Proportional Venn diagram depicting frequencies of entries referencing 
good health states and current ill-health 
Next, entries were classified by the type 
of health condition referenced. The taxonomy was based on that used in Study 1, 
with modifications made where necessary. There was independent agreement 
between the author and second rater with regard to categorisation of conditions for 
116 (99.1%) of the 117 entries referencing a health condition. Table 4.4 presents 
descriptions of the categories used; and, for each one, an abbreviated example, the 
number of entries included, and the percentage of condition- and health-related 
entries accounted for. There were 39 entries included in two or more categories, 
therefore, the numbers across categories sum to more than the total. As in Study 1, 
non-specific illnesses were the most common type of health condition referred to 
(see Section 3.4.2.1). However, references to several conditions were more common 
4.3.2.3 Type of health condition.  
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in blog entries than Twitter messages (death: 18.8% vs 5.5%; insomnia: 9.4% vs 
2.0%; cancer: 5.1% vs 0.8%; gastrointestinal disorders or complaints 12.8% vs 
4.3%); while references to cold, flu, respiratory infection, and fever, were somewhat 
less common in blog entries (7.7% vs 20.4%).  
Table 4.4 
Health conditions mentioned, number of entries per category, and percentage of 
condition- and health-related entries accounted for. 
Category Number 
of 
entries 
% of 
condition-
related 
entries 
% of 
health-
related 
entries 
Non-specific illness. (e.g., “I was so sick the 
whole last week.”) 
25 21.4 20.8 
Death. (e.g., “One of my childhood friends died 
in a car wreck.”) 
22 18.8 18.3 
Mental health and well-being.  (e.g., “I think 
I'm developing some major social anxiety") 
17 14.5 14.2 
Gastrointestinal disorders or complaints. (e.g., 
“My stomach is killing me.  It's been sore all 
day.”)  
15 12.8 12.5 
Injury. (e.g., “And I don't know what I did to my 
neck/right shoulder... but I am in some serious 
pain..”) 
13 11.1 10.8 
Insomnia. (e.g., “Had early morning insomnia.”) 11 9.4 9.2 
Cold, flu, respiratory infection, fever. (e.g., “I 
have a cold.”) 
9 7.7 7.5 
Headache (e.g., “I could cope with hangovers if 
they just gave me groggy headaches, but they 
make me really sick.”) 
7 6.0 5.8 
Cancer. (e.g., “Sadly, Mike Turner lost his 5 
year battle with cancer on Friday night. ”)  
6 5.1 5 
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Category Number 
of 
entries 
% of 
condition-
related 
entries 
% of 
health-
related 
entries 
Eye and vision disorders or complaints. (e.g., 
“...sensitive eyes...”) 
5 4.3 4.2 
Addiction (e.g., “It's not fun to be addicted to 
nicotine") 
2 1.7 1.7 
Allergy. (e.g., “Afterwords some of us got itchy 
tho. our faces/eyes were itchy. mustve been the 
pollen or something.”) 
1 0.8 0.8 
Dizziness. (e.g., “he's been dizzy and nauseous”) 1 0.8 0.8 
Hangover. (e.g., “It's Tuesday morning, I feel 
like shit, perfect sign of a good time.”) 
1 0.8 0.8 
Other (specific). Specific conditions mentioned 
in only one message. (e.g., “...as of yesterday I'm 
officially not anemic”) 
34 29.1 28.3 
 
A greater proportion of blog entries than twitter 
messages  referenced a behaviour and characterised it as able to influence health: 
62.5% of health-related entries (75 entries) met these criteria compared with 30.0% 
of Twitter messages. These entries were categorised in terms of whether the 
behaviour was characterised as being positive or negative for health. There was 
independent agreement between the author and second rater with regard to these 
categories (and also which health-related entries did or did not involve health-related 
behaviours) for 115 (95.8%) of the health-related entries. Table 4.5 presents 
descriptions of these categories; and, for each, an abbreviated example, the number 
of entries included, and the percentage of behaviour- and health-related entries 
accounted for. (Because 22 entries were included in both categories, the numbers 
across categories sum to more than the total.) Whereas in Study 1, references to 
4.3.2.4 Behaviour.  
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positive behaviours were almost twice as common as references to negative 
behaviours (75.0% and 37.5% of behaviour-related messages, respectively), it is seen 
that for blog entries, positive and negative behaviours were referenced equally often.  
Figure 4.4 presents a proportional Venn diagram showing the overlap of 
categories. It is seen that 22 entries (29.3%) made reference to both positive and 
negative health behaviours. This degree of overlap is larger than that observed in 
Study 1, in which the corresponding proportion was 4.1%. Over two-fifths of entries 
concerning positive behaviours also referred to negative behaviours; and almost half 
the entries concerning negative behaviours also referred to positive behaviours. 
Examination of the entries showing showing overlaps revealed that 12 of the 22 
involved references to separate positive and negative behaviours; a further nine 
contained references to a single behaviour with both positive and negative 
consequences (e.g., a medication with benefits but also side effects); the remaining 
entry characterised the giving up of a negative behaviour as a positive one. 
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Table 4.5 
Health behaviours mentioned, number of entries per category, and percentage of 
behaviour- and health-related messages accounted for. 
Category Number 
of entries 
% of 
health 
behaviour 
entries 
% of 
health-
related 
entries 
Positive Behaviour. Characterises a 
behaviour  as being good for or protective 
of health. (e.g., “… Thankfully lots of 
painkillers, a hot bath and an average 
nights sleep seems to have made it a bit 
better...") 
50 66.7 41.7 
Negative Behaviour. Characterises a 
behaviour as being bad or dangerous for 
health. (e.g., “I smoked so much, and made 
myself sick from it, literally”) 
47 62.7 39.2 
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Figure 4.4. Proportional Venn diagram depicting frequencies of entries referencing 
positive and negative health-related behaviours 
 
Entries referencing positive behaviours were also classified as having been 
performed, intended, or something simply recommended. There was independent 
agreement between the author and second rater with regard to these subcategories for 
48 (96%) of the entries referencing a positive behaviour. Table 4.6 presents 
descriptions of these categories; and, for each one, an abbreviated example, the 
number of entries included, and the percentage of positive behaviour- and health-
related entries accounted for. Ten entries were included in more than one category; 
therefore, the numbers across categories sum to more than the total. It is seen that 
nearly two-thirds of the references to positive behaviours involved behaviours that 
had already been performed, and approximately two-fifths were behaviours that were 
intended. A small number of entries involved recommending a behaviour. A similar 
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breakdown of positive behaviour-related Twitter messages was observed in Study 1 
(see Section 3.4.2.4). 
 
Table 4.6 
Positive health behaviours mentioned. number of entries per category, and 
percentage of behaviour- and health-related messages accounted for. 
Category 
Number 
of entries 
% of 
positive 
behaviour 
entries 
% of 
health-
related 
entries 
Positive Behaviour - Performed. States or 
implies that the behaviour has already been 
performed. (e.g., “Thankfully lots of 
painkillers, a hot bath and an average nights 
sleep seems to have made it a bit better”) 
32 64.0 26.7 
Positive Behaviour - Intends. States or 
implies an intention to perform a positive 
health behaviour. (e.g., “So I get to call the 
clinic here at 9 am to see if they can do it.  I 
don't know if they're even capable of checking 
the levels here and we may have to take a trip 
to the hospital.”) 
21 42.0 17.5 
Positive Behaviour - Recommends. (e.g., “I 
then told her that she could get a number of 
infections from a dog bite, and that she 
needed to go to the hospital to have it checked 
out.”) 
4 8.0 3.3 
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Figure 4.5. Proportional Venn diagram depicting frequencies of entries referencing 
positive behaviours 
 
Figure 4.5 presents a proportional Venn diagram showing the overlap of these 
subcategories. It is seen that the only overlap involved ten entries involving both a 
performed and intended positive behaviour. Thus, just under half of the entries 
referencing an intended behaviour also referenced a performed one, and just under a 
third of entries referencing a performed behaviour also referenced an intended one. 
This is in contrast to Study 1, where there was almost no overlap between these 
categories (see Section 3.4.2.4) . Examination of the ten entries concerned revealed 
that half involved separate performed and intended positive behaviours, and the other 
half involved a behaviour that had been performed but was intended to be repeated in 
the future.  
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References to negative behaviours were further classified in terms of whether 
the behaviours were performed or intended. There was independent agreement 
between the author and second rater with regard to these subcategories for 43 
(91.5%) of the entries referencing negative behaviours. Table 4.7 presents 
descriptions of these subcategories; and for each, an abbreviated example, the 
number of entries included, and the percentage of negative behaviour- and health-
related entries accounted for. Three entries were included in more than one category; 
therefore, the numbers across categories sum to more than the total. It is seen that 
almost all entries referencing negative behaviours concerned at least one behaviour 
which had already been performed; in contrast, very few entries referenced a 
negative behaviour that was intended. Compared with Study 1, references to 
performed behaviours accounted for a larger proportion of entries referencing 
negative behaviours (95.7% vs 75.7%); references to intended behaviour accounted 
for a similar proportion of negative behaviour-related blog entries than Twitter 
messages (6.4% vs 6.1%). 
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Table 4.7 
Negative health behaviours mentioned, number of entries per category, and 
percentage of behaviour- and health-related messages accounted for. 
Category Number of 
entries 
% of 
negative 
behaviour  
entries 
% of 
health-
related 
entries 
Negative Behaviour - Performed. States 
or implies that the behaviour has already  
been performed. (e.g., " I have sore wrists 
from weights, pushups, and bike riding, my 
ass and legs are killing me, Im tired, my 
stomach hurts (the hernia is straining).") 
45 95.7 37.5 
Negative Behaviour - Intends. States or 
implies an intention to perform a negative 
health behaviour. (e.g., "I'm trying not to 
think about how much a home birth 
actually scares me. I know nothing can go 
wrong and she's not supposed to be sick, 
but still.")  
3 6.4 6.4 
 
 
Entries were next categorised with regard to the specific type of behaviour 
mentioned. There was independent agreement between the author and second rater 
with regard to these categorisations for 70 (93.3%) of the behaviour-related entries. 
Table 4.8 presents descriptions, the number of entries included, and an abbreviated 
example of each category. There were 22 entries included in multiple categories 
because they mentioned more than one behaviour. It is seen that the most common 
behaviours involved medical procedures or consultations, diet, medications, and rest 
or restricting activity. In contrast, the most common specific behaviours in Study 1 
were medications (26.1%) and rest or restricting activity (17.0%). It is seen that in 
this study, the latter categories accounted for somewhat smaller proportions of 
behaviour-related entries. 
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Table 4.8  
Specific health behaviours mentioned, number of messages per category, and 
percentages of behaviour- and health-related entries accounted for. 
Category Number of 
entries 
% of health 
behaviour 
entries 
% of 
health-
related 
entries 
Medical procedure or consultation. (e.g., 
“Went to the East Shore Hospital to do X-
Ray then they bandage my ankle there.”) 
15 20.0 12.5 
Diet. (e.g., “Stumble upon tells me 33 
health benefits of drinking tea.  In other 
words; tea is MAGICAL.”) 
13 17.3 10.8 
Medications. (e.g., “In other news, I am 
now 6 days since my last decongestant and 
2 and a half days since my last anti-
histamine.”) 
12 16.0 10.0 
Rest or restricting activity. (e.g., “got out 
of work, due to my deathly illness, went 
back to sleep.”) 
9 12.0 7.5 
Exercise. (e.g., “Dad suggested I start 
doing some light cardio to help strengthen 
my heart and for overall endurance.”)  
5 6.7 4.2 
Alcohol consumption. (e.g., “M is a 
generous bartender, and I was an idiot and 
mixed beer, martinis and smoked for the 
first time in ages.  End result? Puking in 
the chip bowl later that night.”) 
4 5.3 3.3 
Sun exposure. (e.g., “hmm now my upper 
arms are a bit tanned, and burnt too.”)  
4 5.3 3.3 
Smoking. (e.g., “It's not fun to be addicted 
to nicotine and so broke that all the old 
tobacco at the bottom of your purse has 
already been smoked.")  
4 5.3 3.3 
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Category Number of 
entries 
% of health 
behaviour 
entries 
% of 
health-
related 
entries 
Drinking water. (e.g., “You can even get 
sick off of water, this is an odd fact but it is 
true.”) 
3 4.0 2.5 
Alternative treatments and home 
remedies. (e.g., “I was almost going to go 
to the chiropractor by accident this 
morning.”) 
1 1.3 0.8 
Other behaviours. (e.g., “Recently, a 
college student died here, pulled under by 
the current.  This has happened many times 
and controversy rages -- officially, there's 
no swimming allowed.”) 
34 45.3 28.3 
 
It is seen that there were several 
differences between health-related Twitter messages and health-related blog entries. 
Noteably, a greater proportion of blog entries than Twitter messages referenced 
“others’ health”; within this category, a smaller proportion referenced others “known 
through the media” and more referenced a “general group”. With regard to health 
states, there were fewer blog entries than Twitter messages referencing “current ill-
health”, but more referencing “past ill-health” and “prospective ill-health”. With 
regard to health behaviours, negative behaviours (in particular, negative performed 
behaviours) accounted for a greater proportion of blog entries than Twitter messages.  
These differences are consistent with the suggestion that blog entries are less 
likely than Twitter messages to focus only on describing the immediate salient 
experience of own current ill-health. Although references to own current ill-health 
remained very common among blog entries, blog entries tended to be much more 
elaborative; therefore, a number of other categories were more prominent in Study 2 
than Study 1. 
4.3.2.5 Comparison with Study 1.  
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As a consequence of blog entries being included in a greater number of 
categories, there was also a tendency for greater overlaps between categories than in 
Study 1. There were greater overlaps between the categories “own health” and 
“others’ health”; “current”, ”past”, and “prospective ill-health”; “positive 
behaviours” and “negative behaviours”; and “positive intended” and “positive 
performed behaviours”.  
Overall, however, the main impression one gets is of a great deal of similarity 
between the two data sets. In particular, it is seen that those categories which 
dominated Twitter messages (i.e., own health and current ill-health) were also 
dominant in blog entries.  Further, within each of the dimensions examined, the order 
of categories from most to least frequent was similar. 
In summary, then, the key difference appears to be less centration on own 
current ill-health in blog entries than Twitter messages: these categories are very 
common in both datasets, but blog entries appear more likely to make a range of 
health-related comments in categories beyond these. This also explains why there 
were greater overlaps among categories in Study 2. This is consistent with the 
expectation that blog entries would capture more elaborative and reflective thinking, 
going beyond one’s own current, salient experience.  
4.3.3 Evidence for Health-Related Risk Judgements 
The salient characteristics of health-related content in blogs having been 
documented, this section now turns to examine evidence specifically for spontaneous 
judgements of health risk. As was done in Study 1, co-occurrences of certain features 
are examined to identify comments which might reflect various formulations of risk 
judgements. 
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In Study 1, Twitter 
messages were examined for risk judgements expressed in the form, “If I perform 
behaviour X, there is a probability P that negative outcome Y will result.” These risk 
judgements were sought in messages classified under “own health”, ”prospective ill-
health” and “negative behaviour”. Only one such message (0.4% of health-related 
messages) was identified (see Section 3.4.3.1). To what extent are judgements of this 
form similarly scarce among blog entries? Figure 4.6 presents a proportional Venn 
diagram of the overlaps among these categories. Only entries where the overlap 
occurred within the same unit are identified in the intersections. 
 
Figure 4.6. Proportional Venn diagram depicting frequencies of entries referencing 
own health prospective ill-health and negative behaviours 
It is seen that 13 entries (10.8%) met these criteria. However, examination of 
these revealed that only in eight (6.7%) was there an implicit suggestion that, if a 
certain behaviour were performed, there would be some probability of a negative 
4.3.3.1 Entries Concerning Prospective Ill-Health.  
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health outcome for the self in the future. For example, one user wrote about her fears 
about complications associated with a prospective home birth; another commented 
that their life span might be shortened if their diet continued to be poor. In the 
remaining five, the negative behaviour had already been performed, but the feared 
consequences had yet to eventuate (e.g., one user had swallowed a pill which stuck in 
the throat and was worrying about choking). As with Twitter messages, although 
there were no explicit quantifications of likelihood, a sense of probability was 
conveyed by the uncertainty inherent in the language used (e.g., “I think”, “it sounds 
like”, “I’m nervous that”). Compared with Twitter messages, it is seen that risk 
judgements of this kind were relatively more common among blog entries. 
Nevertheless they occurred in only a small minority of health-related blog entries. 
Is there any evidence of comments that have a similar form to that just 
discussed, but concerning, not the self, but someone else?  Such a judgement would 
be of the form, “If someone else performs behaviour X, there is a probability P that 
negative outcome Y will result.” Statements of this kind would be classified under 
“others’ health”, “prospective ill-health”, and “negative behaviour”. Only one 
Twitter message (0.4% of health-related messages, see Section 3.4.3.1) met these 
criteria. Figure 4.7 presents a proportional Venn diagram of the overlaps among 
these categories for blogs. Only entries where the overlap occurred within the same 
unit are indicated in the intersections. It is seen that eight entries met the criteria. 
However, examination of these entries revealed that only four (3.3%) involved the 
suggestion that if a negative behaviour were performed, ill-health could result. In the 
remainder, the negative behaviour had already been performed, or did not relate to 
the prospective ill-health mentioned. Aggregating these comments with those 
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concerning the self, 11 participants (8.3%) causally linked behaviour to prospective 
ill-health. 
 
Figure 4.7. Proportional Venn diagram depicting frequencies of entries referencing 
others' health, prospective ill-health, and negative behaviours 
What if the criteria for identifying spontaneous risk judgements are 
broadened to include statements that simply reference prospective ill-health? 
Including those entries already discussed, there were 31 entries (25.8%) that made 
reference to prospective ill-health, compared with 5.2% of messages in Study 1. 
Examination of these revealed that none included an explicit estimate of probability. 
Rather, a sense of probability was conveyed by words or phrases such as “I’m 
nervous that”, “I’m scared that”, “could”, “should”, “I think”, “at stake”. Examining 
these 31 entries, 19 (15.8%) involved prospective ill-health as a threat to the self, 
while 14 (11.7%) involved prospective ill-health as a threat to others (with two 
involving both). Threats to others tended to involve specific individuals, typically a 
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known other. None of the units involved a comparison of self and others’ risk. It was 
also evident that the prospective health threats considered were, as with Twitter 
messages, relatively serious; indeed, a third concerned death, and a further two-fifths 
concerned other serious threats (i.e., prospective cancer, heart problems, 
complications giving birth, and serious infection of a wound).  
 
Content about 
prospective ill-health was more common among blog entries than Twitter messages. 
Nevertheless, such content was still only found in a minority of health-related 
entries. However, as with Twitter messages, it may be prudent to look even further 
afield. For instance, might individuals express judgements of risk in terms of the 
likelihood of prospective good health? A statement that good health is likely to 
continue/result due to a particular behaviour implies, tacitly at least, that prospective 
ill-health is likely if that behaviour were not carried out. Therefore, one might look 
for statements of the form, “If I perform behaviour X, there is a probability P that 
positive outcome Y will result”.  
In the present taxonomy, statements of this kind would be classified under 
“own health”, “prospective good health”, and “positive behaviour”. Figure 4.8 
presents a proportional Venn diagram of the overlap among these categories. Only 
entries where the overlap occurred within the same unit are indicated in the 
intersections. It is seen that six entries (5.0%) were classified this way compared with 
1.5% in Study 1 (see Section 3.4.3.2). In all but one case, there was no indication that 
the user was thinking about whether to engage in the behaviour – that choice had 
already been made – but there was at least a tacit assertion that in the absence of the 
behaviour ill-health might result or continue. For example, one user intended to 
reduce salt consumption and expected to become “healthier in general.” Further, 
4.3.3.2 Entries Concerning Prospective Good Health.  
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there was no explicit quantification of probability; rather, a sense of probability was 
conveyed by the use of terms like “hope” and “hopefully”. 
 
Figure 4.8. Proportional Venn diagram depicting frequencies of entries referencing 
own health, prospective good health, and positive behaviours 
Alternatively, people may make statements concerning others’ prospective 
good health, of the form, “If someone else performs behaviour X, there is a 
probability P that positive outcome Y will result.” Statements of this kind would be 
classified under “others’ health”, “prospective good health”, and “positive 
behaviour”. Figure 4.9 presents a proportional Venn diagram of the overlap among 
these categories. Only entries where the overlap occurred within the same unit are 
indicated in the intersections. No messages met these criteria in Study 1, and only 
one (0.8%) did so in the present study; it involved the suggestion that if a child were 
taken to undergo medical tests, his health problems could be addressed. In this entry, 
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however, the decision to have medical tests appeared to have already been made. 
Nevertheless, tacitly, there was an implication that ill-health would persist without 
the medical tests. 
 
Figure 4.9. Proportional Venn diagram depicting frequencies of entries referencing 
others' health, prospective good health, and positive behaviours 
 
What if the criteria are broadened to cover any statements referencing 
prospective good health? Compared with 3.0% in Study 1 (see Section 3.4.3.2), there 
were 10 entries (8.3%) classified in this category in the present study, including 
those already discussed. These did not include any explicit statement about 
probability, but did include words or phrases such as “hoping”, “sounds like”, and 
“might“. Of these 10 entries, 9 concerned the self, and one concerned a known other. 
None concerned either a general group of people, or a comparison of self and others. 
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Further, prospective good health states tended to be referred to just in non-specific 
terms (e.g., “I hope I’ll be feeling better”).  
 
If risk judgements 
are looked for in statements about prospective ill-health or prospective good health, 
they appear only are included in only a small minority of health-related blog entries. 
However, as with Twitter messages, could one look elsewhere? As noted in Chapter 
3, statements linking behaviour to past or current ill-health might conceivably reflect 
thinking that lays the foundation for future risk judgements. Statements of this type 
would be of the form, “I performed behaviour X and negative outcome Y resulted”. 
Such statements would be classified under “own health”, “negative behaviour”, and 
either “past ill-health” or “current ill-health”. Figure 4.10 presents a proportional 
Venn diagram of the overlap among these categories. Only entries where the overlap 
occurred within the same unit are indicated in the intersections. It is seen that 34 
entries (28.3%) met these criteria compared with the corresponding proportion of 
9.0% in Study 1 (see Section 3.4.3.3). They included, for example, a user recounting 
how rollerblading led to a past injury, and a user noting that recent surgery was 
responsible for some current soreness. 
What of similar messages concerning others’ health, of the form, “Someone 
else performed behaviour X and negative outcome Y resulted”? Statements of this 
kind would be classified under  “others’ health”, “negative behaviour”, and either 
“current ill-health” or “past ill-health”. Figure 4.11 presents a proportional Venn 
diagram of the overlap among these categories. Only entries where the overlap 
occurred within the same unit are indicated in the intersections. It is seen that six 
entries (5.0%) met the criteria, compared with 0.7% in Study 1. They included, for 
4.3.3.3 Entries Concerning Current or Past Ill-health.  
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example, the statement, “Mom's doing better now, she had 2 things, one if which was 
caused by stress because she worries way too much about way too many things.” 
 
 
Figure 4.10. Proportional Venn diagram depicting frequencies of entries referencing 
own health, current ill-health, past ill-health, and negative behaviours 
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Figure 4.11. Proportional Venn diagram depicting frequencies of entries referencing 
others' health, current ill-health, past ill-health, and negative behaviours 
What of 
statements where current or past good health is attributed to a behaviour, of the form, 
“I performed behaviour X, and positive outcome Y resulted?” Statements of this kind 
would be classified under “own health”, “positive behaviour”, and either “current 
good health” or “past good health”. Figure 4.12 presents a proportional Venn 
diagram of the overlap among these categories. Only entries where the overlap 
occurred within the same unit are indicated in the intersections. It is seen that 11 
entries (9.2%) met the criteria, compared with 1.1% in Study 1 (see Section 3.4.3.4).   
4.3.3.4 Entries Concerning Current or Past Good Health.  
  
142 
 
Figure 4.12. Proportional Venn diagram depicting frequencies of entries referencing 
own health, current good health, past good health, and positive behaviours 
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Figure 4.13. Proportional Venn diagram depicting frequencies of entries referencing 
others' health, current good health and positive behaviours 
A similar statement may concern others’ health, and would take the form, 
“Someone else performed behaviour X and positive outcome Y resulted.” Statements 
of this kind would be classified under “others’ health”, “positive behaviour”, and 
either “current good health” or “past good health”. Figure 4.13 presents a 
proportional Venn diagram of the overlap among these categories. Only entries 
where the overlap occurred within the same unit are indicated in the intersections. No 
Twitter messages met these criteria (see Section 3.4.3.4), but seven entries (5.8%) 
did so in the present study.  
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It was suggested that health-related risk judgements would be more evident in blog 
entries than in Twitter messages. The extent to which this held true, however, 
depended on the criteria adopted for identifying evidence of risk-related thinking. 
Under the most strict criteria, there was no difference observed: in neither Twitter 
messages nor blog entries were there explicit estimates of risk paralleling the type of 
response format typically used to solicit risk judgements. However, when the criteria 
were broadened, it was seen that blog entries were more than twice as likely to 
include comments that appear to imply a judgement of risk: of the 120 entries 
sampled, there were eight (6.7%) in which a negative behaviour was causally linked 
to own prospective ill-health, and four (3.3%) in which a negative behaviour was 
causally linked to others’ prospective ill-health; this compares with 0.4% and 0.4%, 
respectively in Study 1. Omitting the criterion of a link to behaviour, 19 entries 
(15.8%) referencing own prospective ill-health, and 14 (11.7%) referencing others’ 
prospective ill-health, were accounted for; this compares with 2.2% and 3.3%, 
respectively, in Study 1. When the criteria were broadened even further, to include 
content related to risk in a more tangential way (material concerning good health, 
past health, or current health), a small minority of Twitter messages and a larger 
minority of blog entries were included.  
4.4 Discussion 
The present study provides a second source of evidence on spontaneous 
health-related thinking, complementing that of Study 1. As with that study, by 
randomly sampling from communication that had already occurred, data free of 
solicitation effects were obtained. To the best of the author’s knowledge, these two 
4.3.3.5 Summary of Evidence for Health-Related Risk Judgements.  
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studies are the first to examine the nature of spontaneous health-related thinking in 
internet communication.  
4.4.1 The Nature of Health-Related Twitter Messages and Blog Entries.  
Comparing the two data sets, it is seen that both the typical Twitter message 
and the typical blog entry included comments about own current ill-health. All other 
categories each accounted for much smaller proportions of messages or entries. This 
suggests that, in everyday life, consciously accessible health-related thinking may 
most typically occur in the context of salient symptoms of ill-health, and that this 
immediate experience is the focus of individuals’ thinking. This is not, however, the 
context in which health-related thinking is solicited in typical research on risk 
judgements. Most commonly, studies involve participants who are currently in good 
health, and solicit their thinking concerning the prospective ill-health of themselves 
or others.  
There were, however, some differences between health-related blog entries 
and Twitter messages. Specifically, blog entries were somewhat less likely to 
reference current ill-health, as well as to include comments that went beyond own 
current ill-health: they were more likely to include references to categories such as 
“others’ health”, “past health”, “prospective health”, and “negative behaviours”. 
Moreover, as a consequence of the greater elaboration in Study 2, greater overlaps 
between categories were observed than in Study 1.  
A likely explanation for these differences relates to the unconstrained length 
of blog entries. On the one hand, it may simply be that the blog format allows 
thoughts that go beyond own current ill-health to be expressed. Similar thoughts may 
well have been in the minds of Twitter users, but the length constraints forced them 
to convey only their first thoughts, most important thoughts, or thoughts deemed to 
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be most newsworthy or relevant to the audience. On the other hand, the blog format 
may actually promote a more elaborative, reflective, and abstract mode of thought. It 
may be that the format of a blog entry leads individuals to think beyond the most 
salient and immediate experiences, to implications, causes, and comparisons. As was 
argued in (Section 3.5), Temporal Construal Theory suggests that thinking about the 
future promotes a more abstract mode of thought. One might also expect that, if this 
is the case, the typical blog writer might have a somewhat different traits than the 
typical Twitter user. The blog format may attract, for example, individuals with a 
greater “need for cognition” (the tendency to engage and enjoy thinking; see 
Cacioppo & Petty, 1982).  
 
4.4.2 The Incidence of Health Risk Judgements as Revealed in Internet 
Communication 
 One might have expected risk judgements to be explicit in most health-
related thinking, given their centrality in HBTs. Yet, none of the Twitter messages or 
blog entries examined included any explicit estimates of risk. However, this may not 
mean that such estimates were absent in the minds of participants. It may be that 
judgements of risk do feature commonly in everyday thinking about health, but 
individuals have no reason to actually articulate these thoughts in Twitter messages 
and blog entries. Perhaps, when communicating about common illnesses and 
symptoms, they believe that the associated health threats and probabilities are well 
known, and therefore expressing them would be redundant, because the intended 
audience can be assumed to have a shared understanding.  
Given the absence of explicit evidence, it was necessary to look for implicit 
evidence: content that might imply an underlying judgement of risk. There were 
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several types of comment that, to varying degrees, might imply a judgement of risk. 
For instance, in a small minority of Twitter messages, and a somewhat larger 
minority of blog entries, there were comments that at least mentioned the possibility 
of prospective health (some of these also linked that prospect to a negative 
behaviour). Although these comments did not include any probability estimate, a 
sense of probability was conveyed by the confidence or tentativeness with which the 
possibility was mentioned.  
Another possibility considered was that individuals might imply judgements 
of risk even without referencing prospective ill-health. Conceivably, individuals 
might express a judgement of risk by linking a negative health behaviour with past 
ill-health or current ill-health; by suggesting such a link, they imply that they judge 
that there is a risk of ill-health in the future, conditional on performing that 
behaviour. Similarly, a judgement of risk might be implied by comments linking a 
positive behaviour to past or current good health, on the logic that their risk will be 
higher if they do not perform that behaviour in the future. A small minority of 
Twitter messages and a large minority of blog entries met these criteria. 
On the one hand, the presence of this type of content suggests that it is 
premature to assert health risk judgements are not common in everyday life. Other 
methodologies for examining spontaneous thoughts might be employed to 
investigate the issue further. Such methodologies may uncover a greater extent of 
spontaneous risk related thinking.  
On the other hand, even the content suggestive of more implicit risk-related 
thinking was only found in a minority of Twitter messages and blog entries. This 
raises the possibility that perhaps individuals do not think very often about risk in 
everyday life. Several possible reasons for this may be proposed.  
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One possible explanation is that individuals tend to avoid thinking about (or 
writing about) prospective health threats, because these threats evoke anxiety. It may 
be that, to protect their mood, such threats tend to be quickly dismissed or glossed 
over, because individuals do not wish to dwell on these possibilities. The scarcity of 
comments about risk would thus reflect defensive avoidance.  
Another possibility is that individuals’ health-related thinking is simply not 
very future-oriented. Indeed, a finding of previous research is that this is a common 
characteristic of everyday thinking in general (e.g., Neimark & Stead, 1981). Why 
might health-related thinking (and everyday thinking in general) be so focused on 
immediate experience, rather than on the future? It may be because future scenarios 
are by their nature more abstract than current experience and thus require more 
involvement of System 2 and, in turn, demand more effort (see Section 1.2). In 
everyday circumstances, when such thinking is not solicited, individuals may not be 
very motivated to make this effort.  
Alternatively, deliberative thoughts about prospective threats may require the 
motivation generated by strong negative affective states (e.g., as might be produced 
by particularly alarming symptoms.) However, most instances of ill-health in the 
general population are relatively minor and transitory (e.g., cold and flu). 
Furthermore, the familiarity of common illness may mean that judgements of risk 
have already been formed and automatised, such that individuals rarely give these 
risks much further thought.  
 
 
The studies reported thus far have examined spontaneous health-related 
thinking, evident in internet communication, concerning a wide range of health 
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concerns arising in everyday contexts.  The next chapter turns to examine health-
related thinking in a specific context, one in which risk-related thinking might be 
expected to be particularly evident: a situation in which individuals learn of a serious 
threat to health of which they were previously unaware. It was thought that risk 
judgements might be more evident in this context, because judgements concerning a 
novel threat could not have been pre-formulated, rehearsed, and automatised, and 
therefore may be more accessible to conscious awareness. Moreover, individuals 
cannot have adapted to the prospect of a novel threat, and thus may feel greater 
anxiety about the threat, anxiety which may motivate greater System 2 processing. A 
“thought listing” study (Study 3), examining spontaneous health-related thinking 
occurring in this context, is reported and its implications discussed. 
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Chapter 5 - Study 3: Spontaneous Responses to a Novel 
Health Threat: A Thought-Listing Study 
 
Studies 1 and 2 were devised to investigate spontaneous health-related 
thinking under conditions which eliminated the possibility of solicitation effects. By 
collecting samples of pre-existing internet communication, these studies assured that 
the research process itself was not influencing cognitive processes. In these data, 
explicit probability estimates were entirely absent; however, comments that might 
imply that participants were considering risk were present. 
This chapter turns to examine health-related thinking in a context in which 
risk judgements may be more evident: a situation in which individuals learn of a 
threat to health of which they were previously unaware. A novel health threat means 
that well-rehearsed, pre-formulated judgements of risk will not already be present; 
this makes it more likely that any judgements of risk that occur will involve slower, 
System 2 processing, available to conscious awareness. This situation provides 
another perspective on individuals’ spontaneous conceptualisations of health-related 
risk. 
 Judgements made in this context are also important because they may be 
particularly influential. In everyday life, individuals are often presented with 
messages about threats to health, typically as part of public health campaigns. 
Spontaneous judgements of risk elicited by such messages may bias how individuals 
access and process the information. For example, if an individual concludes that their 
risk is low when first learning of a threat to health, the tendency for individuals to 
have a confirmation bias (Mynatt, Doherty & Tweney, 1977; Nickerson, 1998; 
Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972) may mean they also arrive at the same conclusion at 
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a later time, even if new information has become available or the situation has 
changed. Thus, initial risk judgements, made when a health threat is novel, may 
shape later judgements to a degree that is unwarranted.  
This chapter reports a study that examined spontaneous responses to a health 
warning using a thought listing methodology. Participants were asked to list their 
spontaneous, consciously accessible thoughts immediately after they read 
information concerning a novel health threat. The main aim of the study was to 
explore, through analyses of thought-listing data, the degree to which spontaneous 
judgements of health risk were evident and the nature of these judgements.  
A second, subsidiary, aim was to investigate the extent to which these 
judgements were influenced by whether the threat was framed in positive or negative 
terms. This is a variable that has received considerable attention in the research 
literature and has implications for how one may maximize the efficacy of health 
warnings. Previous research concerning the effects of messaging framing is 
described in Section 5.2.   
5.1 The Thought-Listing Methodology 
Although the methodology employed in Studies 1 and 2 meant that 
solicitation effects could not be present, individuals were not writing with the aim of 
recording all of their consciously accessible thoughts. It is possible that risk-related 
thoughts were in fact present in the minds of individuals, but omitted from their 
internet communication because they had no reason to articulate them. How might a 
more comprehensive record of spontaneous health-related thoughts be obtained? 
One approach – adopted in the present study – is to ask participants to 
provide a comprehensive account of their thoughts soon after they have 
spontaneously occurred; content analysis can then be employed to identify evidence 
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of spontaneous risk-related thinking. Ericsson and Simon (1980, 1993, 1998) and 
others (e.g., Cacioppo & Petty, 1981; Conrad, Blair, & Tracy, 1999) have argued 
that, within certain limits, individuals can provide valid reports on cognitive 
processes. Nevertheless, valid collection and analysis of verbal reports requires an 
understanding of what participants can verbalise and how they produce verbal 
reports. There are several key concepts. 
First, individuals can only provide valid verbal reports on thoughts available 
to conscious awareness (Conrad, Blair, & Tracy, 2011; Ericsson & Simon, 1980, 
1993). Thus, a thought must either be within working memory at the time it is 
reported, or have previously been in working memory and then entered long-term 
memory. Because of this, it is inappropriate to request reports on cognitive 
processes, or aspects of cognitive processes, that are unlikely to have involved 
working memory (e.g., low level perceptual processes or mental operations which 
are automatised). Soliciting reports on anything beyond the contents of working 
memory makes it likely that individuals will resort to constructing reports based just 
on their lay theories of what they ought to have considered. 
Second, it is the final or intermediate results of a cognitive process – rather 
than the process itself – that are available for report (Ericsson & Simon, 1998); the 
goals, strategies, rationales, or operations involved in a cognitive process may not 
necessarily be consciously available to the participant. Therefore, it is inappropriate 
to ask participants how or why they performed a cognitive task; doing so may result 
in their constructing explanations post hoc. Therefore, instructions employed in 
collecting verbal reports typically ask participants merely to list their thoughts, but 
do not ask them to explain these thoughts. Any such explanations must be inferred 
by the researcher. 
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Third, when verbal reports are given retrospectively, as in the thought-listing 
methodology, biases associated with encoding information into and retrieving 
information from long-term memory may impact on validity (Ericsson & Simon, 
1980). Long delays between the processing and reporting may mean that memories 
of that process are forgotten or become confounded with other memories. When 
thought listing is performed after only a short delay, however, it is likely that some 
thoughts involved in the cognitive process of interest will still be present in working 
memory. The validity of thought listing may thus be increased by minimizing the 
delay between processing and thought listing. 
Fourth, thought-listing data must be analysed with the understanding that 
some thoughts may deliberately be omitted from verbal reports, despite the 
instructions to list everything (Ericsson & Simon, 1980). This may occur because 
participants judge these thoughts to be irrelevant, or due to concerns about social 
desirability or appropriateness.  
 
5.1.1 Implementations of Thought Listing in Previous Health-related Research 
The thought-listing methodology has been used in a number of studies to 
assess health-related thinking (e.g., Benthin, Slovic, Moran, Severson, Mertz, & 
Gerrard, 1995; Ditto, Pizarro, Epstein, Jacobson and Macdonald, 2006; Rothman, 
Martino, Bedell, Detweiler, & Salovey, 1999). However, these studies have varied 
considerably in the manner the methodology was implemented, because of the varied 
aims of these studies.  
Studies have varied in the type of instructions used to elicit thought-listing 
responses. On the one hand, asking participants to report a specific class of thought 
may lead them to construct such thoughts post hoc so that they can meet the 
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expectations of the researchers; therefore, ideally, participants should be given very 
general instructions, asking them to list any thought that has occurred to them 
spontaneously (Conrad, Blair, & Tracy, 2011; Wilson, LaFleur & Anderson, 1996). 
By giving participants freedom to list any thought, one avoids imposing assumptions 
on participants about the types of thoughts they ought to report. A number of studies 
have taken this approach (e.g., Orbell & Kyriakaki,  2008; Kreuter, Bull, Clark, & 
Oswald, 1999; Rothman, Martino, Bedell, Detweiler, & Salovey, 1999; Sherman, 
Nelson, & Steele, 2000).  
On the other hand, entirely general instructions might impose other 
difficulties. For example, participants may list thoughts entirely irrelevant to the 
cognitive processes of interest, thus requiring coders to make judgements as to which 
thoughts are relevant and which are not (Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997). To 
simplify coding, some studies use instructions which ask participants to report only 
relevant thoughts. For example, in a study by Ditto, Pizarro, Epstein, Jacobson and 
Macdonald (2006, Study 2), participants viewed either a video or read a description 
of a young couple deciding whether to have unprotected sex. They were then asked 
to rate the likelihood that they themselves would engage in unprotected sex in the 
same situation. The thought-listing instructions that followed asked participants to 
report up to eight thoughts relevant to that decision. By constraining responses in this 
way, the researchers ensured that all the thoughts listed were relevant, but increased 
the possibility that the thoughts would be influenced by solicitation effects.  
Studies also vary in the way that responses are unitised (i.e., divided into 
discrete units of thought for the purposes of coding). Typically, unitisation is based 
simply on how participants separate thoughts on the page when writing their 
responses (e.g., Rothman, Martino, Bedell, Detweiler, & Salovey, 1999). Participants 
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can be given a form with a space for each thought to encourage them to separate 
thoughts (e.g., Obell and Kyriakaki, 2008), or they can be instructed explicitly to 
ensure that thoughts are separated. Alternatively, unitisation can be based on 
linguistic features (e.g., sentences, independent clauses) or content features of 
responses; or some combination of these (Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997). 
Third, thought-listing responses may be coded in a variety of ways. 
Participants can be required to code their own thoughts after listing them (e.g., 
Benthin, Slovic, Moran, Severson, Mertz, & Gerrard, 1995). This takes advantage of 
their own knowledge of the meaning behind each thought. However, participants 
may have difficulty coding their thoughts with regard to more complex and abstract 
dimensions; moreover, self-coding may introduce social desirability biases. More 
usually, a researcher performs the coding. The reliability of the coding is often 
assessed by having a second independent coder also code the responses, and then 
calculating the degree of agreement between independent codings (Cacioppo, von 
Hippel, & Ernst, 1997). 
Fourth, once coded, results can be summarized and analysed in various ways, 
depending on the aims of the study. For example, researchers might calculate the 
proportion of participants giving at least one thought coded in a specific category; 
groups or experimental conditions can then be compared with the use of non-
parametric tests (e.g., Panzer & Renner, 2008). Other approaches can involve 
comparing groups or conditions on the mean number of thoughts in a given category 
per participant (e.g., Rothman, Martino, Bedell, Detweiler, & Salovey, 1999) or an 
index score derived from the thought listing coding (e.g., Ditto, Pizarro, Epstein, 
Jacobson, & Macdonald, 2006). 
  
156 
5.2 Effects of Event Valence 
Event valence refers to whether an event is generally considered positive (i.e., 
desirable) or negative (i.e., undesirable). In presenting a message warning of a threat 
to health, the threat can be framed in either negative or positive terms: one can refer 
to the possibility of developing an illness, or the possibility of avoiding that illness 
(Gold & Martyn, 2003; Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). For example, a message 
could be framed in negative terms by stating, “If you do not get the flu vaccine, there 
is a greater chance you will get the flu”; or in positive terms by stating, “If you do 
get the flu vaccine, there is a greater chance you will avoid getting the flu.” 
Normatively, these messages are equivalent, because the probability of any event’s 
occurrence is the complement of the probability of its non-occurrence. Nevertheless, 
a number of studies have found that these alternative message frames can produce 
different effects (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth; O’Keefe & Jensen, 2007) . In some 
circumstances, negatively-framed messages have appeared to be more effective in 
motivating protective behaviour change; in others, positively-framed messages have 
appeared more effective. There are several different paths via which these effects 
may occur. Some of these paths, and their implications for risk judgements, are 
discussed next. 
5.2.1 Valence Effects via Loss Aversion 
Section 1.3.2 introduced the notion of loss aversion proposed as part of 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) Prospect Theory. The proposal holds that 
individuals interpret prospective outcomes in terms of either gains or losses. 
However, losses are given greater weight, and take on more importance, than 
objectively equivalent gains. Experimental evidence has supported this claim (e.g., 
Galanter, 1990; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  
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Gold and Martyn (2003) suggested that, if a message about a threat to health 
is framed in negative terms, individuals may take good health as the standard of 
comparison and hence encode the message as concerning a loss (viz, the loss of good 
health); conversely, if the message is framed in positive terms, they may take illness 
as the standard of comparison and hence encode it as concerning a gain (viz, 
avoiding ill-health). If losses are felt more strongly than gains, it follows that the 
negatively-framed message will produce greater concern or worry. This in turn may 
have effects via at least two  psychological mechanisms; these are described in 
Sections 5.2.1.1 and 5.2.1.2. 
Two dual-processing models of 
persuasive communication – The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986), and the very similar Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM; Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993) – hold that attempts at persuasion that focus on rational arguments 
have more impact if individuals engage in “elaborative” (in the ELM) or 
“systematic” (in the HSM) processing. This type of processing is held to involve 
effortful, conscious weighing of arguments and evidence – in the terminology 
employed in this thesis, System 2 processing. According to these models, System 2 
processing of persuasive arguments results in stronger and longer-lasting changes of 
attitudes and beliefs, so long as they are convincing to those who consider them. In 
contrast, when more heuristic (i.e., System 1) processing of the message dominates, 
weaker, less enduring effects on behaviour and intentions occur.  
Event valence may be relevant to determining which type of processing 
occurs. Like other dual-process models, the ELM and HSM hold that System 2 
thinking depends on individuals’ having the motivation to expend the effort required 
for this type of processing. What would so motivate individuals? The ELM and HSM 
5.2.1.1 Motivating System 2 Processing.  
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propose that individuals are motivated to the extent that the message has relevance or 
importance to them. (On this, the models have been criticised, because “relevance” 
has not been clearly operationalised, and therefore the extent of empirical support for 
this proposal is still not entirely clear; Choi & Salmon, 2003.)  
To the extent that a negatively-framed event has more psychological impact, 
it follows that individuals would be more motivated to carefully examine information 
framed in negative terms. One might therefore expect to see more System 2 thinking 
in this case. With particular relevance to risk judgements, greater System 2 thinking 
may cause judgements of risk to feature more prominently (see Section 3.5). System 
2 thinking may promote more abstract thoughts (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & 
Liberman, 2003) which may include thoughts about risk; System 2 thinking also 
requires working memory, and is thus more available to conscious awareness 
(Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich & West, 2000). Therefore, to the extent that a 
negatively-framed health message motivates System 2 thinking, risk judgements may 
be more evident in thought-listing responses.  
If negatively-framed health 
messages elicit greater anxiety, this may make it more likely that individuals will 
employ strategies to deny the threat, in order to bring themselves comfort. One such 
strategy, introduced in Section 1.3.2, is motivated reasoning: the selective tailoring 
of reasoning to arrive at a desired conclusion (Kunda, 1990). With specific regard to 
risk judgements, a likely avenue for bringing oneself comfort is to conclude that 
one’s risk is low, or at least, that it is lower than that of others.  
For example, Gold and Martyn (2003, 2004) and Gold and Brown (2009) 
conducted studies on UO that manipulated event valence by framing a single event 
either positively or negatively. Participants were asked to rate the likelihood of either 
5.2.1.2 Eliciting Defensive Processing.  
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a positive outcome (e.g., avoiding heart problems) or a negative outcome (e.g., 
developing heart problems). In each study, the negative condition elicited 
significantly greater UO than the positive condition. Further studies by Gold and 
Brown (2009) and Gold and Nguyen (2010) examined whether the effect of event 
valence on UO was due to an effect on judgements of own risk, judgements of 
others’ risk, or a combination of both. It was found that event valence had a 
significant effect on judgements of own risk, with participants judging their risk to be 
lower when the framing was negative than when it was positive. However, no effect 
was found on judgements of others’ risk. These results were explained by the authors 
in terms of the elicitation of more defensive processing by negatively-framed 
messages. 
Defensive processing might also take the form of reduced attention paid to 
threatening information. Some neuroscientific evidence suggests that more 
threatening health information better captures individuals’ attention, but also leads to 
more efficient attentional disengagement from that information for individuals for 
whom the threat is relevant (Kessels, Ruiter, & Jansma, 2010). This can be 
interpreted as individuals defensively disengaging attention from the information to 
the extent that it causes anxiety. It follows that such disengagement may occur to a 
greater extent with negatively-framed health messages. 
5.2.2 Effects via Mood Congruent Memory.  
What if individuals are not successful in reducing their anxiety through 
defensive processing? It is conceivable that, if a negative frame elicits greater 
anxiety, framing might impact on individuals’ judgements and decision-making via 
mood-congruent memory effects. Mood-congruent memory (Bower, 1981, 1987) is 
the well-established phenomenon whereby a particular affective state promotes the 
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accessibility of memories congruent with that affective state. Within semantic 
network models, the effect is explicable in terms of affective states being represented 
within a semantic network and activation spreading to memory nodes associated 
directly or indirectly with the active state; the effect of this activation is to lower the 
thresholds for associated memories to be retrieved (Bower, 1981, 1987). Thus, 
individuals induced into a more negative affective state access emotionally negative 
content in memory more quickly and easily, while those induced into a more positive 
affective state access emotionally positive content more readily (e.g., Croyle & 
Uretsky, 1987).  
If negative framing leads to a more negative mood in individuals, it follows 
that it would produce greater accessibility of negative thoughts (e.g., instances of 
their past risk-taking behaviour, or family history of an illness); this, in turn, may 
make them more likely to conclude that their risk is high (e.g, Salovey & Birnbaum, 
1989). This may be particularly so if individuals employ the availability heuristic 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) and base judgements on the ease with which evidence 
for this conclusion comes to mind (see Section 1.3.1.2).  
5.2.3 Effects via the Affect Heuristic 
As discussed in Section 1.3.1.3, individuals may employ the affect heuristic 
in making judgements of risk: they may estimate the risk of a threat to health based 
on the extent to which the threat evokes a negative affective reaction in them. This 
may lead judgements of risk to be influenced by event valence. If a negatively-
framed message evokes more negative affect than a positively-framed one, and if the 
affect heuristic is employed in judging risk, then the illness in question might be 
judged as being more likely in response to the negatively-framed message. This has 
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been offered as an explanation of why lay people tend to overestimate the probability 
of catastrophic events (e.g., nuclear accidents; Slovic, 1987).   
5.2.4 Effects via the Reflection Effect 
In addition to the notion of loss aversion, valence effects have been explained 
in terms of another aspect of Prospect Theory. This aspect concerns a reversal in 
individuals’ preferences for certain versus uncertain outcomes depending on whether 
those outcomes involve losses or gains. Specifically, the theory holds that individuals 
prefer a certain gain over a larger gain that is merely probable (but with an equivalent 
or slightly larger expected value). For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
found that a majority of participants chose a certain gain of $3000 over an 80% 
chance to gain $4000. However, the theory holds that this pattern is reversed in the 
domain of losses. Here, individuals will prefer a loss that is merely probable over a 
certain loss (even if the expected value of the former is equal or slightly larger). For 
example, Kahneman and Tversky found that a majority of participants chose an 80% 
chance of losing $4000 over a certain loss of $3000. They termed this reversal the 
reflection effect.  
Rothman and Salovey (1997)  proposed that this reflection effect has 
implications for the efficacy of gain-framed and loss-framed health information in 
motivating health behaviours. They argued that illness-detection behaviours (e.g., 
breast screenings or HIV tests), are coded by individuals as involving high risk. To 
encourage individuals to take the gamble, they suggested it is useful to highlight 
potential losses; thus, loss-framed messages should be more effective at promoting 
illness-detection behaviours. Conversely, Rothman and Salovey (1997) argued, 
behaviours that help prevent ill-health (e.g., sunscreen use, healthy eating, or 
vaccination) are coded as involving little or no risk; they are associated with 
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certainty. Employing gain-framed messages will best encourage individuals to carry 
out these behaviours. Other researchers (e.g., Gerend & Cullen, 2008) have used 
similar logic to explain framing effects for risk-taking behaviours (e.g., smoking or 
alcohol consumption).  
In support of this theory, Rothman and Salovey (1997) cited a range of 
message-framing studies (e.g., Block & Keller, 1995; Christophersen & Gyulay, 
1981; Levin & Chapman, 1990; Linville, Fischer, & Fischhoff, 1993; Meyerowitz & 
Chaiken, 1987; Meyerowitz, Wilson, & Chaiken, 1991; Treiber, 1986; van der Pligt 
& van Schie, 1990) in which framing effects appeared to conform to this prediction. 
Moreover, Rothman, Martino, Bedell, Detweill and Salovey (1999) conducted two 
studies that experimentally manipulated both the valence and the prevention versus 
detection status of health behaviours, and found the predicted pattern of results.  
However, more systematic reviews of the extant empirical evidence have 
been less supportive. A meta-analysis of 93 message-framing studies (O’Keefe & 
Jensen, 2007) concerning preventative health behaviours found no significant 
differences between positively-framed and negatively-framed messages in their 
effectiveness for promoting diet-related behaviours, safe-sex behaviours, skin cancer 
prevention behaviours, exercise, smoking cessation, or vaccination; there was also no 
effect for all studies combined. The only significant difference found was for dental 
hygiene behaviours, for which positively-framed messages were more effective. A 
similar meta-analysis of 53 message-framing studies concerning disease detection 
behaviours (O’Keefe & Jensen, 2009) found no significant differences between 
positive and negative frames for promoting skin cancer detection, detection of other 
cancers, or detection of dental problems; there was also no effect for all studies 
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combined. The only significant effect was for breast cancer detection, for which 
negatively-framed messages were more effective.  
Beyond the questionable empirical support, there are some pertinent 
criticisms of the theoretical explanation and its invocation of Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). First, Kahneman and Tversky used Prospect Theory 
to explain effects that occurred within a particular experimental paradigm: the risky 
choice paradigm, in which participants are presented with a set of options with the 
possible outcomes and their associated probabilities being stated. The framing used 
involves representing the outcomes as gains or losses, and the dependent variable is 
the degree to which options with probabilistic outcomes are chosen over those with 
certain outcomes. Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth (1998) argued that this paradigm is 
fundamentally different from the type of message framing to which Rothman and 
Salovey (1997) applied it. This latter type of framing, which Levin et al. termed goal 
framing, does not present participants with different outcomes and probabilities; 
accordingly, the degree to which participants choose options with probabilistic 
outcomes cannot be determined. (Indeed, which outcomes are salient to participants, 
and the perceived probabilities of those outcomes, are typically not measured at all.) 
Kahneman and Tversky’s explanation for the reflection effect in this risky choice 
paradigm is thus not directly applicable to the goal framing effects addressed by 
Rothman and Salovey. 
Second, even if individuals do associate detection behaviours with 
uncertainty and prevention behaviours with certainty, Prospect Theory does not 
necessarily hold that uncertainty is always preferred in the domain of losses, while 
certainty is preferred in the domain of gains. In fact, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
demonstrated the reverse pattern – uncertainty-seeking in the domain of gains and 
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uncertainty-aversion in the domain of losses – for individuals dealing with low-
probability prospects. Participants were shown to prefer a small probability of a large 
gain, over double that probability of half that gain, but the reverse for equivalent 
losses. Both detection behaviours and prevention behaviours often concern very 
small probabilities; so, even if the reflection effect were applicable to this type of 
framing, it is not clear why Prospect Theory would not predict the opposite to that 
proposed by Rothman and Salovey (1997). 
It may be that the findings that appear to demonstrate a reflection effect are 
sometimes due to the various psychological effects of framing that can occur because 
of greater involvement of System 2 (see Section 5.2.1.1) or greater defensive 
processing (see Section 5.2.1.2; Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). These 
mechanisms may make  negative frame more persuasive in some circumstances and 
less so in others, depending on the psychological processes that come into play. It is 
conceivable that detection and preventative behaviours may often differ in terms of 
these processes.  
5.2.5 Effects via Approach/Avoidance Congruency 
Another explanation for the effect of positive versus negative framing on 
behaviour relates to the congruency between the frame employed and the type of 
motivation to which a person’s personality predisposes them. Several motivation 
theories (e.g., Gray, 1990) posit that motivation is regulated by two semi-
independent systems: the behavioural approach system (BAS), which regulates 
approaches to potential awards; and the behavioural inhibition system (BIS), which 
regulates avoidance of potential threats. However there are individual differences in 
the dominance of these systems. Mann et al. (2004) and Sherman, Mann, and 
Updegraff (2006) conducted studies in which participants were classified as being 
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either approach-oriented or avoidance-oriented using the BIS/BAS scales (Carver & 
White, 1994). Participants were then randomly assigned to read either a gain-framed 
or a loss-framed message promoting dental flossing. In both studies there was a 
congruency effect: the loss-framed message was more effective than the gain-framed 
one for avoidance-oriented participants; however, the gain-framed message was 
more effective for approach-oriented participants. 
An arguably related finding comes from a study by Gerend and Maner 
(2011). These authors induced participants into either a fearful or an angry state and 
then presented either loss- or gain-framed information about fruit and vegetable 
intake. It was found that the loss-framed information was more persuasive for 
individuals induced to feel fear, while the gain-framed information was more 
persuasive for those induced to feel anger. On the plausible assumption that fear is a 
BIS-related emotion, while anger is a BAS-related emotion, this interaction of 
framing and emotion can be seen as an effect related to BIS/BAS congruency. 
Individuals’ differences on the BIS and BAS systems, and situational factors which 
prime these systems, may thus moderate the effects of event valence described in the 
preceding sections. 
5.3 Method 
5.3.1 Design 
There were two experimental conditions, to which participants were 
randomly assigned. These conditions varied in the event valence frame employed. 
One condition presented a negatively-valenced health message (NV), the other a 
positively-valenced one (PV). The messages used were matched closely in other 
respects. 
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5.3.2 Participants 
The sample comprised 51 Deakin University students. Just over half (58.8%) 
were female, and this did not differ significantly between groups, p = .33 (Fisher’s 
Exact Test). Their mean age was 22.91 years (SD = 3.67); this also did not differ 
significantly between groups, t(49) = 1.24, p = .22. All participants were volunteers 
and received no payment or course credit for taking part. There were 26 participants 
in the NV group, and 25 in the PV group.  
5.3.3 Materials 
The booklets employed first asked participants to write their age and gender 
in the spaces provided. The next page presented information regarding the effects of 
the amino acid homocysteine on the subsequent health of the heart. Pilot studies 
conducted for previous research conducted at Deakin University (Gold & Martyn, 
2003, 2004) had found that almost no students had heard of homocysteine and its 
effects. The two versions of the message are presented in Table 5.1; the phrases that 
differed between versions are indicated in bold type. (These phrases were not, 
however, emphasized in the participants’ booklets.) Participants were told to read the 
message very carefully, then to immediately turn to the next page and carry out the 
instructions given there, without turning back. 
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Table 5.1 
Negative Valence (NV) and Positive Valence (PV) versions of the stimulus message. 
NV VERSION 
Homocysteine is an amino acid found in the blood stream. A recent study by 
the University of Washington has suggested that having high levels of 
homocysteine when you are young makes you very much more vulnerable to 
developing heart problems later in life. 
 
The researchers estimate that unsafe levels of homocysteine lead to 
approximately 60,000 heart attack deaths in the USA each year, and cause 
the onset of heart disease in as many as 250,000 other people. 
 
The vitamin, folic acid, found in green leafy vegetables, beans and citrus 
fruits, breaks down homocysteine. Thus, failing to eat adequate amounts of 
these foods greatly increases the likelihood of becoming ill with heart 
disease later. 
 
PV VERSION 
Homocysteine is an amino acid found in the blood stream. A recent study by 
the University of Washington has suggested that having low levels of 
homocysteine when you are young makes you very much less vulnerable to 
developing heart problems later in life. 
 
The researchers estimate that keeping homocysteine down to safe levels 
would prevent approximately 60,000 heart attack deaths in the USA each 
year, and protect against the onset of heart disease in as many as 250,000 
other people. 
 
The vitamin, folic acid, found in green leafy vegetables, beans and citrus 
fruits, breaks down homocysteine. Thus eating adequate amounts of these 
foods greatly increases the likelihood of having a healthy heart later. 
 
 
The next page of the questionnaire presented the thought-listing instructions: 
We are now interested in any thoughts that went through your mind while 
you were reading the information on the previous page. Please write these 
thoughts down in the space below. Include anything you can recall thinking, 
even if it seems irrelevant. Please be completely honest.  Don’t worry about 
spelling, grammar, etc. Note: we are not interested in what you are thinking 
right now. Only write down thoughts that occurred to you while you were 
reading the information on the previous page.  
Two pages of lines on which participants could write were provided.  
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5.3.4 Procedure  
Students who were sitting alone in the Deakin University library or cafeteria 
were approached by the author and invited to participate. On agreeing to take part, 
participants were given a booklet and were asked to begin reading and following the 
instructions inside. Participants were randomly assigned to receive the booklet 
containing either the NV or PV version of the message; the author was blind to the 
version they had received until after they had completed it. The author observed the 
participant unobtrusively from a distance to ensure they were not distracted or helped 
by others, and then returned to collect the completed questionnaire within 10 to 15 
minutes.  
 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Unitisation and Coding 
On average, participants wrote 54.86 words in response to the thought listing 
instructions (SD = 29.89; median = 49; range 14 - 127). Before any further analysis, 
all responses were divided into units by the author. This was done on a different 
basis from that which had been employed in Study 2.  In that study, a given blog 
often ranged over a number of different topics; accordingly, a "unit" was defined in 
such a way as to represent material dealing with just a single topic (see Section 
4.3.1). In the present study, by contrast, all participants' responses did appear to deal 
only with a single general topic (unsurprising, given the well-defined context in 
which responses were given). Here, unitisation had the aim merely of delineating 
separate thoughts relating to that general topic. 
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A unit was therefore defined as a set of contiguous words that met any of the 
following criteria: they were demarcated by a new line, paragraph, or bullet point; 
they were punctuated by the participant as forming a sentence; or they formed an 
independent clause (even if joined with another independent clause by a 
conjunction). The mean number of units per participant was 3.49 (SD = 2.08; median 
= 3; range 2 – 12) and the average number of words per unit was 16.75 (SD = 7.19; 
median = 15.5; range 6 – 43). Classifications were confirmed by an independent rater 
and inconsistencies were resolved through discussion.  
 
5.4.2 Evidence for Health-Related Risk Judgements 
The first concern was with examining the responses for evidence of 
spontaneous judgements of risk. Corresponding to what was done in Studies 1 and 2, 
all responses were read several times by the author. They were first read with the aim 
of identifying the most explicit evidence for risk judgements which paralleled those 
that are typically solicited in studies. Subsequent passes through the data focused on 
identifying responses that more implicitly suggested risk judgements were being 
made.  
If participants were to spontaneously articulate a canonical risk judgement in 
response to the stimulus message, one might expect them to report thoughts of the 
form, “If I do (or do not) perform behaviour X, there is a probability P that I will (or 
will not) experience homocysteine-related heart disease”. At a minimum, one would 
expect that the essential elements of such a judgement would be evident: a reference 
to the prospective health outcome, a reference to own health, and a reference to a 
health-related behaviour. (Because the stimulus message provided to participants 
referred to either “developing” or “avoiding” homocysteine-related heart disease – 
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depending on the valence condition – references either to the prospect of 
experiencing or to the prospect of not experiencing the disease were coded as 
references to the target prospective health outcome.) 
Participants’ responses were first coded for the presence of these elements. 
Table 5.2 presents the characteristics coded for; and for each, the number of 
participants included, the percentage of the sample this represented, and the 
percentage of participants for whom there was inter-rater agreement. Figure 5.1 
presents a Venn diagram of the overlap among the first three categories in the table.  
Table 5.2  
Characteristics coded for, number of participants included, percentage of the 
sample, and percentage of participants for whom there was inter-rater agreement. 
 
Category 
Number of 
participants 
% Inter-
rater 
agreement  
Behaviour. Suggests or questions whether 
a behaviour influences health (e.g., “how 
would I compare in relation to my current 
diet?”) 
41 80.4 96.1% 
Own Health. (e.g., “So it is clear for me 
that I have to think more about my health, 
but not to be a health paranoic”)  
29 56.9 100.0% 
Prospective Health Outcomes. 
References the prospect of experiencing or 
avoiding the health outcomes mentioned in 
the stimulus message (e.g., “This is a 
serious issue, it affects as many people and 
could possibly affect me.”)  
24 52.9 92.2% 
Others’ Health. (e.g., “What about 
healthy people like John Illllham? Did he 
have too much homocysteine”)  
26 51.0 98.0% 
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Figure 5.1. Proportional Venn diagram depicting numbers of participants referencing 
own health, prospective health outcomes, and health-related behaviour 
 
It is seen that 16 participants (31.4% of the sample) gave responses that fell 
in all three categories. Examination of these participants’ responses revealed that 
none gave probability estimates. That is, there were no responses that could be 
converted to a frequency or range of frequencies without additional information or 
assumptions (see Section 1.4.2.3). Five of the 16, however, expressed a sense of the 
probability of experiencing heart problems by using a verbal description. For 
example, one referred to themselves as being in a “serious risk group”, while another 
stated “it is unlikely that this will affect me”. The remaining 11 referred merely to 
the possibility of experiencing heart problems, but did not express a view on its 
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probability. These participants, for example, queried whether they would experience 
problems (e.g., “Will I have heart problems later in life?”) or stated that they did not 
want to experience them (e.g., “I recalled thinking that I don't want heart problems”).  
Of the 16 participants, how many made a causal link between the behaviour 
and the health outcome? In Study 2, it was assumed that if the behaviour and the 
health outcome appeared within the same unit (and hence, were mentioned within the 
same topic), a causal link was being made. In the present study, by contrast, units 
were not delineated in the same way (see Section 5.4.1) and so a different approach 
to deciding whether causality was being asserted was employed. 
Four of the 16 participants signalled causality very clearly by their choice of 
words; for example, one stated, “that in complex with my tobacco addiction and lack 
of time to eat healthy (or just not fast-food) food, I might be in a serious risk group.” 
Another characterised diet as a way of reducing their susceptibility to the problem (“I 
should begin to eat more leafy vegetables, beans and citrus fruits to decrease my 
susceptibility to getting this disease.”). 
Another nine participants did not do this, but juxtaposed the reference to the 
health outcome and the behaviour; this juxtaposition suggested that the two were 
causally related in their mind. For example, one of these participants responded, 
“Maybe I should be eating more green leafy vegetables”, followed immediately by, 
“I also thought wow there are so many things that cause health problems, nothing is 
safe”. Another responded, “I recalled thinking that I don't want heart problems”, 
followed immediately by, “how would I keep these levels low.” 
For the remaining three participants, it was harder to establish whether a 
causal link was being asserted, because intervening material separated the 
references; for example, one reported the thought, “I wondering if they will ask me 
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about heart attack and how I intend to avoid them on the next page”, and then – but 
only after intervening material -- “Oh ok a solution - eat more vegies - the solution to 
everything.” Another participant referenced the health behaviour of “young people” 
(“I thought about obesity epidemic in Australia and how young people are not eating 
healthy due to fast  food and easy pleasures that occur these days”) and then, after 
intervening material, referenced their own prospect of heart problems (“I figure I am 
healthy and fit and I would not suffer the consequences.”).  
In summary, 13 participants (25.5%) referenced and causally linked a health 
behaviour to their own prospective health outcome (either explicitly or through the 
juxtaposition of references). For five of these, there was some sense of probability 
expressed verbally. 
 
What of similar judgements, but concerning others’ prospective health 
outcomes. A canonical risk judgement here would take the form, “If someone else 
does (or does not) perform protective behaviour X, there is a probability P that they 
will (or will not) experience homocysteine-related heart disease”. Such judgements 
would reference a health-related behaviour, the prospective health outcome, and 
others’ health. Figure 5.2 presents a Venn diagram of the overlap among these three 
categories.  
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Figure 5.2. Proportional Venn diagram depicting numbers of participants referencing 
others’ health, prospective health outcomes, and health-related behaviours 
 
 
It is seen that 12 participants (23.5%) were included in all three categories. 
Again, there were no examples of numerical estimates of risk among these responses. 
However, there were four participants who verbally expressed some sense of 
probability. One, for example, stated, “I also thought of my friends that never eat 
citrus fruits and that they may be at risk.”; another stated, “I also thought that it was a 
rather large amount of people who suffer from this disease”.  
Of the 12 participants, eight commented on a behaviour and a prospective 
health outcome in a way that strongly signalled a causal link. One stated, “I know a 
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lot of people who might not eat these foods regularly and from the information 
provided, could obviously cause heart problems.” Another commented, “Eating 
vegetables is better for your heart in terms of preventing heart problems.”. Four of 
these eight were those who conveyed a sense of probability.  
The remaining four participants made references to prospective health 
outcomes, but, in all cases, the behaviour and prospective health outcomes 
referenced concerned different target individuals; therefore, these could not be taken 
as signalling a causal link. For example, one participant commented on others’ health 
behaviour (“…young people are not eating healthy due to fast  food and easy 
pleasures that occur these days”) but then their own prospective health outcome (“I 
figure I am healthy and fit and I would not suffer the consequences.”). Another 
participant referenced the behaviour of two specific family members (“are my 
brother and father eating enough vegies?”) but then referenced the prospective 
outcome in the context of people in general (“if this is true, all these deaths could be 
prevented”). 
In summary, eight participants (15.7%) referenced and causally linked a 
health behaviour to the prospective health outcome of one or more others. Four of 
these expressed some sense of probability verbally.  
Overall, aggregating responses concerning own health, others’ health, or 
both, there were 20 participants (39.2% of the sample) who linked a health behaviour 
to a prospective health outcome. Six of these (11.8%) conveyed probability verbally. 
 
What if the criteria for identifying spontaneous risk judgements relating to the 
self are broadened so as to omit the requirement to reference health behaviour; they 
would thus include any responses that simply reference own health and prospective 
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health outcomes. This would capture judgements of the form, “There is a probability 
P that I will (or will not) experience homocysteine-related heart disease”. It is seen in 
Figure 5.1 that there were 16 participants (31.4%) who referenced own health and 
prospective health outcomes; the additional three participants were those already 
discussed who referenced behaviour but did not clearly draw a causal link.  
 
The criteria for judgements of others’ risk can be similarly broadened to omit 
the requirement to reference health behaviour; they would thus include any responses 
that simply reference others’ health and prospective health outcomes. This would 
capture judgements of the form, “There is a probability P that someone else will (or 
will not) experience homocysteine-related heart disease”. It is seen in Figure 5.2 that 
16 participants (31.8%) met this criterion. This includes the eight already discussed, 
who also referenced a health behaviour. Of the additional eight participants, three did 
not actually reference others’ prospective health outcomes; rather these participants 
referenced others’ health and their own prospective outcomes in separate, and 
unrelated, units.  
Thus, it seems reasonable to infer that at least 13 participants (25.5%) had 
considered the possibility of others’ experiencing homocysteine-related heart disease. 
Of these, six participants verbally conveyed a sense of the probability of others’ 
experiencing heart problems. One participant stated, “preventing 60,000 heart attacks 
in the USA is a massive amount”; the other stated, “that keeping homocystene down 
would save a lot of lives”. It is also noteworthy that of these 13 participants, all in 
some way referenced the prospect of a general group to which the participant 
themselves belonged. For example, by using words such as “we” and “our” 
participants explicitly included themselves in the group, or implicitly did so by 
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referring to “people (in general)” or “the public”. Thus, these statements can be seen 
as relevant to the self as well as to others. 
Overall, aggregating responses concerning own health, others’ health, or 
both, 24 participants (47.1%) referenced prospective health outcomes. Eight of these 
(15.7%) expressed probability verbally. 
 
5.4.3 Evidence of Valence Effects on System 2 Processing, Defensive 
Processing, and Persuasiveness. 
The two experimental groups were compared to test for differences relevant 
to the literature on the effects of event valence on System 2 processing and defensive 
processing. These comparisons involved some of the features already discussed, but 
also additional features.  
Because the stimulus message concerned a novel threat to health, so that participants 
would not have pre-formulated conclusions on which to rely, it was expected that 
both groups would engage in some effortful System 2 processing of the message. 
However, on the basis of the principle of loss aversion, it was also expected that the 
negative version of the stimulus message would elicit greater System 2 processing 
(see Section 5.2.1.1). There were several salient features of participants’ responses 
on which the two groups could be compared that seemed relevant to this possibility. 
In view of the definite expectations derived from the literature, one-tailed 
significance tests were employed.  
First, if participants put more effort into processing the stimulus message, one 
would expect that they would have more detailed responses; therefore, the groups 
were compared on the number of words and the number of units. Means and standard 
5.4.3.1 Evidence of valence effects on System 2 processing.  
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deviations are presented in Table 5.3. The NV group had significantly greater word 
counts overall than the PV group, t(49) = 2.92, p = .005. This also represented a 
greater number of thoughts: it is seen that the NV group had a greater number of 
thoughts per participant than did the PV group; this difference was significant, t(49) 
= 2.42, p = .019. 
Table 5.3 
Between-groups comparisons of features suggestive of System 2 processing. 
Experimental Condition Category 
NV PV 
Word count per 
participant 
M = 65.15 (SD = 33.98) M = 44.16 (SD = 20.60) 
Units per participant M = 4.08 (SD = 2.62) M = 2.88 (SD = 1.05) 
Health outcomes 23 (61.5%) 16 (44.0%) 
Diet 25 (96.1%) 16 (64.0%) 
Relating material to 
the self 
20 (76.9%) 9 (36.0%) 
N 26 25 
 
Second, one would expect that more effortful processing would lead to better 
recall of key information in the message. Therefore thoughts that suggested 
participants had attended to and understood the key information concerning the 
possible health outcomes were coded for. This included references to prospective 
outcomes discussed in Section 5.4.2 but also any comments about homocysteine and 
heart-disease more generally. Thoughts that implied participants had attended to the 
information concerning dietary recommendations were also coded for, but 
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corresponded precisely to those deemed to be behaviour-related in Section 5.4.2.  It 
is seen in Table 5.3 that the NV group were more likely than the PV group to 
reference the health outcome information; Fisher’s Exact Test revealed that this 
difference was significant, p = .041. Similarly, the NV group was significantly more 
likely to reference the information about diet, p = .004. 
Third, more thoughtful processing might lead individuals to relate the 
message to themselves. The stimulus messages used in this study, like typical health 
warnings, were phrased in terms of the threat to a general group; the messages were 
not tailored to the participant as an individual. Very often, however, participants 
applied the information to themselves. (These thoughts were those deemed to 
concern “own health” in section Section 5.4.2.) It is seen from Table 5.3 that the NV 
group was more likely than the PV group to do this; Fisher’s Exact Test indicated 
that this difference was significant, p = .003.  
Fourth, it was proposed in Section 5.2.1.1 that if the NV message prompted 
greater involvement of System 2, one might expect to find more risk judgements in 
the NV group.  
Table 5.4 presents the numbers and proportions of participants in each group 
whose responses met narrower and broader criteria for evidence spontaneous risk 
judgements (see Section 5.4.2), and the significance of the differences. Because some 
participants made references concerning both own and others, disaggregated 
numbers for self- and other-references sum to more than the aggregated total. It is 
seen that in most cases, evidence for risk judgements was more common in the NV 
group than the PV group. In particular, there was a significant difference for 
references to prospective outcomes for the self, whether or not there was a causal 
link to behaviour; differences also reached significance if references concerning the 
  
180 
self and others were aggregated. However, when it was required that responses 
conveyed some sense of probability (even merely implicitly) , the differences did not 
reach significance.   
Table 5.4  
Between-group comparisons of thoughts providing evidence of risk judgements 
 Experimental Condition  
Category NV PV Significance  
(Fisher’s Exact 
Test; one-tailed) 
Referenced a prospective 
health outcome AND drew a 
causal link with behaviour 
   
        a) for the self 12 (46.1%) 1 (4.0%) p < .001 
        b) for others 6 (23.1%) 2 (8.0%) p = .14 
        either a) or b)  17 (65.4%) 3 (12.0%) p < .001 
AND conveyed 
probability  
5 (19.23%) 1 (4.0%) p = .10 
    
Referenced a prospective 
health outcome  
   
         c) for the self 14 (53.8%) 2 (8.0%) p < .001 
         d) for others 8 (30.6%) 5 (20.0%) p = .29 
 either c) or d) 17 (65.4%) 7 (28.0%) p = .008 
AND conveyed 
probability 
5 (19.23%) 3 (12.0%) p = .37 
    
N 26 25  
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If the negative version of the stimulus message elicited greater concern, a 
consequence of this may have been more defensive processing in the NV group than 
the PV group (see Section 5.2.1.2). There were three categories of thought that could 
plausibly be evidence of such defensive processing. Again, in view of the definite 
expectations derived from the literature, one-tailed significance tests were employed 
to test for differences here.  
First, some participants reported thoughts indicating that their own risk was 
low. The numbers of participants listing such thoughts in each group are presented in 
Table 5.5. It is seen that thoughts of this kind were present for the NV group but not 
the PV group; Fisher’s Exact Test revealed the difference to be marginally 
significant, p = .060.  
Table 5.5 
Between-group comparisons of features suggestive of defensive processing. 
 Experimental Condition 
Category NV PV 
A. Own Risk Low 4 (15.4%) 0 (0.0%) 
B. Others’ Risk High 4 (15.4%) 0 (0.0%) 
C. Both A and B 4 (15.4%) 0 (0.0%) 
D. Derogation of study 3 (11.5%) 1  (4.0%) 
   
C and/or D 7 (26.9%) 1 (4.0%) 
Total 26 25 
 
 
5.4.3.2 Evidence of effects of event valence on defensive processing.  
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Second, even if it cannot be plausibly concluded that own risk is low, comfort 
can be sought in favourable comparison of own and others’ risk – a judgement that 
one’s risk is relatively low (UO). The numbers of participants reporting that others 
are at high risk are in Table 5.5. Again, it is seen that only the NV group reported this 
kind of thought; Fisher’s Exact Test revealed this difference to be marginally 
significant, p = .060. There was a perfect overlap between those reporting  thoughts 
that own risk was low and those reporting thoughts that others’ risk was high: all 
four participants included in one category were included in the other. Although none 
of these participants explicitly compared own and others’ risk, the juxtaposition of 
statements suggests that these participants were indeed making comparative 
judgments resembling UO.  
Third, thoughts derogating the credibility or relevance of the information in 
the stimulus message may bring comfort, because this casts doubt on there being any 
threat to health at all. Some participants derogated the information by questioning the 
methodology of the study (e.g., “How did they prove a causal link rather than merely 
an association?”) or the credibility of the message source  (e.g., “How do I know this 
information is in fact correct?”). Table 5.5 presents the numbers of participants 
listing such thoughts in each group. It is seen that more did so in the NV than the PV 
condition; however, this difference was not significant, p = .390 (Fisher’s Exact 
Test). 
It may be added that, if an individual derogates the credibility of the message, 
they are unlikely to feel a need to make a UO judgement as well: if the study can be 
dismissed out of hand, there is no need for any further defensive reaction. Indeed, 
examination revealed that no participants who derogated the information also 
reported making a UO judgement. 
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To obtain a total estimate of those engaging in defensive processing, the 
number in each group either reporting a UO judgement or derogating the information 
was calculated. It is seen in Table 5.5 that there were more such participants in the 
NV group than the PV group; this difference was significant, p = .028 (Fisher’s 
Exact Test). It thus appears that consistent with the literature, there was greater 
evidence of defensive processing in the NV than PV condition. 
 
A number of 
participants reported thoughts indicating that they were considering making 
improvements to their diet. Examples include, “After hearing this information, I 
might eventually take more healthy food.” and “I should make more of a 
conscientious effort to eat more vegetables and fruit”).  
There are reasons for expecting that such thoughts might have been more 
common in the NV condition than the PV condition, but also reasons for suggesting 
the opposite. On the one hand, the principle of loss aversion suggests that such 
thoughts may be more common in the NV group: if negatively-framed messages are 
encoded in terms of losses (which loom larger than equivalent gains) then individuals 
given these messages may be more motivated to seek protection on account of the 
greater perceived threat (see Section 5.2.1). On the other hand, if the NV group 
engaged in more defensive processing, then this could have undermined the 
persuasiveness of the message, leading to less intention to improve (see Section 
5.2.1.2). Rothman and Salovey’s (1997) theory involving the “reflection effect” 
would also predict that negatively-framed messages would be less effective for 
motivating a preventative behaviour (see Section 5.2.4). 
5.4.3.3 Evidence of valence effects on persuasiveness.  
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In the absence of a clear reason for a directional hypothesis, a two-tailed 
Fisher’s Exact Test was used to compare the number in each group mentioning that 
they were considering improving their diet. Whereas nine participants (34.6%) listed 
such thoughts in the NV condition, only two (8.0%) did so in the PV condition; this 
difference was significant (p = .023). This suggests that the NV version of the 
stimulus message was in practice more persuasive than the PV version. 
 
5.5 Discussion 
The present study employed a thought-listing methodology to seek evidence 
for individuals spontaneously judging risk. Participants were presented with a 
message warning them of a novel threat to health (viz, homocysteine-related heart 
disease); they were then asked to report the thoughts that occurred to them while they 
were reading the message. This context was one in which risk judgements, to the 
extent they occur spontaneously, seemed particularly likely to be evident. 
Indeed, in this context, and employing the thought-listing methodology, 
evidence for risk judgements was more readily apparent than in Studies 1 and 2. In 
the present study, 25.5% referenced their own prospect of developing heart problems 
and made a causal link with a health behaviour; by contrast, only 0.4% of Twitter 
messages and 6.7% of blog posts referenced prospective ill-health and linked it to 
behaviour. When the criterion of a causal link to behaviour was omitted, 31.4% of 
the present study’s participants were accounted for, compared with 2.2% and 15.8% 
in Studies 1 and 2, respectively. Judgements of others’ risk were also more evident in 
the present study. Others’ prospective heart problems were causally linked to 
behaviour by 15.7%, compared with 0.4% and 3.3% in Studies 1 and 2. When the 
criterion of a causal link to behaviour was omitted, 25.5% of the present study’s 
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participants were accounted for, compared with 3.3% and 11.7% in Studies 1 and 2. 
Aggregating responses concerning own and others’ health, 39.2% of participants 
causally linked behaviour to prospective ill-health (in this study, homocysteine-
related heart disease); and 47.1% at least referenced prospective ill-health. By 
comparison, the corresponding proportions were 0.7% and 5.2% of Twitter 
messages, and 8.3% and 25.8% of blog entries.  
What could explain this difference? There were several aspects of the present 
study that may have helped bring risk judgements to the fore. First, the thought-
listing instructions told participants to report all of their spontaneous thoughts 
without censoring, modifying, or interpreting them. The aim was to discourage 
participants from filtering their thoughts. Studies 1 and 2, by contrast, analysed 
communication that arose for a social purpose; the authors of the Twitter messages 
and blog posts may well have omitted, modified, or re-organised thoughts, to avoid 
redundancy and to suit their communicative aims.  
Second, the stimulus message concerned a threat to health that was likely to 
have been unfamiliar to the participants. As such, they were less likely to have 
previously formulated judgements that could quickly and easily be accessed from 
memory. Thus, these data may reflect judgements that were made more effortfully 
and slowly (via System 2), and were consequently more available to conscious 
awareness.  
Third, although the present study aimed to maximise ecological validity, the 
methodology necessarily created a more artificial context. Participants were aware 
they were participating in a university psychological study, which in itself may have 
prompted a more analytical (System 2) mode of thinking than is typical. Moreover, 
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they completed the study on campus; this environment may have put them in a more 
analytical frame of mind.  
Fourth, participants in Studies 1, 2, and 3 came from different populations 
and thus may have differed on important characteristics. For example, the present 
study employed university students, so the level of education may well have been 
higher than in the other studies. Students may be likely to engage in more effortful, 
elaborative processing than would the average Twitter or blog user. 
Fifth, although participants listed their thoughts immediately after reading the 
stimulus message, the task may nevertheless have been subject to the problems 
associated with retrospective recall. It may be that, for some individuals, risk-related 
thoughts were not elicited by the stimulus messages, but were reported because it 
was felt, after the fact, that such a thought ought to have occurred.  
 
A noteworthy similarity between the findings of the present study and those 
of Studies 1 and 2, was that participants never spontaneously articulated a risk 
judgement as a “probability estimate” (e.g., none used percentage probabilities, 
frequencies, or odds ratios; see Section 1.4.2.3). For the present study, this finding is 
particularly noteworthy in light of the fact that risk information was provided by the 
stimulus message in numerical terms. Although some participants in the present 
study repeated the statistics referenced in the stimulus message (e.g., “60,000 heart 
attacks in the USA is a massive amount”), none attempted to convert this into a 
probability estimate. For example, one might have expected someone to use an 
estimate of the US population to conclude something like, “That means the risk of 
homocysteine-related heart attack is less than 1 in 5000”.  
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One in six participants (15.7%) did employ “probability expressions”, using 
terms such as “at risk”, “likely”, “unlikely”. Combining this with the findings of 
Studies 1 and 2, it appears that most individuals rarely spontaneously articulate 
probability estimates of risk, doing so only if prompted by a researcher. 
How should this robust finding, observed in three different sources of data, be 
interpreted? One possible explanation might be that individuals do not even 
discriminate between more than a few levels of risk unless required to do so. This 
might be because discriminating between more than a few levels of risk could require 
significantly greater System 2 processing, and thus greater time and effort. If 
individuals have made a judgement only in terms of high versus low risk, then verbal 
descriptors such as “likely” and “unlikely” are sufficient, and reflect the nature of 
these spontaneous judgements. 
On the one hand, this explanation dovetails well with dual-process theories, 
which hold that System 2 processing requires effort and that individuals seek to 
minimise effort by using heuristic strategies. In general, individuals seek to minimise 
effortful processing. On the other hand, Studies 1 and 2 concerned samples of 
internet communication which, in some cases, concerned the reasonably imminent 
prospect of serious ill-health or death for the writer. One would expect that at least 
these individuals would have been sufficiently motivated to estimate their risk with 
some precision. Therefore, on the evidence considered thus far, this explanation is 
not entirely convincing.  
Alternatively, one could argue that individuals actually made reasonably 
precise probability estimates, but omitted such estimates from twitter messages, blog 
posts, and thought-listing responses. In Studies 1 and 2, participants may have 
omitted numerical estimates because, in a social interaction, precision was not 
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necessary. However, in the present study, participants were specifically asked to 
report all thoughts without concern for relevance. Certainly, it cannot be assumed 
that all complied with this instruction. Nevertheless, it seems difficult to believe that 
many participants consciously formulated probability estimates, but all felt it was 
necessary to summarise estimates using vague probability expressions.  
 Another possible explanation is that, in their spontaneous judgements of risk, 
individuals do typically discriminate between many levels of risk, but also typically 
represent their judgement merely in terms of relatively “fuzzy”, System 1 based 
intuitions. Such representations might be thought of as intervals encompassing a 
range of values on a continuous probability scale, but intervals with “fuzzy” 
boundaries (Wallsten & Budescu, 1995). Individuals may typically find these fuzzy 
representations sufficient for the purpose of their own decision making. If required 
to, they may be able to map such judgements to probability estimates, however, 
doing so would require particular cognitive effort on their part. They would need to 
choose an appropriate numerical format in which to express a judgement, consider 
the maximum and minimum numerical values possible, consider what risk would 
correspond to those maximum and minimum values, choose a number to represent 
their judgement, consider the plausibility of that number, and adjust the number and 
consider its plausibility until satisfied. If there is no requirement to formulate a 
probability estimate, then for the purposes of choosing whether to take some action, 
a fuzzy representation of risk may suffice (Wallsten & Budescu, 1995; Windschitl & 
Wells, 1996).  
 
A subsidiary aim of the present study was to examine the effects of event 
valence. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of two versions of the 
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stimulus message: one framed in negative terms, the other in positive terms. 
Consistent with the valence-framing literature, there were several aspects of 
participants’ responses which implied that the NV message was processed more 
deliberatively (i.e., there was greater involvement of System 2). Participants who 
read the NV message reported a greater number of thoughts, and articulated them 
with a greater number of words. They were significantly more likely to comment on 
the health outcomes and dietary recommendations mentioned in the message; this 
suggests that they had made more of an effort to attend to, understand, and remember 
this key information. This group was also more likely to go beyond the message and 
relate the information to themselves. Evidence for risk judgements was also more 
common in the NV than PV condition. Specifically, there were more references to 
prospective health outcomes and their behavioural causes in the NV condition.  
These effects are consistent with Prospect Theory, in combination with the 
HSM, ELM, and other dual-process models. If the negatively-framed message was 
encoded in terms of a prospective loss, then the principle of “loss aversion” predicts 
that this message would elicit greater concern (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Dual-
process theories hold that System 2 processing of information occurs to the extent 
that the individual has motivation to carry it out, because such processing requires 
effort (see Section 5.2.1.1). Additional concern about the threat elicited in the NV 
condition may provide this motivation. For example, individuals may have been 
motivated to examine the information more carefully to arrive at an accurate 
judgement.  
As was argued in Section 3.5, risk judgements may be more likely to occur to 
the extent individuals employ System 2. Because risk judgements involve thinking 
about future hypothetical outcomes, they may require the more abstract mode of 
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thought associated with System 2. Further, dual-process theories hold that System 2 
processes are available to conscious awareness. The thought-listing methodology can 
only capture consciously available thoughts, because only these can be reported. 
When risk judgements involve only fast and automatic System 1 processes, it would 
be more difficult to find evidence of these using thought listing. It may also be that 
more System 2 processing means that risk-related thoughts were in working memory 
for a longer duration, and therefore had a better chance of being encoded into long-
term memory. Thus, participants may be more likely to recall these thoughts when 
asked to list their thoughts later.  
 
Another difference observed between conditions – and another indication that 
the NV message caused greater concern – was more evidence of defensive 
processing in response to the NV message than the PV message. There were more 
participants who had responses resembling UO or who derogated the information in 
the message. This is consistent with Prospect Theory in combination with the theory 
of motivated reasoning. Participants in the negative condition may have felt more 
motivated to arrive at a conclusion that would bring them comfort. Concluding that 
one is at low risk relative to others (the UO conclusion) might provide such comfort. 
Derogating the information presented may also do this, because, if the information 
provided can be doubted, then one need not even attempt to apply it to oneself.  
It was also found that participants in the NV condition were more likely than 
those in the PV to state they were considering improving their diet. Thus, although 
the NV condition showed greater evidence of defensive processing, it would seem 
that overall the NV message was more persuasive than the PV version.  
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Studies 1, 2, and 3 were all concerned with the question of whether 
individuals spontaneously make judgements of health-related risk, and if so, whether 
spontaneous judgements resemble those typically solicited by researchers. In all of 
these studies, there were references to both own and others’ prospective ill-health, 
some of them causally linked to a behaviour. However, there was not a single 
instance of an individual spontaneously providing a probability estimate. This was 
the case even in Study 3, in which the health event considered was unfamiliar and 
serious, and in which numerical information relevant to judging the risk was 
provided. Although these data can not establish that individuals never spontaneously 
arrive at such estimates, they suggest that this occurs only rarely.  
Does this mean that when researchers solicit risk estimates, they are 
provoking a judgement that rarely occurs in everyday life? This seems to be the case. 
If solicited risk judgement measures require something additional from participants, 
then solicitation of risk judgements may well alter responses. Even if individuals 
have spontaneously formulated a risk judgement, soliciting a probability estimate 
may provoke them to engage in further processing that affects their judgement.  
Having examined spontaneous health-related thinking, the thesis now turns to 
examine the concordance of solicited judgements with spontaneous ones. The next 
chapter presents a study which sought to experimentally test for effects of soliciting 
risk judgements.  
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Chapter 6 - Study 4: Risk Judgement Solicitation Effects 
Studies 1-3 investigated the extent to which risk judgements occur 
spontaneously. But they did not actually investigate the central issue of whether 
soliciting risk judgements alters those judgements. An important assumption is that 
the act of measuring a construct does not inadvertently influence that construct in a 
significant way. In Chapter 2, it was argued that there are several mechanisms by 
which soliciting a risk judgement may impact on that judgement: these include 
enhancing the involvement of System 2 processes, affecting the use of judgement 
heuristics, amplifying motivated reasoning, amplifying self-presentation biases, and 
imposing greater cognitive load. This chapter reports a study designed specifically to 
test for effects of soliciting risk judgements.  
6.1 Testing for Solicitation Effects 
Testing for solicitation effects presents a challenge. The hypothesis is that the 
act of soliciting a risk judgement alters that judgement, such that solicited estimates 
of risk differ from unsolicited ones. But how could one ever test this directly? To 
directly compare solicited and unsolicited judgements both would have to be 
quantitative in nature. But it was seen in Studies 1, 2, and 3 that individuals almost 
never spontaneously offer probability estimates (e.g., percentage probabilities, 
frequencies, or odds ratios). There would thus be no common metric for solicited and 
unsolicited judgements, comparison would be impossible.  
A solution may be found by drawing an analogy from the literature on the 
effects of soliciting behavioural intentions. These effects have been referred to as 
“mere-measurement effects”, “question-behaviour effects”, “self-prophecy effects”, 
or “reactive effects of measurement”. This stream of research began with a study by 
Sherman (1980) that tested individuals’ ability to predict whether they would 
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perform socially desirable behaviours in the future (e.g., volunteering for a charity). 
The study had two groups: one group was asked to predict whether they would 
perform a behaviour, while a control group was simply given the opportunity to 
perform the behaviour but not questioned about it beforehand. Those questioned 
tended to subsequently perform the behaviour at a much higher rate than those not 
questioned. For example, in the charitable volunteering study, 31.1% of the 
questioned group actually volunteered, compared to just 4.2% of the control group. 
Thus, there was a large effect of a behavioural intention question on subsequent 
behaviour.  
Since Sherman’s (1980) study, effects of asking behavioural questions have 
been replicated with regard to other socially desirable behaviours including 
recycling, voting in elections, donating blood (Godin et al., 2008, 2010), flossing 
(Levav & Fitzsimons, 2006), attending health clubs (Spangenberg, 1997), having 
one’s health and fitness assessed (Sprott et al., 2004), recycling aluminum cans 
(Spangenberg, Sprott, Grohmann, & Smith, 2003; Sprott, Spangenberg, & Perkins, 
1999), donating to one’s alma mater (Obermiller & Spangenberg, 2000), and 
choosing low-fat snacks over less healthy options (Sprott, Spangenberg, & Fisher, 
2003). In these studies, asking behavioural questions increased the performance of 
these behaviours. Behavioural questions have also been found to increase some 
socially undesirable behaviours, including drinking alcohol, having unsafe or 
unprotected sex, using drugs use, and skipping class (Fitzsimons & Moore, 2008); 
effects have also been observed on more neutral behaviours, such as consumer 
purchasing of particular brands of goods (Fitzsimons & Morwitz, 1996).  
Importantly, in some studies, measurement effects of this kind have been 
found to persist over extended periods of time. For example, Godin, Sheeran, 
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Conner, and Germain (2008) found an effect of asking recent blood donors whether 
they would donate blood again; the effect was evident both 6 months and a year after 
questioning.  
In summary, then, this body of research illustrates that simply asking a 
question can sometimes have large and long-lasting effects on another variable that is 
“downstream” of it (that is, influenced by it). One infers that asking a question about 
variable X had an effect on variable X, by showing an effect on variable Y, that is 
influenced by variable X.  
6.2 Testing for Risk Judgement Solicitation Effects  
This type of research design could be used to test for effects of soliciting risk 
judgements. As discussed in Section 1.1, the risk motivation hypothesis, common to 
most HBTs, holds that risk judgements influence motivation for protective 
behavioural change. One would therefore expect greater motivation for change to the 
extent that individuals judge their risk to be high. In turn, one would expect this to 
manifest in behavioural intentions: those who judge their risk to be high should 
exhibit stronger intentions to change. Thus intentions are downstream of risk 
judgements in the same way that behaviours are downstream of intentions. It follows 
that, just as the effects of soliciting intentions can become evident by examining 
behaviours, so the effects of soliciting risk judgements might become evident by 
examining behavioural intentions. An experimental design comparing the 
behavioural intentions of a group presented with risk questions with those of a group 
not presented with such questions, may serve to reveal effects of soliciting risk 
judgements. 
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6.3 Interactions Between Solicitation and Numbers Provided  
What type of effect on intentions is likely to be produced by soliciting risk 
judgements? Because there are several possible mechanisms (see Section 2.2), it is 
difficult to formulate a directional hypothesis. However, there are reasons to expect 
an interaction between solicitation and another variable to be described below.  
6.3.1 Interactions Due to Greater Involvement of System 2 
It was argued in Section 2.2.1 that soliciting risk judgements may promote 
greater involvement of System 2 processes. A possible consequence is that 
individuals may respond differently to normatively relevant quantitative information 
concerning an event; they may become more sensitive to this sort of information. 
Previous research involving judgements in other domains has shown that 
manipulations that promote more rational, rule-based (i.e., System 2) processing lead 
individuals to be more normatively rational, in sense that they take more account of 
the quantitative aspects of a judgement object (e.g., the number, size, amount, or 
degree). For example, Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) manipulated two independent 
variables. First, they manipulated the extent to which participants used calculations 
(System 2) versus feelings (System 1) by employing a priming task: participants 
were asked questions requiring either mathematical calculations or the accessing of 
feelings. In an ostensibly unrelated task, participants were then assigned to judge 
how much they would be willing to pay to buy either 5 or 10 Madonna compact discs 
from a friend. Those primed to employ System 2 processes were willing to pay 
significantly more for 10 than 5 CDs; they displayed a more rational pattern of 
valuation. Those primed to employ feelings, however, were not willing to pay 
significantly more for 10 CDs than 5, and thus showed a less rational pattern of 
valuation.  
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Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) explained this finding in terms of feelings 
being sensitive mainly to the presence versus absence of qualitative aspects of a 
judgement object. For the discs study, feelings would be determined mainly by one’s 
opinion of Madonna and her music, and that the discs were being bought from a 
friend; these factors did not vary across conditions. By contrast, judgements 
involving more “calculation” are sensitive to quantitative aspects of a judgement 
object; here, the number to be purchased would be a dominant factor. Importantly, in 
this study, the manipulation that induced greater sensitivity to quantitative 
information induced a more rational relationship between that information and 
relevant judgements.  
Although most empirical research on this phenomenon has involved 
judgements of value (e.g., Dunn & Ashton-James, 2007; Small, Loewenstein & 
Slovic, 2007), the same principle seems relevant to judgements of risk. Judgements 
of risk too can be influenced by quantitative information (e.g., the number or 
proportion of people affected per year, how many more people in one group are 
affected than in another, etc.); hereafter this will be referred to as the “numbers 
provided” to the participants.  It seems possible that greater involvement of System 2 
may increase the extent to which individuals incorporate quantitative information in 
a rational way.   
If soliciting risk judgements promotes more rational processing, it follows 
that an effect of soliciting risk judgements may moderate the influence of providing 
high versus low numbers. If a risk judgement were solicited, higher numbers would 
lead to relatively greater numbers than would lower numbers. In turn, this would be 
expected to have an effect on downstream variables, such as behavioural intentions. 
Therefore, if risk judgements were solicited, individuals would more strongly intend 
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to make protective behavioural change in response to high numbers than low 
numbers, relative to any difference observed if risk judgements were not solicited.  
6.3.2 Interactions Due to Greater Motivated Reasoning 
Alternatively, soliciting risk judgements might have the opposite effect, if it 
amplifies motivated reasoning. As was suggested in Section 2.2.3, posing a question 
about risk may force individuals to consider a threat to their health in particular 
depth; they might otherwise avoid thinking about the threat in such depth to avoid 
anxiety. If instead, people underestimate their risk in order to bring themselves 
comfort, one might expect this to occur to a greater extent if the numbers provided 
were high than if they were low, on the basis that the former would elicit greater 
anxiety. If risk judgements were solicited, individuals may employ greater motivated 
reasoning, and hence have a less rational (or more irrational) pattern of risk 
perceptions. They would perceive less risk in response to high than low numbers, 
relative to the case if risk judgements were not solicited. In turn, this would be 
expected to have downstream effects. Individuals would have less intention to make 
a protective change in response to high than low numbers, relative to any difference 
observed when risk judgements were not solicited. Thus, an interaction effect of 
solicitation and numbers provided on intentions would again occur, but in the 
opposite direction to that proposed in the previous section.  
6.4 The Present Study 
The present study sought to examine these possibilities by testing for risk 
judgement solicitation effects following the presentation of a health message. The 
message was similar to that employed in Study 3: it warned of a link between levels 
of the amino acid homocysteine and the risk of heart disease. As noted in Section 
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5.3.3, previous research conducted at Deakin University has shown that most 
undergraduate students are unaware of homocysteine and its effects on health (Gold 
& Martyn, 2003, 2004). This allowed information about it to be plausibly 
manipulated by varying key phrases across two versions of the message. Half the 
participants were informed that homocysteine-related heart disease affects a large 
number of people; the other half were informed it affects a smaller number. 
In addition, judgements of risk were solicited for half the sample but not the 
other half. Two judgements were solicited: one about participants’ own likelihood of 
developing homocysteine-related heart disease, and another about that of the average 
peer. 
Finally, all participants answered two questions concerning intentions to 
increase their intake of the protective foods mentioned in the message. The first 
question concerned how strongly they intended to improve their diet. On the basis 
that either of the mechanisms for solicitation effects discussed in Section 6.3.1 and 
6.3.2 might plausibly come into play, and they would act in opposite directions, a 
non-directional hypothesis was formulated. It was hypothesised that there would be a 
significant interaction of solicitation and the numbers provided on intention strength.  
The second question concerned the timeframe within which behavioural 
change was intended. Participants were asked how soon they intended to make the 
change, on the assumption that those more motivated to change their behaviour 
would intend to do so sooner. This variable was intended to capture not just the 
degree of desire to change behaviour ‘eventually’, but the degree of desire to make 
concrete plans to achieve such change in the near future – somewhat more of what 
Gollwitzer (1993) terms an implementation intention. An implementation intention 
concerns specific plans for how and when an individual intends to achieve a goal, 
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rather than simply an intention to achieve it tout court (Gollwitzer terms the latter a 
goal intention). Implementation intentions have been shown to have a stronger 
relationship with behaviour than do goal intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer & 
Brandstatter, 1997), but they are more difficult to activate than goal intentions; a 
persuasive message may provoke an intention to pursue a goal (e.g., behavioural 
change), but an individual may not form plans on how and when they will do so. For 
example, a message about the importance of healthy eating might prompt individuals 
to form an intention to improve their diet (a goal intention), but not prompt any 
thoughts about which foods to avoid, which healthy foods to purchase when next 
shopping for groceries, or when to begin making a change (implementation 
intentions). Asking participants about when they intended to make a change seemed 
likely to tap, to a greater extent, whether participants were so greatly motivated that 
they planned to implement change in the near future.  
Depending on the magnitude of the solicitation effects, it seemed possible 
that the experimental manipulations would so greatly impact the persuasiveness of 
the message that the intended timeframe for making a change would be impacted. It 
was therefore (tentatively) hypothesised that there would be an interaction of 
solicitation and the numbers provided on intended timeframe. Again, because the two 
proposed mechanisms for solicitation effects would act on intended timeframe in 
opposite directions, a directional hypothesis was not formulated.  
6.5 Method 
6.5.1 Participants 
The sample comprised 116 Deakin University undergraduate students who 
were enrolled in science, engineering, and journalism courses. The author addressed 
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students in these courses and invited them to remain after their lecture to complete a 
questionnaire if they wished to participate. Of those who elected to participate, two-
thirds (69.8%) were female; the mean age was 19.61 years (SD = 2.41 years). Neither 
age nor gender differed significantly across experimental conditions (F(3,112) = 
1.103, p = .351, and (3) = 3.750, p = .290, respectively) Participants received no 
payment or course credit for taking part.  
6.5.2 Design, Measures, and Procedure  
A 2 (solicitation: solicited versus not solicited) X 2 (numbers provided: high 
versus low) between-subjects design was employed. The experimental manipulations 
were effected by presenting each participant with one of four alternative versions of a 
paper questionnaire (each page of which was printed on one side only so that only 
one was viewed at a time). Participants were told not to turn back to earlier pages. 
They were randomly assigned to their conditions by interleaving the different 
versions of the questionnaire. 
All versions of the questionnaire began with a health message warning of the 
link between the amino acid homocysteine and heart disease. The number of cases of 
homocysteine-related heart disease was stated for all participants; for half, the 
number given was relatively high, while for the other half, it was relatively low. 
Below, the phrases which differed across high- and low-number conditions are 
indicated in italics, with the low-number version in parentheses: 
Homocysteine is an amino acid found in the blood stream. A recent study by 
the University of Washington has suggested that having high levels of 
homocysteine when you are young makes you very much more (somewhat 
more) vulnerable to developing heart problems later in life. The researchers 
estimate that unsafe levels of homocysteine lead to approximately 60,000 
(5,000) heart attack deaths in the USA each year, and cause the onset of heart 
disease in as many as 250,000 (20,000) other people. The vitamin, folic acid, 
found in green leafy vegetables, beans and citrus fruits, breaks down 
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homocysteine. Thus, failing to eat adequate amounts of these foods greatly 
(somewhat) increases the likelihood of becoming ill with heart disease later. 
 
After reading this message, participants turned the page. Half the sample – 
those in the solicitation condition – were asked to report risk-related judgements. 
These items were chosen to be representative of the type of risk judgements most 
commonly solicited from participants in health psychological research (see Section 
1.4). The first risk judgement item required a “self-estimate”; it asked, “What do you 
think is the likelihood that you will develop homocysteine-related heart problems 
later in life?” The second risk judgement item required an “other-estimate”; it asked, 
“What do you think is the likelihood that the average person of your age and gender 
will develop homocysteine-related heart problems later in life?” Responses to these 
questions were given on a 7-point Likert scale with anchors of “not at all likely” and 
“extremely likely”. The other half of the sample – those in the no-solicitation 
condition – were not presented with these questions; they proceeded directly to the 
final page.  
For all versions of the questionnaire, the final page presented two items 
concerning participants’ intentions to increase the consumption of green leafy 
vegetables, beans, and citrus fruits. The first item measured “intention strength”: 
participants were asked, “How strongly do you intend to increase the amount of 
green leafy vegetables, beans, and/or citrus fruits that you eat per day?” They 
responded on a 7-point Likert scale anchored by “do not at all intend” and “strongly 
intend”. The second item measured the timeframe within which participants intended 
to make the change (“intended timeframe”). They were asked, “How soon will you 
try to make this change?” and responded by writing a number in the space provided 
and circling a unit of time (days, weeks, months, years). Participants had the option 
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of ticking a checkbox labelled “not applicable: I don’t intend to make any change.” 
Table 6.1 provides a summary of the stimuli, measures for each condition, and 
numbers in each group. 
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Table 6.1 
Summary of measures and stimuli presented in each condition 
Condition 
 S, H 
 
(risk 
judgements 
solicited / high 
numbers) 
NS, H 
 
(risk 
judgements not 
solicited / high 
numbers) 
S, L 
 
(risk  
judgements 
solicited / low 
numbers) 
NS, L  
 
(risk judgements 
not solicited / 
low numbers) 
N 32 29 26 29 
     
Page 1 Demographic 
items: 
Demographic 
items: 
Demographic 
items: 
Demographic 
items: 
 Age Age Age Age 
 Gender Gender Gender Gender 
     
Page 2 Message:  Message:  Message:  Message:  
 High 
numbers   
version 
High 
numbers 
version 
Low numbers 
version 
Low numbers 
version 
     
Page 3 Judgement 
items: 
 Judgement 
items: 
 
 Self-estimate  Self-estimate  
 Other-estimate  Other-estimate  
     
Page 4 Intention 
items: 
Intention 
items: 
Intention 
items: 
Intention 
items: 
 Intention 
strength 
Intention 
strength 
Intention 
strength 
Intention 
strength 
 Intended 
timeframe 
Intended 
timeframe 
Intended 
timeframe 
Intended 
timeframe 
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6.6 Results 
6.6.1 Data Cleaning and Transformations 
For the “intended timeframe” variable, all responses were converted into days. If 
participants specified a range, the mid-point of that range was entered (e.g., “1-2 
days” was entered as 1.5 days). The intended timeframe variable was severely 
positively skewed (Z of skewness = 34.94); also, a number of participants indicated 
for this item that they did not intend to ever make a change. To make this variable 
amenable to analysis, responses were recoded on an ordinal scale according to the 
scheme described in 
Table 6.2. After this recoding, skew was acceptable (Z of skewness = 2.42)4. 
Following these procedures there were no outliers on either of the dependent 
variables.  
 
Table 6.2 
Initial and recoded values for "intended timeframe". 
Initial response Recoded 
value 
0-1 days 1 
1-7 days 2 
7-14 days 3 
14-30 days 4 
30-365 days 5 
> 365 days or no intention to ever make a change 6 
 
6.6.2 Effects on Intention Strength 
Figure 6.1 presents the means and standard deviations across conditions for 
intention strength. It is seen that intentions to increase intake of the protective foods 
were strongest in the S,H group, weakest in the NS,H group, and intermediate in the 
                                                
4 Bootstrapping (Efron, 1979) confirmed that with the sample sizes obtained, this level of skewness 
did not alter the results of significance tests.  
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S,L and NS,L groups.  Scores on intention strength were submitted to a 2 
(solicitation: risk judgements solicited versus not solicited) X 2 (numbers provided: 
high versus low) ANOVA. There was a marginally significant main effect of 
solicitation, F(1,112) = 3.72, p = .056, and no significant main effect of numbers 
provided, F(1, 112) = 0.11, p = .743. However, this was qualified by a marginally 
significant interaction of solicitation and numbers provided, F(1,112) = 3.10, p = 
.081. 
 
Figure 6.1. Means (standard deviations) across groups for intention strength. 
 
Although Levene’s Test of Homogeneity of Variance was non-significant, 
F(3,112) = 2.15,  p = .098, it was noted that the standard deviations of the two low-
number groups were somewhat larger than the those of the high-number groups. 
Being an omnibus test, ANOVA uses the within-group variance from all groups in 
the calculation of the F-ratio.  Thus, it seemed possible that this had reduced the 
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statistical power to correctly detect a difference between the two high-number 
groups. In light of this, and the fact that the  interaction effect was marginally 
significant, a series of supplementary t-tests were conducted. Whereas the ANOVA 
pooled the within-group variance of all four groups, as would simple effects tests, 
standard t-tests pool only the within-group variance of the two groups being 
compared.  
All six possible t-tests were conducted using a Bonferroni-corrected alpha 
level of .008 to control for multiple comparisons. There was therefore no inflation of 
the experiment-wise error rate. Table 6.3 presents the results of each test. It is seen 
that the only groups which differed significantly from each other were the S,H and 
NS,H groups. The outcomes of all other comparisons were non-significant. Thus, 
there was an effect of solicitation when numbers were high, but not when they were 
low. When they were high, soliciting risk judgements caused a stronger intention to 
increase intake of the protective foods. The size of this effect was medium to large 
(Cohen’s d = .79).  
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Table 6.3 
Pairwise t-tests comparing groups on intention strength 
Groups compared Significance 
S,H and NS,H t(59) = 3.09, p = .003 
S,H and S,L t(56) = 1.40, p = .167 
S,H and NS,L t(59) = 1.66, p = .103 
NS,H and NS,L t(56) = 1.07, p = .289 
NS,H and S,L t(53) = 1.12, p = .270 
S,L and NS,L t(53) = 0.12, p = .907 
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Figure 6.2. Means (standard deviations) across groups for intended timeframe 
6.6.1 Effects on Intended Timeframe  
Consistent with the implementation-intention literature, intended timeframe 
and intention strength were correlated (r = -.614, p < .001), such that stronger 
intentions predicted an intention to make the change sooner.  However, the two were 
not so strongly correlated  as to be collinear.  
Figure 6.2 presents the means and standard deviations across conditions. It is 
seen that participants in the high-number conditions intended to make the change 
sooner than those in the low-number conditions; however, the S,H group intended to 
change somewhat sooner than the NS,H group, and the NS,L group intended to make 
the change somewhat sooner than the S,L group.  
Scores on intended timeframe were submitted to a 2 (solicitation: risk 
judgements solicited versus not solicited) X 2 (numbers: high versus low) ANOVA. 
  
209 
This revealed a marginally significant main effect of numbers provided, F(1,112) = 
3.93, p = .050. There was no a significant main effect of solicitation, F(1,112) = 
0.01, p = .916, or significant interaction of numbers provided and solicitation, F(1, 
112) = 0.62, p = .4335. Thus, independent of whether risk judgements were solicited 
or not, participants intended to increase their intake of the protective foods 
significantly sooner after reading the high-numbers message than after reading the 
low-numbers message. This is in contrast to the tentative hypothesis that there would 
be an interaction of solicitation and numbers provided. The size of the main effect of 
numbers provided was small to medium (partial η2 = .04).  
6.7 Discussion 
The present study was designed to test whether the act of soliciting risk 
judgements is inert, an assumption implicit in typical methodologies for studying risk 
judgements. Participants were presented with a message warning of an unfamiliar 
negative health event. The event was described as affecting either a greater or a 
lesser number of people. Judgements of risk were then either solicited or not solicited 
from participants. Participants then reported on their intentions to take protective 
action. It was reasoned that such intentions would be sensitive to participants’ 
conclusions about their risk, whether those conclusions were themselves reported or 
not. Thus, behavioural intentions were used as a means of detecting whether risk-
judgement solicitation provoked cognitive processes that would not otherwise have 
occurred. 
It was hypothesised that there would be an interaction of the independent 
variables on intentions for behavioural change. This hypothesis was formulated on 
                                                
5 Bootstrapped ANOVA and pairwise t-tests were also conducted on the original (unrecoded) values 
of intended timeframe. The outcomes of these were similar, confirming that these results were not an 
artefact of recoding. 
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the basis of two proposed mechanisms for solicitation effects. First, it was reasoned 
that solicitation might provoke greater involvement of System 2; in turn, this would 
lead participants to take more rational account of quantitative information in 
formulating risk judgements. Second, it was reasoned that solicitation might provoke 
greater defensive processing in the high-numbers condition. To the extent that 
soliciting risk judgements had such effects, it was reasoned that this would “flow 
through” to influence participants’ behavioural intentions. 
Indeed, on one of the two intentions measures, an effect was apparent. 
Among participants who read the high-number message, soliciting risk judgements 
led them to report significantly stronger intentions to increase their intake of the 
protective foods. There was no evidence of any solicitation effect among participants 
who read the low-number version of the message. This is consistent with solicitation 
moderating the effect of the numbers provided.  
What can be inferred about how this effect came about? It seems reasonable 
to exclude the possibility that solicitation influenced how participants attended to and 
encoded the stimulus message as they read it. After all, the solicitation occurred after 
they read it, and they had no foreknowledge that it would occur. It also seems 
reasonable to exclude the possibility that the greater length of the questionnaire in the 
solicitation condition produced the effect: had this factor been responsible, it should 
have been evident in both the high- and low-number condition. Yet solicitation 
effects were found within only the high-number conditions.  
The results are consistent, however, with the proposal that soliciting risk 
judgements led participants to make greater use of System 2 thinking in such a way 
that they took more rational account of the numbers provided. Posing questions 
about risk may have forced participants to think more deeply and rationally about the 
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quantitative information in the message and infer that higher numbers implied greater 
risk. This would produce a significant difference between the S,H and NS,H groups. 
With more statistical power, simple effects of the numbers presented (when risk 
judgements were versus were not solicited) may have reached significance.   
However, it appears that the solicitation effect within the high-number 
conditions was not so robust as to also significantly impact implementation 
intentions. It was tentatively hypothesised that there would be an interaction effect of 
solicitation and numbers provided on how soon participants intended to implement 
their goal for change. No such interaction was evident.  
However, it is of interest that there was a significant main effect of the 
numbers provided. Regardless of whether risk judgements were solicited or not, 
participants who read the high-numbers message intended to make a change sooner 
than those who read the low-numbers version. On this dependent variable, then, 
participants appeared rational even when risk judgements had not been solicited, 
being keener to take action sooner to protect against a negative health event 
described as affecting high numbers of people than low numbers.  
It might be that, asking participants when they would make change had a 
similar effect on their cognitions as did soliciting risk judgements; the timeframe 
question itself may have induced greater motivation to be rational. It seems plausible 
that, in order to commit to a timeframe, participants would need to think more 
carefully about how much effort would be required to make the change. If they 
concluded that a lot of effort would be required, this might provide them with 
motivation to reconsider the threat from homocysteine-related heart problems more 
carefully using System 2 processes. (For example, someone might think “If I try to 
improve my diet this week, it will mean I need to spend more time cooking; that will 
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interfere with my plans for this week. Are homocysteine-related heart problems 
really such a threat that I need to act this week?”). In contrast, asking participants to 
report just the strength of their intention seems less likely to provoke a 
reconsideration of risk.  
 
Although the present study employed behavioural intentions as dependent 
variables, the primary aim was not to determine whether soliciting risk judgements 
actually impacts on behaviour. Measures of intentions were used to indirectly detect 
whether soliciting risk judgements could impact on participants’ cognitions. The 
present study suggests that under certain conditions, it can have a large effect. The 
solicitation effect on intention strength (when the numbers presented were high) was 
of a medium to large size, the difference between means amounting to more than one 
point on the 7-point intention strength Likert scale. In many ways, this is not 
surprising. It was seen in Studies 1, 2, and 3 that individuals do not typically 
articulate judgements of risk in probabilistic terms; asking them to do so is likely to 
mean they have to make a special effort. Moreover, the literature on the mere-
measurement effect demonstrates that questions can have effects on downstream 
variables, even when the question appears to be reasonably neutral.  
If the act of soliciting risk judgements alters how participants process 
information, then solicited risk judgements cannot be assumed to be entirely 
representative of unsolicited ones. However, nor does it imply that solicited risk 
judgements bear no relationship to unsolicited ones. The next chapter, therefore, 
reports a study designed as a test of the assumption that solicited judgements are 
correlated with spontaneous ones.  
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Chapter 7 - Study 5: Predicting Spontaneous Affective 
Responses to a Health Warning 
 
The studies reported thus far have all addressed the ecological validity of 
soliciting health-related risk judgements. Studies 1, 2, and 3 bolstered confidence 
that individuals do spontaneously think about health-related risk, as has generally 
been assumed. Nevertheless, these studies also suggested that spontaneous risk 
judgements may be of a very different nature than those typically solicited. Study 4 
demonstrated that the act of soliciting risk judgements can in itself have effects, 
providing further reason to query the ecological validity of risk judgement measures. 
Study 5 sought to investigate whether solicited risk judgements correlate with 
spontaneous ones. Again, this presents a challenging task. If individuals do not 
spontaneously offer probability estimates, how can the relationship between solicited 
and spontaneous judgements be assessed? What may be required is an implicit 
approach. Fazio and Olsen (2003) define implicit approaches as those in which a 
psychological construct is measured indirectly, via some related variable or set of 
variables. The advantage of implicit measures is that they disguise the purpose of the 
study, including the construct that is being targeted, and/or make it difficult for 
individuals to give biased responses.   
The present study assessed the relationship between solicited and 
spontaneous judgements by using a proxy for the latter: affective responses to a 
health warning. The logic was as follows: If, in response to a health warning, people 
spontaneously consider the prospect of a serious threat to their own health, one 
would expect this to impact negatively on their affective state. The degree to which it 
does so, however, ought to be moderated by a spontaneous judgement of risk: people 
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who judge their risk to be high ought to feel more negative affect than those who 
judge their risk to be low. (It is also possible that people who judge their risk to be 
low may experience a positive affective response, if their judgement brings relief.) 
Although affective responses will be determined by more than risk judgements alone, 
it would be expected that, to the degree that solicited risk judgements are similar to 
spontaneous ones, the former ought to be significantly predictive of affective 
responses to a health warning. To avoid interfering with spontaneous responses, 
however, solicited risk judgements must be assessed only after affective responses 
are measured. In this way, affective responses may serve as a useful means of 
enabling the relationship between spontaneous and solicited risk judgements to be 
assessed.  
7.1 Measuring Affective Responses 
Theorists (e.g., Russell, 1980) define affective state as a subjective feeling 
that underlies all conscious experience, and that varies (within and between subjects) 
in a two-dimensional space. This affect space can be described by two orthogonal 
axes: a hedonic dimension reflecting the degree to which the state is subjectively 
pleasant versus unpleasant (i.e., positive versus negative or good versus bad), and an 
activation dimension reflecting the degree of physiological arousal involved. 6 
Importantly, for the purposes of the present study, an affective state does not 
inherently carry any information about its causes. In other words, an affective state, 
of itself, is not about anything. Affect is the felt experience that may underlie an 
                                                
6 An alternative model, the Positive and Negative Affect model (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), 
proposes that hedonic tone and arousal are not orthogonal, and that positive and negative affect are 
relatively independent dimensions. However, Feldman Barrett, and Russell (1998), and Russell and 
Carroll (1999), have shown that this independence is an artefact of the scales used, as well as the 
measurement of individuals’ typical affect over time rather than momentary affect. When these 
methodological issues are taken into account, the data are much more consistent with the proposal that 
momentary affective states are best represented by orthogonal hedonic and arousal dimensions. 
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emotion, or a feeling that is experienced but not interpreted at all (“I am feeling 
tense”, “I am feeling very happy”, “I am feeling down”). Emotions, on the other 
hand, are held to be “cognitive construals of the causes and consequences of an 
affective state” (Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1999, p. 11). Thus emotions (e.g., anger, 
delight, disappointment) are evaluations, anchored in affect, but linked to some 
object; they are “about” something (e.g., “I am worried about him”, “I am delighted 
with myself”, “I am disappointed with this product”). This distinction is easily 
confused, however, because the same words can be used to describe both affect and 
emotion (e.g., “I am happy” – an affect description – and “I am happy with myself” – 
an emotion description).  Moreover, even within the psychological literature, the 
terms “affect”, and “emotion”, as well as terms like “feelings” and “mood”, vary 
greatly in how they are employed. 
Under one well-established model (the Circumplex Model, Russell, 1980), 
adjectives that describe affect or emotions are conceptualised as marking different 
positions on a circular perimeter around a two-dimensional affect space (see Figure 
7.1). For example, “excited” falls in the upper right quadrant because it represents a 
highly pleasant state involving high arousal; in the language of factor analysis, 
“excited” is said to “load” positively on both the hedonic and arousal dimensions. 
Similarly, “depressed” falls in the lower left quadrant because it represents a highly 
unpleasant state involving low arousal. Terms like “happy” and “alert” will load 
more purely on the hedonic and arousal dimensions respectively, and are thus 
positioned close to those axes.  
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Figure 7.1. Two-dimensional model of affect presenting typical positions of 12 
common affect descriptors. Adapted from Feldman Barrett and Russell (1999, p. 11). 
Conceptualising affect in terms of hedonic and arousal dimensions, is merely 
one possible way of summarizing the two-dimensional space. Because affect 
descriptors form a circular perimeter (rather than clusters), alternative rotations are 
possible to describe the same data.  Moreover, if axes are identified by employing a 
factor analytic technique (e.g., principle axis or maximum likelihood factoring), with 
or without a rotation algorithm (e.g., varimax or oblimin), different axes may emerge 
depending on the population, situations, or items used. For example, Thayer (1978) 
proposed a model based on factor analysis of items concerning states of arousal. 
Because Thayer employed items from only certain regions of the circumplex, 
participants tended to vary along axes aligned with these regions. Thus, in this study, 
factor analysis identified these dimensions as accounting for the most variance.  
  
217 
Using affect items from only a certain region of the circumplex is not a 
methodological error, however, unless the aim of the study is to specifically test the 
circumplex model. Indeed, Feldman, Barrett, and Russell (1999) recommend that 
researchers use scales designed to measure the regions of the affect space most 
relevant to their hypotheses; the validity of such scales can be addressed by 
examining and reporting their factor structure for the study’s sample. They argue that 
this is preferable to adopting general-purpose affect measures.  
7.1.1 Sensitivity of Affective Responses to Spontaneous Risk Judgements 
Affect can provide a useful window through which to examine affectively 
charged cognitions. The notion that affective states are sensitive to cognition is 
uncontroversial. Indeed, it is the central premise behind cognitive behavioural 
therapies that teach individuals to change their thoughts in order to regulate affective 
states. In the domain of health, models including the EPPM (Witte, 1994) hold that 
information concerning a threat to health elicits fear responses (or in the language of 
affect, a shift towards an unpleasant aroused state). A meta-analysis of 51 studies (N 
= 12,735) testing effects of threat on fear responses found an average effect size 
equivalent to r = .29, p < .05 (Witte & Allen, 2000). Moreover, the degree of fear 
arousal generated by health warnings was predictive of health protective behaviours 
and behavioural intentions (Witte & Allen).  
Of course, individuals will inevitably vary in the magnitude of their affective 
response to health warnings; this variation may arise due to several variables, 
including individuals’ trait neuroticism, their judgements of the severity of the threat, 
or their familiarity with the threat. However, in part, one would expect affective 
responses to also reflect how individuals judge their risk. Thus, a change in affective 
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state ought to reflect spontaneous risk judgements, particularly in the moments 
immediately after such judgements are made.  
There are a few caveats. The effect of a spontaneous risk judgement on 
affective state is likely to be short-lived. This is because any effect will soon become 
lost in the noise created by the many other cognitions and stimuli that influence 
affect. Therefore, it is important to measure an affective response to a risk judgement 
soon after the judgement has been made. Further, because individuals may adapt to 
the prospect of a risk over time, a judgement may only influence affective state in 
any significant way if the risk is a relatively unfamiliar one. For these reasons, to 
access spontaneous risk judgements via their impact on affect, it may be necessary to 
elicit a risk judgement by introducing a novel threat; affective responses must then be 
assessed immediately after with a relatively brief measure. 
7.1.2 Minimising Susceptibility to Demand Characteristics and Social 
Desirability Bias 
Affective responses to a threat can be measured by posing a question of the 
kind “How did X make you feel?” or “How did you feel while reading/thinking 
about X?” However, the former question would seem to be a measure of emotion 
(i.e., a cognitive construal of affect), because it specifically asks participants to tie 
their affective state to the stimulus; the latter question may have the same problem. 
Questions of this kind may thus perform poorly as implicit measures because they 
may be overly subject to biases. For example, individuals may not wish to admit to a 
fear response, or may wish their affective responses to appear in proportion to their 
objective risk; they may distort their ratings of affect on this basis. It seems 
important to attempt to circumvent such biases as much as possible. 
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To avoid referencing the threat stimulus, one can simply measure each 
participant’s momentary affective state before and after presentation of the stimulus, 
then model the change. This has the added benefit of enabling analyses to 
statistically control for participants’ prior affective state if necessary. The pre- and 
post-tests should involve multiple items so that it is difficult for participants to recall 
their pre-test responses at the time of completing the post-test. Further, for each item, 
ratings of affect should be made on an end-defined continuous scale; labels or 
markings along the scale might serve to make it easier for participants to recall pre-
test responses. (A continuous scale also allows for greater sensitivity.) Importantly, 
participants should complete the pre-test with no knowledge that either the threat 
stimulus or post-test will follow. This reduces the chance they will commit pre-test 
responses to memory. These features serve to bolster confidence that any change in 
affect observed reflects a genuine affective response to the stimulus message. 
7.2 The Present Study 
Following the principles just discussed, the present study examined Deakin 
University students’ affective responses to a health warning. The message warned 
them about the link between diet, homocysteine levels, and heart disease (the same 
message as that used in Studies 3 and 4). This message was chosen on the basis that, 
as noted in Section 5.3.3, most Deakin University students are unaware of the link; it 
was expected that, for this reason, participants would experience a greater emotional 
response to the message, having had no opportunity to emotionally adapt to the 
threat. 
Affective state was assessed immediately before and after presentation of the 
message. Following the second assessment of affective state, participants were asked 
to report judgements of risk on three different scales. Because any relationship 
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between these solicited risk judgements and affective responses might be explained 
by trait neuroticism, this variable was also measured and included in analyses. 
Neuroticism (Costa & McCrae, 1985) has been found to predict fear and startle 
responses (Perkins, Kemp, & Corr, 2007; Wilson, Kumari, Gray, & Corr, 2000), but 
also risk-related judgements (e.g., Vollrath, Knoch, & Cassano, 1999)  
The study’s hypothesis was based on the assumption that spontaneous risk 
judgements would be reflected in participants’ affective responses. It was 
hypothesised that the shared variance among solicited risk judgements would 
correlate with the change in affective state measured between the pre- and post-tests. 
7.3 Method 
7.3.1 Participants 
The initial sample comprised 235 students from Deakin University. The mean 
age was 27.69 years (SD = 9.38), and 88.1% were female. All were volunteers; no 
payment, course credit, or other incentive was offered. 
7.3.2 Procedure 
Participants were invited to complete the anonymous online questionnaire via 
notices posted to online student message boards. They were told that the 
questionnaire concerned health-related thoughts and feelings, but to preserve the 
spontaneity of their responses, they were not told anything about the aim of the 
study, the nature of the stimulus, or the questions to be asked. Participants were 
provided with a web link to the questionnaire and completed it at a time of their 
choosing. The study received approval from Deakin University’s Research Ethics 
Committee. 
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7.3.3 Materials and Measures  
Data were gathered by means of online questionnaire.  It comprised the 
following sections, each on a separate page: demographic items (age and gender), 
pre-test of affective state, the stimulus message, post-test of affective state, questions 
soliciting risk judgements (each of these was on a separate page), and personality 
items assessing trait neuroticism.  
The stimulus message was based on that used 
in the previously reported studies. The message was as follows:  
 
Please read the following information very carefully before continuing. 
Homocysteine and Heart Disease 
 
Homocysteine is an amino acid found in the blood stream. A recent study by 
the University of Washington has suggested that having high levels of 
homocysteine when you are young makes you very much more vulnerable to 
developing heart problems later in life.   The researchers estimate that unsafe 
levels of homocysteine lead to approximately 60,000 heart attack deaths in 
the USA each year, and cause the onset of heart disease in as many as 
250,000 other people.   The vitamin, folic acid, found in green leafy 
vegetables, beans and citrus fruits, breaks down homocysteine. Thus, failing 
to eat adequate amounts of these foods greatly increases the likelihood of 
becoming ill with heart disease later.  
 
Pre- and post-tests comprised the same set of four 
visual analogue scales. For each item, participants were asked to click a point on the 
scale to indicate the extent they felt that way “right at this moment”. The scales were 
anchored on “not at all” and “extremely”; higher values reflected a greater degree of 
the feeling described. The affect descriptors used were “happy”, “tense”, “calm”, and 
7.3.3.1     Stimulus Message.  
7.3.3.2     Affective State.  
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“relaxed”. Each visual analogue scale was 450 pixels in length; thus responses were 
assigned a value between 1 and 450. 
Three different scales were used to 
solicit risk judgements after the post-test of affect. Each was presented on a new 
page. The first question asked, “How likely do you think it is that you will 
experience homocysteine-related heart disease in the future (assuming you don't 
change your diet)?” Responses were made on a horizontal 450-pixel Visual 
Analogue Scale, anchored on “certain NOT to happen” and “certain to happen”. 
Next, participants were asked, “Which of the terms below best describes how likely 
you think it is?” They had to choose a response to complete the sentence, “My 
chances of experiencing homocysteine-related heart disease in the future (assuming I 
don't change my diet) are…” The seven response options listed were “almost zero”, 
“very small”, “small”, “moderate”, “large”, “very large”, and “almost certain”. 
Finally, participants were asked, “Now in terms of a specific percentage probability, 
can you tell us again, how likely do you think it is?” Participants were required to fill 
in the blank with a number between 0-100 to complete the sentence, “There is a 
_____ % chance that I will experience homocysteine-related heart disease in the 
future (assuming I don't change my diet).” For all three scales, higher values 
corresponded to greater risk. 
The final page presented the Neuroticism 
scale from the Big Five Inventory (BFI - 44, John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991), 
comprising eight items. This scale has been found to have good test-retest and 
internal reliabilities (>.80) as well as good convergent and discriminant validity 
(Benet-Martinez & John, 1998; Gosling, Rentfrow, Swann, 2003). Items from other 
BFI scales were included among these as distractors. 
7.3.3.3     Solicited Risk Judgements.  
7.3.3.4     Trait Neuroticism.  
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7.3.4 Analytic Strategy 
Analyses sought to examine the relationship between change in affective state 
(between pre- and post-tests) and the risk judgements reported subsequently. The 
strategy used was a Latent True Change (Steyer, Eid, & Schwenkmezger, 1997) 
approach to Structural Equation Modelling (SEM). In the following sections, the 
principles of these techniques and their advantages are outlined. 
 
SEM is an increasingly 
popular approach to examining relationships among multiple variables and their 
theorised underlying constructs (Buhi, Goodson, & Neilands, 2007). SEM can be 
conceptualised as an extension and combination of multiple-regression and factor-
analysis. The power of SEM comes from its ability to perform a set of multiple-
regression and factor analyses simultaneously, and thus evaluate a model as a whole.  
Like multiple-regression, SEM allows the researcher to use one set of variables 
to predict another variable; similarly, it provides estimates of the size and 
significance of the predictive relationships. However, unlike classical multiple 
regression, SEM allows a set of regression equations to be evaluated simultaneously. 
In addition, SEM also tests the null hypotheses implicit in a model (i.e., the implicit 
hypotheses that there are no additional significant relationships between variables 
beyond those specified). Thus, whereas multiple-regression tests hypotheses 
concerning a single dependent variable, SEM is concerned with the fit of an entire 
model to data.  
The fit of a model is evaluated by calculating a set of “fit indices” and 
comparing the values obtained to a set of standard conventions for good fit. When a 
model fits well (i.e., it does not differ significantly from the data), only then are size 
7.3.4.1     Principles and advantages of SEM.  
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and significance of relationships among variables interpreted. If it does not fit well, a 
modified or alternative version of the model can be evaluated.  
SEM also allows the researcher to test and estimate relationships involving 
dimensions that underlie a set of measured variables. In this way, SEM is like factor-
analysis, in that it identifies dimensions to describe shared variance among measures. 
This is achieved, as in factor-analysis, by an iterative algorithm (typically maximum 
likelihood estimation) that iterates through possible factor solutions to find one that 
best explains shared variance within the constraints of the model.  
In SEM, the dimensions identified are referred to as “latent” or “unmeasured” 
variables and are represented diagrammatically by circles. Measured variables (also 
called “indicator” variables) are represented as rectangles. Relationships between 
measured and measured variables, latent and measured variables, or latent and latent 
variables, are represented by either one-headed or two-headed arrows. By 
convention, components of variance that are unique to a variable, or unexplained by 
another variable, are represented by a latent variable linked to just that variable. 
These are referred to as “error terms” or “residuals”, respectively. 
A key advantage of SEM is that, because latent variables reflect only the 
shared variance among indicator variables, correlations between two latent variables 
can be estimated free of the influence of measurement error (Bentler, 1980). This 
provides a great deal more statistical power to detect significant relationships than 
classical approaches (e.g., calculating composite scores by averaging or summing 
variables or their Z-scores). Certain parameters of the model (e.g., regression weights 
or variances) can also be constrained (on theoretical grounds) and the goodness-of-fit 
between the model and the data evaluated.  
For the present study, SEM allowed changes in affective state to be reliably 
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assessed with a very brief measure, because error variance on each item could be 
isolated. As noted, a brief measure was essential to the aims of the study. 
Latent True 
Change modelling is the application of SEM to the modelling of intra-individual 
changes in a latent variable over time (Steyer et al., 1997; Steyer, Partchev & 
Shanahan, 2000). It involves modelling two or more sets of measurements, for 
instance, a set of measurements at time 1 (T1) and the same measurements at time 2 
(T2). The model is specified in such a way that intraindividual change over time is 
represented by its own latent variable.  
 Figure 7.2 illustrates how this is achieved. Each T1 indicator is specified to 
load on the first latent variable: this represents individuals’ baseline state. Each T2 
indicator, however, is specified to load on both the latent baseline state and a second 
latent variable. This second latent variable reflects the change in state. Thus, the 
shared variance among T2 measurements is decomposed into that which is explained 
by the baseline state at T1 and that which is explained by the change in state between 
T1 and T2.  
In order to ensure that measurements at T1 and T2 have the same factor 
structure (and thus measure the same construct over time), factor loadings and 
intercepts are constrained to be invariant over time (as indicated in Figure 7.2). 
Latent True Change models also typically specify correlations between the error 
terms of each indicator at T1 and the same indicator at T2, to account for “indicator 
specific effects”. This ensures that the latent variables do not over-estimate the 
stability of constructs over time due to items administered on two occasions 
correlating simply due to wording effects (Steyer et al., 1997; 2000). Because change 
7.3.4.2     Principles of Latent True Change Modelling.  
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itself may be correlated with the baseline state, a correlation between the two latent 
variables can also be specified in the initial measurement model. 
 
Figure 7.2. Example of a latent true change model. Parameters constrained to be time 
invariant (i.e., set equal to each other) have the same subscript. 
7.4 Results 
In the present study, change in affective state between pre- and post-tests was 
modelled using this Latent True Change approach. The Amos 18 software package 
was used to conduct all analyses. Except where noted, all models were fitted using 
maximum likelihood estimation. Solicited risk judgements were modelled as a latent 
variable reflected by the three risk judgement indicator variables. The relationship 
between risk judgements and latent affective change could then be estimated free of 
measurement error.  
Model fit was assessed by examining the comparative fit index (CFI), 
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), Standardised Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR), and 
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Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA); satisfactory fit is indicated by 
a high CFI (>.95), a high TLI (>.90), a low SRMR (< .06) and a low RMSEA (< .05) 
(Hu & Bentler, 1999) Because the RMSEA can be artificially high for models with 
low degrees of freedom (Kenny & Kaniskan, 2011), 90% confidence intervals for the 
RMSEA were also calculated.  If RMSEA exceeds .05, but the lower bound of the 
confidence interval is less than .05, fit can be considered acceptable (MacCallum, 
Browne, & Sugawara, 1996).  
If modifications to the model were necessary, improvement of fit was 
assessed by examining the differences in chi-square and Akaike’s Information 
Criterion (AIC); improvement of fit is indicated by a significantly smaller chi-square 
(Buhi, Goodson, & Neilands, 2007) and a smaller AIC (Bozdogan, 1987).  
7.4.1 Missing data, reliabilities, outliers, and distributions 
Data were missing for 22 participants (9.4%); data were missing on 12 of the 
17 questionnaire items. The number of missing values ranged from 1-3 per 
participant and 1-3 per item. Little’s MCAR test was non-significant, χ2 (229) = 
247.21, p = .19, indicating that there was no pattern to missing values. Missing 
values were therefore replaced using the SPSS expectation maximisation function.7  
Next, the eight BFI Neuroticism items were reverse-coded where necessary 
so that higher numbers always reflected greater neuroticism. Following this, 
Cronbach’s Alpha suggested good internal reliability (.86), and all corrected item-
total correlations were greater than .50. To confirm the unidimensionality of the 
scale, a principal components analysis of the eight items was conducted. This 
                                                
7 To assess whether missing value replacement influenced the results, the final structural model was 
re-estimated with the 22 cases that had a missing value excluded. The fit-indices were similar, χ2(55, 
N = 210) = 91.93, p < .001, CFI = .98, TLI = .98, SRMR = .040, RMSEA = .057; 90% CIRMSEA = 
.035, .077, as were parameter estimates. The key parameter, the standardized regression weight for the 
path between Perceived Risk and Affect Change, was -.265.  
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revealed a single component with an eigenvalue greater than one; it accounted for 
50.2% of the variance among items. Item loadings ranged from .62 to .80. It having 
been confirmed that the scale was reliable and unidimensional, a neuroticism score 
was computed for each participant by summing item scores. In all further analyses 
involving neuroticism, this composite score was used.  
The eight affect variables, three risk judgement variables, and the neuroticism 
variable, were next examined for outliers. There were no univariate outliers on these 
variables. To identify multivariate outliers, Mahalanobis distances were calculated. 
An iterative process of removing the most outlying case and recalculating 
Mahalanobis distances was conducted until there were no remaining multivariate 
outliers. Three multivariate outliers were identified this way and were removed from 
the sample. Therefore the final sample comprised 232 participants.  
Table 7.1 presents means, standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis 
statistics for the final dataset. It is seen that for all variables, univariate skewness did 
not exceed 2.0 and univariate kurtosis did not exceed 7.0, and thus were acceptable 
(Curran, West, & Finch, 1996). However, the data departed significantly from 
multivariate normality. To address this, the stability of parameter estimates was 
confirmed by bootstrapping (see Section 7.4.4).  
Table 7.1 
Variable means, standard deviations, skew, and kurtosis values 
 Mean SD Skew Kurtosis 
Happy T1 249.00 87.15 -0.33 -0.37 
Tense T1 168.04 112.13 0.19 -1.18 
Calm T1 244.93 111.41 -0.02 -1.05 
Relaxed T1 224.27 116.22 0.03 -0.87 
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 Mean SD Skew Kurtosis 
Happy T2 252.28 92.69 -0.25 -0.54 
Tense T2 170.11 113.86 0.21 -1.05 
Calm T2 247.43 105.10 -0.10 -0.84 
Relaxed T2 228.49 109.76 -0.02 -0.81 
Risk (Visual Analogue 
Scale)  
152.09 94.80 0.53 -0.51 
Risk (Verbal Scale) 3.14 1.08 0.25 -0.03 
Risk (Percentage 
Estimate) 
28.67 23.12 0.67 -0.65 
BFI-Neuroticism 24.92 6.88 -0.15 -0.62 
     
Multivariate     40.83 
(critical 
ratio = 
16.97) 
7.4.2   Affective Change Measurement Model 
The first concern was with establishing the measurement model for the latent 
change in affective state between pre- and post-tests. Figure 7.3 presents the initial 
model. Regression weights and intercepts were constrained to be time invariant; 
indicator specific effects were modelled by allowing pairs of indicators to correlate.  
The initial model was of marginally good fit, χ2(22, N = 232) = 35.68, p = .03, 
CFI = .99, TLI = .99, AIC = 79.68, SRMR = .024, RMSEA = .052; 90% CIRMSEA = 
.010, .082. It is seen in Figure 7.3, however, that Affect Change did not correlate 
significantly with AffectT1. This correlation was therefore removed and the model re-
estimated, χ2(23, N = 232) = 35.76, p = .04, CFI = .99, TLI = .99, AIC = 79.46, 
SRMR = .240, RMSEA = .049; 90% CIRMSEA = .009, .079; this did not significantly 
alter goodness of fit, χ2diff (1) = 0.08, p = .78.  
  
230 
No further modifications were deemed necessary. The CFI, TLI, SRMR, and 
RMSEA values were within standard criteria for good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The 
final model is presented in Figure 7.4. It is seen that all T2 measurements loaded 
significantly on Affect Change. This indicates that there was a reliable change in 
affective state between T1 and T2 that was reflected in all four affect items. Thus, 
those who rated themselves as less happy at T2 than T1 tended also to rate 
themselves as more tense, less calm, and more relaxed (at T2 compared with  T1). 
 
 
Figure 7.3. Initial measurement model of affective change. Fixed parameters are 
marked with a hash (#). Parameters constrained to be time invariant (i.e., equal) have 
the same superscript. Standardised parameters are in parentheses, unstandardised 
ones are not.  
* p < .05, ** p <  .01, *** p < .001. 
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Figure 7.4. Final measurement model of affective change. Fixed parameters are 
marked with a hash (#). Parameters constrained to be time invariant (i.e., equal) have 
the same superscript. Standardised parameters are in parentheses, unstandardised 
ones are not.  
* p < .05, ** p <  .01, *** p < .001 
7.4.3 Measurement Model of Solicited Risk Judgements 
To examine whether the shared variance among the three solicited risk 
judgements predicted affect change, each of the risk ratings was specified to load on 
a single latent variable (Perceived Risk). Figure 7.5 presents this model and the 
parameter estimates.  
It is seen that all indicators loaded very strongly on the latent variable. 
However, because there were only three observed variables, the model was just 
identified. Therefore, there were no degrees of freedom available for fit indices to be 
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calculated for this measurement model. The goodness of fit of this measurement 
model could only be evaluated as part of the structural model (see Section 7.4.4).  
 
 
Figure 7.5. Measurement model of solicited risk judgements. Fixed parameters are 
marked with a hash (#). Standardised parameters are in parentheses, unstandardised 
ones are not.  
* p < .05, ** p <  .01, *** p < .001 
7.4.4 Structural Model – Predicting Affect Change from Solicited Risk 
Judgements 
The initial structural model was specified based on the hypothesised 
relationships among solicited risk judgements and affect change. Additional 
correlations were specified for those relationships that were not explicitly precluded 
by the hypothesis. Figure 7.6 presents this model and the parameter estimates. This 
model was of good fit, χ2(53, N = 226) = 99.23, p < .001, CFI = .98, TLI = .98, 
SRMR = .039, RMSEA = .061; CIRMSEA = .042, .080.  
  
233 
 
Figure 7.6. Initial structural model. Indicators for Affect T1 and Affect Change are 
omitted for simplicity. Fixed parameters are marked with a hash (#). Standardised 
parameters are in parentheses, unstandardised ones are not. 
 * p < .05, ** p <  .01, *** p < .001. 
It is seen, however, that two parameter estimates in the model were non-
significant; these were removed. First, the correlation between Affect T1 and 
Perceived Risk was removed and the model re-estimated, χ2(54, N = 232) = 99.59, p 
< .001, CFI = .98, TLI = .98, SRMR = .048, RMSEA = .060; 90% CIRMSEA = .041, 
.079; this change did not significantly alter fit, χ2diff (1) = 0.55, p > .05. Thus it appears 
there was no relationship between Perceived Risk and participants’ initial affective 
state. (Note that this also implies that there was no relationship between perceived 
risk and their post-test state, after controlling for the change. Thus, Perceived Risk 
was predictive only of the change and not the affective state at T2.) 
Second, the regression path between BFI Neuroticism and Affect Change 
(which remained non-significant), was removed and the model re-estimated, χ2(55, N 
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= 232) = 100.23, p < .001, CFI = .98, TLI = .98, SRMR = .048, RMSEA = .060; 90% 
CIRMSEA = .041, .078; this change did not significantly alter fit, χ2diff (1) = 0.64, p = .42. 
Thus, it appears that, contrary to expectations, trait neuroticism was not predictive of 
affective responses. 
No further modifications were deemed necessary. The final model, presented 
in Figure 7.7, had a CFI, TLI, and SRMR indicative of good fit; although the 
model’s RMSEA exceeded .05, confidence intervals were within the range indicative 
of acceptable fit. To assess the robustness of parameter estimates, the final model 
was reestimated using 10,000 bootstrapped samples. Bootstrapped estimates of 
regression weights and correlations were very similar to the unbootstrapped 
estimates, and all remained statistically significant.  For standardised regression 
weights, the differences between bootstrapped and unbootstrapped estimates were all 
between .001 and -.002; for correlations, differences were all between .002 and -
.026. The full set of unbootstrapped parameter estimates for the final model are 
presented in Appendix B. 
It is seen that, as hypothesised, solicited judgements of risk were significant 
predictors of Affect Change. To the extent they judged themselves to be at risk, 
participants were likely to feel less happy, more tense, less calm, and less relaxed 
after reading the health warning compared with at T1. The relationship was small to 
medium in size; risk judgements predicted 7.2% of the variance in latent affective 
change (90% bootstrapped confidence interval of 0.7% to 20.0%). Estimates of risk 
made on all three scales (a visual analogue scale, a verbal scale, and a percentage 
scale) were strongly intercorrelated, and all contributed to predicting Affect Change 
relatively equally.  
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It is also seen that, although neuroticism was correlated with AffectT1 and 
Perceived Risk, contrary to expectations, it was not predictive of affect change. 
Moreover, participants’ AffectT1 was unrelated to Perceived Risk. 
 
Figure 7.7. Final structural model. Indicators for Affect T1 and Affect Change are 
omitted for simplicity. Fixed parameters are marked with a hash (#). Standardised 
parameters are in parentheses, unstandardised ones are not.  
* p < .05, ** p <  .01, *** p < .001. 
7.5   Discussion 
The present study sought to evaluate the assumption that solicited risk 
judgements correlate with spontaneous ones. It was reasoned that, to the extent 
participants spontaneously judged their risk to be high after reading a health warning, 
they would experience negative affect in response. Therefore, it was hypothesised 
that solicited risk judgements (obtained after affective change was assessed) would 
predict change in affective state. Participants’ affective state was assessed 
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immediately before and after reading a warning about a novel health risk; the change 
in affect was modelled using a Latent True Change SEM approach. 
Consistent with the hypothesis, the shared variance among all three solicited 
risk judgement measures predicted affective change. Participants who subsequently 
estimated their risk to be high were more likely to have experienced a negative 
change in affective state: they tended to report themselves to be less happy, more 
tense, less calm, and less relaxed, compared with those who estimated their risk to be 
low. This is as would be expected if solicited risk judgements were correlated with 
spontaneous risk judgements.  
However, might the relationship between solicited risk judgements and 
affective responses be explained in some other way? Several alternative explanations 
might be considered. First, could the solicitation of risk judgements have itself 
caused participants’ affective response? Clearly, this cannot be the case, because risk 
judgements were only solicited after the post-test of affect was complete. Moreover, 
participants had no knowledge that they would be asked to make such judgements 
until they reached this point in the questionnaire because they could only view each 
page of the questionnaire in the intended order.  
What of the possibility of a causal effect in the reverse direction: could affect 
have influenced participants solicited judgements of risk? One could argue that those 
in a more negative state at T2 would be more likely to estimate themselves to be at 
greater risk. Use of the affect heuristic could plausibly produce this effect (see 
Section 1.3.1.3 for a discussion). However, if this had occurred, solicited risk 
judgements would be more predictive of Affect T2 than Affect Change. The final 
model was of satisfactory fit with Perceived Risk specified to predict only Affect 
Change and not Affect T2; therefore this explanation can be excluded.  
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What of the possibility that participants based their solicited risk judgements 
on the change in affect that they felt in response to the stimulus? They may have 
inferred that, if the message had caused an increase in negative affect, they therefore 
must be at risk. Although this explanation is consistent with the data, it requires the 
assumption that participants were aware of how their affective state changed. It is not 
clear the extent to which participants would have been able to disentangle the change 
from the final state, given that they were given no reason to take note of their state at 
T1. Moreover, affective states at T1 and T2 were highly correlated, suggesting that 
participants’ affective state tended to change only slightly as a result of the stimulus 
message. Future research could address this limitation by introducing a delay 
between the post-test of affect and the solicitation of risk judgements. This would 
reduce the likelihood that change in affect influenced solicited risk judgements. 
Beyond this, what of the possibility that trait characteristics of participants 
caused them to have a stronger negative affective response to the health warning and 
also to judge themselves to be at greater risk? Trait neuroticism is the obvious 
candidate as an explanatory third variable. People high on neuroticism might be more 
prone to experience fear in response to the warning, but also more likely to judge 
themselves to be at high risk. In this study, BFI Neuroticism correlated significantly 
with baseline affect and perceived risk: thus, more neurotic participants tended to 
have a more negative baseline affective state, and also rated their risk as being 
higher. However, BFI Neuroticsm was not a significant predictor of Affect Change. 
Therefore, trait neuroticism cannot account for the relationship between affect 
change and risk judgements. Whether other participant characteristics could explain 
the results requires further research.  
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It might have been found that one of the three solicited risk judgements was 
clearly much superior or inferior in predicting affective responses. In particular, 
given that Studies 1-4 showed that individuals almost never spontaneously articulate 
probability estimates (e.g., in terms of percentage probabilities, frequencies, or odds 
ratios), it might have been expected that percentage estimates would be much less 
predictive of affective responses. Yet all three solicited risk judgements were very 
strongly intercorrelated and had high factor loadings. This suggests that, although 
individuals rarely articulate percentage probabilities spontaneously, soliciting such 
estimates may not necessarily distort risk judgements more than soliciting responses 
in other formats.  
 It also appeared that, in this study, the number of response options available 
made little difference. This conforms with some of the findings from studies 
evaluating measures on other criteria (see Section 1.5.5). The visual analogue scale 
and the percentage estimate did not offer any great advantage over the 7-point verbal 
scale, despite allowing much more granular responses; but nor were they worse. Of 
course, of the many different ways that risk judgements might be solicited, only three 
were employed in this study; differences may become apparent if a greater range of 
measures are compared in future research.    
7.4.5 Explained Variance: Glass 7.2% Full or 92.8% Empty?  
To the best of the author’s knowledge, the present study is the first to use 
affective responses to a health warning as a way of indirectly investigating 
spontaneous risk judgements. If solicited risk judgements had accounted for the great 
majority of variation in these affective responses, this would have provided rather 
strong evidence that the same or very similar conclusions about risk were made 
spontaneously in response to the message, and thus preceded their solicitation. 
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Although a relationship was found, it was of a much smaller magnitude, with less 
than 10% of the variance being accounted for. 
What does this imply about the ecological validity of solicited risk 
judgements? On the one hand, one would not expect affective responses to be 
entirely accounted for by any single construct; other variables, not measured or 
controlled for in this study, may have influenced affective responses and thus 
produced a degree of unexplainable variation. Moreover, the generalisability of this 
finding is limited by the specific nature of the health message used, the solicited risk 
judgement measures used, and the sample characteristics.  
Those caveats acknowledged, the relatively small correlation is surprising in 
light of the variables that were accounted for in the procedure and analyses. First, the 
health warning message was crafted in such a way that one would expect individuals 
would consider and focus on their own risk. The final two sentences clearly stated 
that the likelihood of homocysteine-related heart disease is greatly reduced by eating 
specific foods. Having made this link salient, one would expect it to dominate 
participants’ affective responses.  
Second, risk judgements were solicited immediately after the post-test of 
affective state. Because there was no intervening period, there was no opportunity for 
participants to obtain new risk relevant information or have changed their diet. 
Therefore, one would not expect them to have spontaneously revised their risk 
judgements before risk judgements were solicited.  
Third, analyses controlled for variation in how participants interpreted 
affective state items by employing a latent true change model. By modelling 
indicator specific effects and time invariance constraints, variation in scale use, item 
interpretation, and factor structure were statistically controlled for.  
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 Fourth, and of particular importance, by employing the SEM approach, the 
correlation between Perceived Risk and Affect Change was estimated free of random 
measurement error. Therefore, the estimated correlation (and the associated 
confidence intervals) were not attenuated by the influence of random measurement 
error.  
Fifth, if affective responses were to be accounted for by a variable other than 
risk judgements, one would have expected trait neuroticism to be the most likely 
candidate. Yet, neuroticism was not predictive of Affect Change at all.  
If solicited risk judgements were not able to strongly predict affective 
responses under these conditions, then it must be questioned how else the ecological 
validity of solicited risk judgements to spontaneous ones could be better 
demonstrated. It remains plausible that the small relationship points to a lack of 
correspondence between solicited risk judgements and spontaneous ones. It may be 
that the mere act of soliciting risk judgements provoked such different considerations 
that participants reported conclusions very different from their spontaneous 
judgements. Although the present study does not provide evidence on the 
mechanisms for solicitation effects that may have occurred, several of the 
mechanisms introduced in Section 2.2 are plausible. Examples are: increasing the 
involvement of System 2 processes, affecting choice among heuristics, amplifying 
motivated reasoning, and enhancing self-presentation biases.  
In the next and final chapter, the results of this study, and those of the 
previous studies, are synthesised. Implications and future directions are then 
discussed.  
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Chapter 8 – Summary, Conclusions, and Future Directions 
 
This thesis has addressed the issue of ecological validity in research 
involving health-related risk judgements. It was shown in Chapter 1 that risk 
judgements – judgements of the probability of ill-health – are a central construct in 
the most frequently cited HBTs. Consequently, a great many studies within the 
health-psychology literature have examined risk judgements, doing so to assess their 
accuracy, understand their determinants, and, indeed, test the validity of their 
inclusion in HBTs.  
In all but a few cases, however, the health-related risk judgements concerned 
have been solicited by the researcher. Yet in everyday life, if risk judgements impact 
on health protective behaviours, it would be those made spontaneously (i.e., 
unsolicited) that would do so. Thus, it was argued that research on health-risk 
judgements has bypassed an important step. To establish ecological validity, it is 
necessary to show that the risk judgements that are measured in research are similar 
to spontaneous, everyday judgements. Addressing this gap in the literature has been 
the focus of this thesis.  
Chapters 1 and 2 proposed that, for several reasons, solicited risk judgements 
may often not resemble spontaneous ones. First, it was shown that a great variety of 
questions and response formats have been used to measure health-risk judgements, 
with little consensus on which measures should be preferred. Second, it was shown 
that there are numerous methodological issues that make it difficult to assess whether 
risk judgments have a causal impact on everyday health behaviour. Few studies have 
overcome these issues; thus, although solicited risk judgements have been found to 
predict health behaviours, it is unclear the extent to which a predictive relationship 
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reflects a causal one. Third, there are several theoretical reasons why the mere act of 
soliciting a risk judgement may alter how individuals judge risk and the conclusions 
they reach. Such potential effects were termed “solicitation effects”.  
Chapters 3 to 7 presented a set of studies that employed a range of 
complementary methodologies. These studies were designed to examine the nature of 
spontaneous risk-related thinking and the resemblance of spontaneous judgements to 
solicited ones. In the present chapter, the combined theory and evidence from 
Chapters 1 to 7 are summarised and integrated with regard to the family of questions 
that were considered. Implications and future research directions are then discussed.  
 
8.1 Do Individuals Make Spontaneous Health-Related 
Risk Judgements and if So When? 
A key aim of Studies 1-3 was to ascertain the extent to which health-related 
risk judgements occur spontaneously, that is, in the absence of specific questions 
posed by researchers. If risk judgements are important to everyday health behaviour, 
then at a minimum, there ought to be some empirical evidence that health-related risk 
judgements do occur unsolicited.  
These studies entirely avoided soliciting risk judgements from participants. 
Thus, when risk-related thinking was evident, it was strong evidence that such 
thoughts had occurred spontaneously. However, an inherent limitation of these 
studies was that they relied on participants being able to, and choosing to, articulate 
risk-related thoughts. Therefore, one cannot be absolutely sure that the absence of 
such thoughts in these data constitutes evidence that they did not occur. One can 
always suggest that these methodologies did not delve deep enough into the “black 
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box” of cognition. It is possible, for example, that certain processes may have 
occurred outside participants’ conscious awareness, and thus could not be articulated.  
Conclusions derived from these data are, of course, also limited by the range 
of contexts in which the data were gathered. Studies 1 and 2 examined data arising in 
the context of public internet communication; Study 3 examined thoughts occurring 
in response to two versions of a health message. It may be that risk-related thinking 
(and different forms of risk-related thinking) would be more evident in other 
contexts. For example, in a context where there is strong temptation to engage in a 
risk-taking behaviour (e.g., in the presence of drugs, alcohol, or tobacco), 
individuals’ conclusions that their risk is low might be prominent, because they serve 
to justify risk-taking behaviour. Similarly, in contexts in which others’ risk–taking 
behaviours are very salient (e.g., in a pub or at a party), there might be more 
evidence for comparisons of own and others’ risk.  
These limitations conceded, given that almost no empirical data on 
spontaneous judgements could be found in the prior literature, Studies 1-3 provide an 
important evidentiary foundation for understanding spontaneous health-related 
thinking. Studies 1 and 2 were designed to sample a broad range of health-related 
thinking; any Twitter message or blog entry related to health was included in the 
dataset. It might have been expected that thoughts clearly paralleling the way risk 
judgements are solicited by researchers (e.g., thoughts of the form, “If I do (or do 
not) perform behaviour X, there is a probability P that I will (or will not) experience 
disease Y”) would have featured prominently. Yet, among the sample of 267 Twitter 
messages and 120 blog entries there was not a single instance of a risk judgement 
with all of these features. This was the case in relation to judgements both of own 
and others’ risk. In particular, there was not a single instance of a probability 
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estimate (e.g., a percentage probability, frequency, or odds ratio) in these data. 
Whereas risk judgements are commonly solicited in terms of probability estimates, 
the findings of Studies 1 and 2 suggest that it is exceedingly rare for individuals to 
articulate probability estimates spontaneously.  
It would not have been reasonable, however, to conclude, solely on this basis, 
that risk judgements were entirely absent. Even where all elements of a canonical 
risk judgement could not be found, some of these elements nevertheless featured. It 
therefore became important to examine this more implicit evidence of spontaneous 
risk-related thinking. 
In Studies 1 and 2, respectively 0.3% and 6.7% of participants referenced 
their own prospect of ill-health and linked it to a behaviour; if one omitted the 
criterion of a link to behaviour, the proportions rose to 2.2% and 15.8%. As for 
references to others’ prospective ill-health linked to behaviour, 0.3% and 3.3% of 
participants made such references; if one omitted the criterion of a link to behaviour, 
the proportions were 3.3% and 11.7%. In a minority of cases, then, it was clear that 
individuals were at least considering the possibility of prospective ill-health, 
sometimes as a possible consequence of behaviour. These data refute any notion that 
risk-related thinking is only ever the product of researchers’ questions. That said, 
evidence for spontaneous risk-related thinking was not easily found. Risk 
judgements do not appear anything like as common in health-related thinking as 
HBTs would seem to imply.  
In light of these findings, it was reasoned that spontaneous risk judgements 
might only become evident in particular contexts. Study 3 therefore sought to 
document spontaneous risk judgements occurring in response to a message warning 
participants of an unfamiliar threat to their health. None of the 51 participants in this 
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study articulated probability estimates. However, thoughts about own and others’ 
prospective ill-health (including those linked to behaviour) were more common in 
this study than in Studies 1 and 2. (In this study, a reference to the prospect of either 
developing or avoiding the focal illness – homocysteine-related heart problems – was 
deemed to be evidence for risk-related thinking). A quarter (25.5%) of participants 
referenced their own prospect of the heart problems and drew a causal link with 
behaviour (see Section 5.4.2); omitting the criterion of such a link increased the 
number of participants included to almost one-third (31.4%; see Section 5.4.2). 
However, the proportions differed significantly across the two experimental groups. 
Among those who were assigned to read a negatively-framed health message, 53.8% 
referenced own prospective health outcomes, and most drew a link with behaviour. 
Among those who read an equivalent positively-framed message, 8.0% referenced 
own prospective health outcomes, and 4.0% drew a link with behaviour. Thus a 
strong valence effect was apparent for references to one’s own prospect. There were 
15.7% who referenced others’ prospective health outcomes with a link to behaviour; 
if the criterion of a causal link to behaviour was omitted, 25.5% were included. There 
was not a significant difference across the experimental conditions for these 
references.  
A possible explanation for the valence effect was found in the fact that there 
was also more evidence for System 2 processes (i.e., more elaborative thinking) in 
response to the negatively-framed message. On the logic that risk judgements might 
require System 2 processes, because of their abstract nature (see Section 3.5), it was 
argued that the greater System 2 processing in the negative condition may have 
allowed risk-related thoughts to feature more commonly. Further, risk judgements 
might be more apparent in reports when there is more involvement of System 2, 
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because System 2 processes are available to conscious awareness; this would make 
them more likely to be reported.  
One would expect more System 2 processing in circumstances in which 
individuals are more motivated to arrive at an accurate conclusion. System 2 
processing is held to be effortful and therefore requires motivation. Such motivation 
may be more likely with regard to a negative health event. If a negatively-framed 
event is interpreted in terms of a prospective loss, and a positively-framed event is 
interpreted in terms of a prospective gain, Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979) predicts that the former will have a greater psychological impact.  
This explanation in terms of System 2 processes also dovetails well with the 
findings from Studies 1 and 2 that references to prospective ill-health in internet 
communication were typically about serious health problems. Whereas most health-
related Twitter messages and blog posts concerned relatively minor ill-health, future-
oriented thinking was associated with serious health problems. Thus, it may be that a 
threat must be perceived as relatively serious for individuals to expend the effort to 
employ System 2 to deliberate about the prospect.  
Although the populations and methodologies differed, comparing Studies 1-3 
reveals some other factors that may influence when spontaneous risk judgements 
occur. Risk-related thinking was most evident in Study 3; in this study, participants 
were presented with new information concerning a novel health threat. In contrast, 
health-related Twitter messages and blog entries commonly dealt with familiar and 
common illnesses: in these studies risk judgements were more difficult to find. It is 
possible that spontaneous risk judgements may be more prominent when the threat 
presented is unfamiliar. For a familiar threat, participants are likely to have a 
previously formulated risk judgement; if new information presented does not, at first 
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glance, greatly contradict that view, then the individual may be likely to maintain 
that conclusion rather than engage in effortful elaborative processing to formulate a 
new risk judgement. For an unfamiliar threat, however, participants cannot have a 
previously formulated risk judgement; thus the cognitive work of integrating 
information available in the environment and in memory must happen there and then. 
Moreover, to formulate a new judgement, it may be quite difficult to use typical 
heuristic strategies (see Section 1.3.1), because these heuristics rely on the individual 
having pre-existing knowledge. For example, one cannot use the availability 
heuristic to judge the risk of homocysteine-related heart disease by the ease with 
which instances come to mind if homocysteine is a novel concept. Therefore, 
judgements of the risk of novel threats may tend to require more effortful, 
elaborative, System 2 thinking. Again, because such processes are available to 
conscious awareness, they are more likely to be reported. 
8.2 What Form Do Spontaneous Judgements Take? 
In Chapter 1, a taxonomy was presented for describing solicited health risk 
judgements. Risk judgements can be solicited in terms of own or others’ outcomes, 
positive or negative valence frames, conditional or unconditional risk, and as 
requiring comparative or non-comparative judgements; responses can be required as 
probability estimates of varying kinds, or more ambiguous probability expressions; 
and the levels of risk to be discriminated can vary in number. Although any 
combination of these elements can be described as a measure of perceived risk, 
different ways of soliciting risk judgements may tap very different cognitive 
processes. What form, then, do spontaneous judgements take?  
In Studies 1 and 2, relatively few Twitter messages and blog entries could be 
confidently identified as being clearly risk-related, because so few even made 
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reference to prospective ill-health. This small number makes it difficult to infer much 
about the nature of spontaneous risk judgements directly. In Study 3, however, 
references to prospective homocysteine-related heart disease (developing or avoiding 
it) were reasonably common. Therefore, the following sections focus, initially, on 
summarising what might be inferred from the responses in Study 3 that referenced 
the prospect of homocysteine-related heart disease. After this, the implications of 
Studies 1 and 2 are considered in a more speculative way. 
8.2.1 Target Individual 
Risk judgements can be solicited in terms of different target individuals: 
participants can be asked about own or others’ risk. Study 3 suggests that judgements 
of both own and others’ risk feature in spontaneous thinking. Among thought-listing 
responses, overall, references to participants’ own prospect of homocysteine-related 
heart disease were only slightly more common than references to that of others. 
However, in the negative valence condition, references to one’s own prospect were 
almost twice as common as references to that of others. 
It is of interest that references to others’ prospect of homocysteine-related 
heart disease all concerned the prospect of a general group to which the participant 
themselves belonged (see Section 5.4.2). It seems likely that, although participants 
did not refer to themselves directly, being a member of that group, they saw the 
prospect as one that could affect them. This might suggest that some individuals 
spontaneously judge the risk of a general group to which they belong in lieu of a 
judgement of own risk. In part, this may have been because the stimulus message 
provided population statistics on risk; group-focused judgements may be the easiest 
to make when this type of information is available. One might also suggest, however, 
that thinking in terms of one’s own group may be a strategy to reduce anxiety; it may 
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allow the individual to evaluate risk in a detached way without evoking the image of 
experiencing ill-health oneself. 
A number of factors may determine whether judgements are made in terms of 
own or others’ risk. Clearly, however, both can occur spontaneously. Given that 
judgements of own and others’ risk are likely to be based on different information, 
and be subject to different biases (Gold & Brown, 2009), further research on this 
issue may be important.   
8.2.2 Valence 
Just as a researcher’s risk question can be phrased in positive or negative 
terms, spontaneous health-related thinking could focus on good health or ill-health. 
In Study 3, the health warning phrased in terms of the prospect of developing 
homocysteine-related heart problems resulted in more risk-related references than did 
an equivalent warning phrased in terms of avoiding those problems. This might 
suggest that spontaneous health risk judgements will more typically involve a 
negative valence frame. It seems likely that this would be the case, because, for most 
individuals relatively good health represents the normal, and therefore unremarkable, 
state of affairs. However, in some circumstances the opposite may be true. For 
example, among those with a chronic illness, good health may represent an unusual 
occurrence. In such cases, individuals may be more likely to think in terms of 
prospective good health (e.g., the probability of recovery, or the probability that 
health will not worsen).  
8.2.3  Conditional Risk  
Researchers sometimes solicit conditional risk judgements: participants are 
asked to judge risk for a hypothetical scenario (see Section 1.4.1.4). Typically, risk 
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judgements are conditioned on performance or non-performance of a health 
behaviour by soliciting a judgement of the form, “If I do (or do not) perform 
behaviour X, there is a probability P that Y will follow”. Theoretically, as explained 
in Section 1.4.1.4, it is this type of judgement that should be most predictive of 
health behaviour. Although there were no instances of individuals explicitly 
articulating thoughts in this form, in Study 3, where there were references to 
prospective health outcomes they were commonly linked to health behaviours. When 
individuals do spontaneously consider risk, then, it would seem that the influence of 
behaviour might be a closely associated topic. However, the stimulus message did 
itself highlight the link with behaviour, stating that diet influences a person’s risk. 
This may have made participants much more likely to reference behaviour.  
8.2.4 Comparisons  
Comparative judgements of risk, in particular judgements of own risk relative 
to others’ risk, have been the focus of many health-related studies. However, there is 
little empirical data concerning whether individuals commonly make such 
comparisons spontaneously. In Study 3, there were no instances of an individual 
explicitly comparing own and others’ risk (i.e., none stated “I am at higher/lower risk 
than person X”; see Section 5.4.3.2). However, four participants implied that their 
own risk was low and also implied others’ risk was high. This may suggest that these 
individuals were spontaneously drawing something like the UO conclusion – the 
conclusion that their own risk is relatively low compared to others (see Section 
1.1.5). All four of these were in the negative valence condition, which is consistent 
with the proposal that the UO conclusion arises as part of defensive processing (see 
Section 1.1.5). However, it would appear that such comparisons are not typical.  
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8.2.5 Response Option Label Type / Response Definition and Levels of Risk 
Researchers often ask participants to report risk judgements in terms of 
probability estimates (e.g., odds ratios, percentage probabilities). Probability 
estimates were never articulated by participants in Study 3. Even expressions of 
probability (e.g., “likely”, “highly likely”, “unlikely”) were not commonly used. 
Where probability was conveyed, it was by the degree of confidence or tentativeness 
implied by the language used (e.g., “I don’t think X will happen” or “I am sure X 
will happen”). From the vagueness of such expressions, as was discussed in Section 
5.5, one might assume that individuals only discriminate two or three levels of risk.  
Another interpretation, also discussed in Section 5.5, is that spontaneous risk 
judgements do not typically produce a conclusion in terms of a well-defined point 
estimate, or even a range with well-defined boundaries. Rather, spontaneous 
judgements may more typically result in a fuzzy conclusion – a vague sense that 
certain points on a continuous probability are more plausible estimates than other 
points. If requested, individuals may well be able to convert such fuzzy 
representations into a form that would make distinctions between multiple levels of 
risk clear, but in everyday life, they may rarely have reason to do so. It was argued in 
Section 5.5 that mapping risk onto a scale likely requires effortful System 2 
processes. Individuals would be unlikely to expend this effort unless they were 
specifically required to.  
8.2.6 Spontaneous Health-related Thinking and Its Implications for 
Spontaneous Risk Judgements  
Although Studies 1 and 2 identified relatively little material that was clearly 
risk-related, they nevertheless provided a good picture of health-related thinking 
more generally. Three strong trends in these data may have some implications for 
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spontaneous risk judgements, because in everyday life such judgements will arise in 
the context of more general thoughts about health. 
First, it was seen that own health was a substantially more common topic in 
Twitter messages and blog posts than was others’ health (two or three times as 
common). It would seem likely that, to the extent that such thinking leads to risk 
judgements, it would be to judgements of own rather than others’ risk, this being the 
more closely related topic. 
Second, references to ill-health accounted for the great majority of Twitter 
messages and blog posts; references to ill-health were far more common than 
references to good health. This is likely to be because, for the majority, ill-health is 
an unusual state of affairs, and therefore worth thinking or talking about. In 
comparison, good health is familiar and therefore not noteworthy. This may suggest 
that the same will be true of typical health risk judgements. Individuals would be 
more likely to judge the likelihood  of experiencing a disease, rather than the 
likelihood of not experiencing it, because experiencing it would be the unusual event. 
Third, references to current health accounted for the great majority of Twitter 
messages and blog posts; these were far more common than references to past or 
prospective health. In both studies, health-related thinking was thus very focused on 
the present. As was argued in Section 3.5, this might partly explain why risk 
judgements were difficult to find in these data. Temporal Construal Theory (e.g., 
Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 2003) holds that the temporal distance 
of an event influences the abstractness of thoughts about it: an event near in time will 
be thought about in more concrete terms, and an event in the distant future will be 
thought about in more abstract terms. If risk judgements require more abstract 
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thinking, but a focus on the present promotes more concrete thinking, then this may 
make risk judgements less likely to occur.  
8.2.7 Summary: The Nature of Spontaneous Risk Judgements 
From the data obtained in Study 3 (and to a lesser extent Studies 1-2), some 
inferences can be drawn about the form that spontaneous risk judgements may 
typically take. Just as researchers can pose questions in terms of own risk, the risk of 
a specific other, or the risk of a general group, so too did spontaneous risk-related 
thinking vary in whose risk took focus. There are also reasons to suspect that 
individuals will more commonly judge risk in negative terms  (i.e., the probability of 
experiencing ill-health) rather than positive terms (i.e., the probability of avoiding ill-
health). Behaviour was typically referenced in risk-related thinking, which may 
possibly point to a conditional judgement being made. There was little evidence for 
comparative judgements of risk, however. Most striking was the complete absence of 
probability estimates, and the scarcity of probability expressions.  
8.3 How Closely Do Spontaneous Judgements Correlate with 
Solicited Ones? 
Combined, Studies 1 – 3 bolster confidence that individuals do engage in 
risk-related thinking spontaneously; however, they also heighten the suspicion that 
soliciting risk judgements will often provoke thinking would not otherwise have 
occurred. In particular, if in spontaneous thinking, individuals vary in whose risk 
they consider and if they rarely use probability estimates or probability expressions, 
to what extent can solicited risk judgement measures capture the spontaneous 
judgements of a sample? Put alternatively, to what extent can solicited responses on 
scales correlate with spontaneous risk judgements? 
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On this question, Study 5 used affective responses as a proxy for spontaneous 
(latent) risk judgements, to seek evidence regarding such a correlation. It was found 
that solicited risk judgements, measured using three different scales, were slightly 
predictive of affective responses to a health message. This is consistent with the 
assumption that spontaneous judgements of risk were made, and influenced 
participants’ affective state, prior to the solicitation of risk judgements. To the best of 
the author’s knowledge, this was the first study to evaluate risk judgement measures 
on such a criterion.  
The fact that three very different risk judgement measures were equal 
predictors of affective responses might suggest that choice of risk judgement 
measure may not be as crucial one might expect. For example, although percentage 
probabilities were not found in Studies 1-3, judgements solicited in terms of 
probabilities were no less predictive of affective responses than those expressed on a 
verbal or visual analogue scale.  
Of central importance, however, is the fact that solicited risk judgements 
predicted only 7.2% of variance in latent affective responses. One would not expect 
risk judgments to predict all of the variance; however, under the conditions of the 
study, one would expect risk judgements to be a reasonably strong influence. Thus, 
although this study suggests that solicited risk judgements do correlate with 
spontaneous ones, the relatively low correlation that was found might suggest that 
the three solicited risk judgements captured different cognitive processes than those 
that occurred spontaneously. Replications in different populations, employing 
alternative stimuli, and evaluating a greater range of risk judgement measures, are 
required before more general conclusions can be drawn.  
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8.4 Is the Act of Soliciting Risk Judgement Psychologically 
Inert? 
In Chapters 2 and 6, it was argued that soliciting risk judgements might 
impact, not only what participants report, but also what conclusions about risk they 
actually draw and give weight to. Solicitation effects may therefore be detectable by 
their influence on downstream variables  (i.e., variables sensitive to judgements of 
risk).   
Study 4 tested for solicitation effects by examining whether the act of 
soliciting risk judgements had downstream effects on intentions for protective 
behavioural change. It was found that, when the event considered (homocysteine-
related heart disease) was described as affecting relatively many people (the “high-
numbers” condition), soliciting risk judgements caused participants to subsequently 
report stronger intentions to engage in protective behavioural change. The size of this 
simple effect was medium to large. No effect was detected when the event was 
described as affecting relatively few people (the “low-numbers” condition). Thus, the 
effect of solicitation was moderated by whether the stimulus message described the 
health threat as affecting high numbers or low numbers. One plausible explanation is 
that soliciting risk judgements provoked greater use of System 2 processing, which 
in turn meant that participants were more likely to incorporate the numerical 
information provided.  
It would appear, then, that soliciting risk judgements can indeed provoke 
cognitive processes that would otherwise not occur. Moreover, Study 4 showed that  
solicitation can interact with another independent variable. As French and Sutton 
(2010) noted, if effects of measurement interact with an intervention/treatment, this 
can cause particular problems for the validity of conclusions drawn from an 
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experimental study. Such interactions mean the act of soliciting risk judgements 
could produce, enhance, or mask the effect of the manipulated variable. Study 4 
showed that this is more than just a theoretical possibility. This result further 
highlights the need for researchers to carefully consider and when possible, evaluate, 
the ecological validity of the risk judgement measures they use. 
8.5 Recommendations 
Going forward, researchers should be wary of the possibility that the risk 
judgements they solicit from participants may not correspond to those that occur 
spontaneously. Chapters 1 and 2 laid a theoretical foundation for how and why this 
may occur, and subsequent chapters presented empirical evidence that supports this 
possibility.  
This does not mean, however, that the practice of soliciting risk judgements 
should be abandoned. Certainly, it is possible to collect data on spontaneous risk 
judgements and circumvent solicitation effects, as demonstrated by Studies 1-3. 
These methods provided rich data sets, less constrained by assumptions about risk 
judgements, and the data obtained are less likely to be influenced by the research 
process. However, the hands-off nature of these methods do not seem well suited for 
the purposes for which risk judgements are typically assessed. Evaluating the 
accuracy, sensitivity, or predictive power of health risk judgements will usually 
require reliable quantitative measurement of them. Given that individuals almost 
never spontaneously articulate risk judgements in terms of probability estimates, use 
of quantitative scales in some form would seem to be unavoidable for most studies. 
For typical research involving risk judgements, there are approaches 
researchers might employ to test for solicitation effects, or reduce their impact. First, 
just as solicitation was manipulated as a between-groups factor in Study 4, 
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solicitation can be included as a factor in any experimental study in which risk 
judgements are hypothesised to mediate the influence of another variable. By 
including extra groups for which risk judgements are not solicited, researchers can 
separate treatment effects from solicitation effects. This would apply whether the 
treatment is a between- or within-subjects variable. In a study where risk judgements 
themselves are the primary dependent variable, obviously, one cannot have a no-
measurement condition. In these studies, a condition employing an alternative way of 
soliciting risk judgements may help bolster confidence in the robustness of the 
treatment effect.  
This strategy has the disadvantage of requiring larger sample sizes. 
Moreover, it only applies to experimental studies where risk judgements are solicited 
to investigate their mediating role (or as a manipulation check). Another approach, 
which may be more practical, is for researchers to use a set of risk questions and 
response formats. Just as other psychological constructs are measured with 
inventories comprising multiple items, so too can multiple measures be used to 
measure risk judgements.  
Rather than seek a standard set of measures, however, researchers should 
select a set of complementary measures that are practical and appropriate to the aims 
of their particular study; but which, through their differences, help explore whether 
the findings are likely to be relevant to everyday, spontaneous risk judgements. 
When a relationship with, or an effect on, risk judgements is hypothesised, one 
would initially examine if this is equally evident among all risk judgement measures. 
If a result depends on the type of risk judgement, the researcher can suggest reasons 
why this may have occurred; these reasons may include explanations in terms of 
solicitation effects.  
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In choosing a set of measures, the theoretical and empirical work presented in 
this thesis suggests that researchers should consider the following principles: First, 
when possible, include a measure designed to capture risk judgements that rely 
primarily on System 1. This might be achieved, for example, by imposing time limits 
on responses, imposing a high cognitive load, using cueing words such as “feel” or 
“intuition” in the question, or using non-numerical response options. Dual-process 
theories hold that System 2 processing is effortful; because soliciting risk judgements 
may make participants more willing to expend this effort, including measures that 
discourage or interfere with System 2 processing may help assess the robustness of 
results.  
Second, consider the possible effects of preceding items and tasks on each 
risk judgement measure. When possible and appropriate, randomise the order of risk 
judgement measures, then analyse the responses for any effects of order. 
Alternatively, present risk judgement items with the aim of minimising the influence 
of one risk judgement measure on another. This might involve, for example, 
presenting each risk judgement measure on a separate page, separating risk 
judgements with intervening items, or presenting less constraining measures before 
those that are more likely to produce solicitation effects. 
Third, because soliciting risk judgements may heighten motivated reasoning, 
when possible include at least one measure designed to minimise the influence of 
motivated reasoning on risk judgements. This might involve, for example, using 
another person or a general group as the target of the risk judgement, or employing a 
positive valence frame. 
Fourth, except when necessary to the aims of the study, or the pursuit of the 
other principles just described, researchers should generally prefer measures with 
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features observed to be more common in spontaneous risk-related thinking. This is 
recommended on the basis that doing so may help reproduce the mindset in which 
everyday, spontaneous risk judgements occur. A common theme among well-
established models of memory and cognition (e.g., ACT, Anderson, 1983; encoding 
specificity, Tulving and Thomson, 1973) is that the accessibility of cognitions can be 
affected by features of the context in which thinking occurs. The mere presence of a 
certain sight, sound, or smell in the environment causes activation to spread to 
associated concepts and facilitates their retrieval. Features of a question or response 
format used to solicit risk judgements are likely to be particularly salient features of 
the measurement context, and may therefore play an important role in reproducing a 
mindset similar to that in which everyday judgements occur. Thus, by maximising 
the correspondence between the features of risk judgement measures and those of 
everyday, spontaneous judgements, researchers may improve ecological validity.  
The present thesis provides some evidence to guide these choices. For 
example, Studies 1-3 suggest that spontaneous judgements may typically be made in 
terms of negative event valence; in the absence of a reason to choose otherwise, 
negatively-framed risk questions should therefore be preferred. However, researchers 
may wish to first investigate the form these judgements take when they occur 
spontaneously, in the particular population and concerning the particular event of 
interest, using thought-listing or thinkaloud procedures. For example, a preliminary 
study of teenagers’ alcohol-related risk judgements might involve recruiting teenage 
participants in a context where alcohol is present. While in that environment, they 
would be asked merely to think aloud. At first, they should have no particular 
instructions on what topic to focus, nor should they be aware that the research 
concerns alcohol. If a participant’s thoughts do not spontaneously turn to alcohol, or 
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risk, then increasingly more specific prompts can be given (e.g., “now think aloud 
about alcohol”, “now think aloud about risks from alcohol”). Material obtained with 
more general prompts should be given greater weight, but more specific prompts 
may be more successful at generating risk-related material. Data obtained in this way 
may help researchers to design risk questions and formats that better reproduce 
everyday judgements.  
Certainly, more research specifically focused on understanding solicitation 
effects is needed; this is discussed in the following section. Yet, as French and Sutton 
(2010) have suggested, there may be a bias against publishing studies on 
measurement effects that find no effect; generally, null effects are less likely to be 
published in psychology because they not deemed to be interesting (Easterbrook, 
Gopalan, Berlin, & Matthews, 1991). If so, studies which find effects of soliciting 
risk judgements may tend to become overrepresented in the literature. However, if it 
became routine for any study involving risk judgements to employ multiple 
measures, and report the relations and differences among them, this would build a 
base of less biased evidence for evaluating the characteristics of measures. 
8.6 Suggestions for Further Research 
Studies 1-5 employed a variety of approaches to investigate spontaneous 
health-related thinking. With regard to the findings of this thesis, convergent 
evidence might usefully be sought using a thought recognition approach. This would 
involve providing participants with a list of statements and asking them to rate the 
extent to which they recognise each as having been among their spontaneous 
thoughts (for an example, see Gold & Karantzas, 2008). Studies 1-3 relied on 
participants’ recall; it has been well established in memory research, that recognition 
requires less time and effort for encoding and retrieval, and is less reliant on 
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elaborative processing (Rugg & Yonelinas, 2003; Yonelinas, 2002). Thus, to the 
extent that thoughts about health-related risk occur, but are underrepresented in free-
recall data, a recognition task might better detect them. The statements most 
frequently and strongly endorsed may provide further insight into how health and 
health-related risk are spontaneously conceptualised; the speed with which 
statements are endorsed might also be a useful indicator. Although this approach may 
not be entirely impervious to solicitation effects – by suggesting possible thoughts 
the questionnaire could bring risk-related thoughts into being – it may nevertheless 
provide useful complementary evidence.  
In addition, the methodology employed in Study 5 might usefully be extended 
to different contexts or using different stimuli; this may help shed light on why the 
correlation observed in Study 5, between solicited risk judgements and affective 
responses, was so low. It might be that, for example, risk judgements would be more 
strongly predictive of affective responses to a health warning if the perceived 
severity of the prospect were very high (i.e., the consequences were very 
undesirable). Most HBTs hold that severity judgements and risk judgements have 
interactive effects, such that risk is most strongly related to behaviour when severity 
is high (see Section 1.1); affective responses might be expected to similarly depend 
on severity judgements. If so, a warning crafted to heighten perceived severity (even 
more so than in Study 4) may thus mean that affective responses are a better proxy 
for spontaneous risk judgements. This could be achieved, for example, by describing 
the consequences of a health threat in detail, or presenting graphic images alongside 
the warning. In addition to judgements of risk and severity, it might also be useful to 
measure other components of HBTs, including self- and response-efficacy 
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judgements, and examine whether these interact with risk judgements to predict 
affective responses.  
Another variation on Study 5 would involve varying the health message 
between independent groups to experimentally manipulate risk judgements, for 
example, by describing a disease as common or uncommon. In such a study, one 
would expect a correlation within both groups between affective responses and 
solicited judgments, just as was found in Study 5. If the correlation is indeed due to a 
causal effect of risk judgements on affect, one would expect the manipulation to 
increase the mean level of both judged risk and negative affect. Moreover, 
appropriate mediation tests should be consistent with the proposal that the 
experimental effect on affective responses is mediated by risk judgements, and not 
the converse.  
In addition, more studies involving ecological momentary assessment (e.g., 
Hogarth, Portell, & Cuxart, 2007; Shiffman, Stone, & Hufford, 2008; and see Section 
2.3) might be used to investigate the role of various everyday contexts on 
spontaneous risk judgements. Ecological momentary assessment involves soliciting 
responses from participants at random intervals by means of a handheld computer or 
mobile phone that they keep with them whilst going about their everyday life.  When 
an alarm rings, the participant is required to respond to the device. Participants could 
thus report on their recent spontaneous health-related thinking; this could involve a 
free-response format (e.g., a thought-listing task), or a thought recognition a task. 
The key advantage would be that the full range of everyday contexts experienced 
could randomly, and thus representatively, be sampled. Detailed contextual 
information (e.g., the participant’s location, mood, activity) could be gathered and 
relationships with spontaneous risk-related thinking could be explored. Of course, 
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this approach brings its own problems. For example, in such a study participants may 
know ahead of a given alarm ring what question they will be asked; this means the 
thinking that is recorded may not in fact be entirely spontaneous. Nevertheless, such 
a study may provide convergent evidence for the findings of this thesis. 
The primary rationale for considering risk judgement solicitation effects in 
thesis was on the basis that they might cause problems for the validity of research. 
However, it might be that, with a better understanding of risk judgement solicitation 
effects, they could be put to good use. Soliciting judgements of risk could in and of 
itself be a useful intervention to promote protective health behaviours.  
8.7 Conclusion 
For research in health psychology to have practical relevance, the questions, 
response formats, tasks, and stimuli used by researchers to gather data must capture 
cognitive processes that are representative of those which occur in everyday life. A 
simple question such as, “What do you think is the chance of X?” may seem, at first, 
to be a straightforward, innocuous, and self-evidently relevant way of assessing 
health-related risk judgements. Risk judgements are central to most health behaviour 
theories, and health-related risk is one of the most commonly assessed constructs in 
all of health psychology. Yet, the assumptions underlying the measurement of this 
construct have to date received little consideration or empirical evaluation. 
 The contribution of this thesis has been to address the fundamental questions 
of ecological validity that are typically overlooked. First, the gap in the literature and 
the need to address it were demonstrated through a review of the risk judgement 
literature and a theoretical exploration of the issue of risk judgement solicitation 
effects. Second, a range of novel methodologies was employed to shed empirical 
light on spontaneous health-related thinking and the adequacy of typical measures to 
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assess them. At a time in which health outcomes for individuals are increasing 
determined by the extent to which they voluntarily engage in protective behaviours, 
it is crucial that health promotion efforts have a solid scientific basis. This means that 
the health behaviour theories that guide these efforts, and the measures to which they 
give rise, need to be ecologically valid. It is this need that inspired this thesis. 
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Appendix A: Data for Studies 1 and 2 
Table A1 lists the categories used in Studies 1 and 2 and their associated 
category  codes. Table A2 presents the full text of each of the 267 health-related 
Twitter messages examined in Study 1 (see Chapter 3); Table A3 presents the full 
text of each of the 120 health-related blog entries examined in Study 2 (see Chapter 
4). For each Twitter message and blog entry, the categorisations are indicated by the 
associated category codes. The spelling, grammar, punctuation, and formatting are 
unaltered. 
Table A1 
Categories employed in Studies 1 and 2 and their associated category codes.  
Category Code 
  
Target  
     Own health T1 
     Other’s health T2 
         Known other T2a 
         Twitter user T2b 
         Stranger T2c 
         General group  T2d 
         Other known through the media T2e 
         Unclear T2f 
     Unspecified target T3 
  
Health events/states  
     Prospective Ill-health/death H1 
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Category Code 
     Current ill-health H2 
     Past ill-health/death H3 
     Prospective good health H4 
     Current good health H5 
     Past good health H6 
  
Type of health condition  
     Allergy C1 
     Cancer C2 
     Eye and vision disorders or complaints C3 
     Gastrointestinal disorders or complaints C4 
     Cold, flu, respiratory infection, fever C5 
     Injury C6 
     Death C7 
     Unspecified illness C8 
     Other specified C9 
     Headache C10 
     Dizziness C11 
     Hangover C12 
     Sleeping difficulties C13 
     Mental health/wellbeing C14 
     Addiction C15 
  
Behaviours  
     Positive health behaviour B1 
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Category Code 
          Performed positive health behaviour B1a 
          Intends positive health behaviour B1b 
          Recommends positive health behaviour B1c 
  
     Negative health behaviour B2 
          Performed negative health behaviour B2a 
          Intends negative health behaviour B2b 
  
     Type of behaviour  
          Alcohol consumption B3a 
          Alternative treatments & home remedies B3b 
          Drinking water B3c 
          Diet B3d 
          Exercise B3e 
          Medical procedure or consultation B3f 
          Medication B3g 
          Rest or restricting activity B3h 
          Other behaviours B3i 
          Limiting behaviour B3j 
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Table A2 
Twitter messages examined in Study 1 and their categorisations.  
Message Text Categories 
Im not going to be tired during CES…thats good. All I have 
to do is eat right get good sleep and have some healthy 
spiritual time. 
T1, B1, B1b, B3d, 
B3h 
well, the stress has finally been melted away for a few hours 
at least 
T1, H3, H5, C14 
sick.  =( T1, H2, C8 
have insomnia… what gives, I can sleep for England 
usually! Plah. 
T1, H2, C13 
My sister had her nose broken today. By her Jack Russell 
terrier. Only in my family. 
T2, T2a, H2, C6 
shooting pain in my shoulder. Ow T1, H2, C9 
Headache hitting like that monster no one has seen yet in 
Cloverfield. 
T1, H2, C10 
mother fucker im still sick! 101 fever lastnight i’m not at 
99.6 
T1, H2, C5 
Nathan has a cold: fever, sluggish, achey. I forsee videos and 
games. 
T2, T2a, H2, C5 
Feeling vomity  T1, H2, C4 
I think not. Really need to go back to sleep. Feel like I’m 
getting something 
T1, H2, C8 
My eyes burn T1, H2, C3 
fever making me see things, or i have a new pet scurrying 
around… 
T1, H2, C5 
Going to work with a sore throat and an achy body is NOT 
on my top ten list of things to do before I’m 40. 
T1, H2, C5 
i love my life is so live !!!!!!!! T1, H5, C14 
Warm fire, blankets, bones rerun and a decongestant haze. T1, H2, C5, B1, 
B1a, B3f 
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Message Text Categories 
I think chili’s tried to poison me. I’ve never had that 
immediate of a violent reaction to food before. 
T1, H3, C4, B2, 
B2a, B3d 
I’m baaaaaaaaaaaaaackkkkkkkkkkkk !!!!!!!!  Only won a 
belly ache in Vegas from the buffets. 
T1, H3, C4, B2, 
B2a, B3d 
Just finished working out I feel like CRAP! Ah and I have a 
headache which uberduber sucks! 
T1, H2, C10 
Trying to nurse my strained neck. T1, H2, C6 
Love working out to Eminem. Getting healthy in 08 T1, H4, B1, B1a, 
B1b, B3e 
I’m helping a friend get through a crisis. T2, T2a, H2, C14 
Time to get the chilluns in bed. P hacked and coughed all 
last night but had no nap today – does that mean she WILL 
sleep or WON’T? 
T2, T2a, H2, C5 
Er. I hate liars… & coughing. Also hate being sick. It’s not 
as fun as not being sick. =[. 
T1, H2, C5 
I’m very tired. I think my boring ass is going to call it a 
night and go to bed early. I think I’m catching a cold. 
T1, H2, C5 
My very hot wife made me tater tots to feed my cold. T1, H2, C5, B1, 
B1a, B3d 
I am getting way too cranky….gotta meditate more. Let 
go….. 
T1, H2, C14, B1, 
B1a, B1b 
I am rethinking going out tonight, considering i feel like i’m 
going to puke everywhere. 
T1, H2, C4 
Ugh, headache. Someone bring me some 294lichéd and 
whiskey. 
T1, H2, C10, B1, 
B3a, B3g 
feeling great after seeing my new chiropractor T1, H3, H5, B1, 
B1a, B3b 
freaking sick T1, H2, C8 
The brain is not happy, probably because I drank quite a bit 
of Cobra beer tonight and I’m starting to remember it. 
T1, H2, C12, B2, 
B2a, B3a 
Drinking way too much T1, B2, B2a, B3a 
Wonderful, Smyth is out for 8 weeks w/ a broken ankle. T2, T2f, H2, C6 
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Message Text Categories 
Wayne just got attacked by a deer! T2, T2a, H2, C6 
home- I feel like dieing  soooo sick T1, H2, C8 
My plan to `sleep thru the pain` has failed. I still have a 
headache but at least my stomach is feeling better. 
T1, H2, H3, H5, C4, 
C10 
going to take a nap & hope to feel better when I wake up…. T1, H2, H4, C8 
Wow…age can suck sometimes… now I’m seeing double. T1, H2, C3 
Off to Temple, since I skipped with sickness last week.  
Picking up Sheryl afterwards…need an adult beverage. 
T1, H3, C8 
received my shots for the 295liché trip, feeling pretty 
nauseous at the moment 
T1, H2, C4, B1, 
B1a, B2, B3g 
Ah, PMS, thou art the bane of my existence T1, H2, C9 
so much gaming. I already have a sore spot on my thumb! T1, H2, C6, B2, 
B2a, B3i 
My date of death… Sunday, February 19, 2051 – found it at 
http://deathclock.com 
T1, H1, C7 
Waiting for word on Britney status. She’s in hospital, 
lawyers in court, TMZ on the scene of course. 
T2, T2e, H2 
Can you get carpal tunnel in your trapezius muscle?  I have 
diagnosed myself with it.  Maybe I’m the break through 
T1, H2, C9 
Going to try and take a nap. I have the most MASSIVE 
headache in the history of ever. 
T1, H2, C10 
Sick. Messy house. No help from HER all of a sudden. 24 
hours to go. sigh 
T1, H2, C8 
It didn’t hit me until I was up on the roof taking down x-mas 
lites that yesterday was the 1 yr mark of my accident @ 
work. What a year! 
T1, H3, C6 
OK, I finally got the flu bug; be afk T1, H2, C5 
im so sick! T1, H2, C8 
Considering dragging my sick ass out of the house for the 
first time in 4 days 
T1, H2, C8 
sore throat and a cold  T1, H2, C5 
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Head hurts… throat is sore… sinus pressure… sneezing 
fits… sniffles… I think I’m sick…  
T1, H2, C5 
Going out with Nick to get him some paints.  Feeling better 
today. 
T1, H3, H5, C8 
Big plans again tonight: Sleep and sleep. Getting better but 
am a long way from healthy still. 
T1, H2, H3, H5, C8, 
B3h 
Dosing myself liberally with generic Nyquil.  FYI, flying 
with a head cold is a special kind of torture. 
T1, H2, C5, B1, 
B1a, B3g 
kdot is feeling a little behind, but is running on high. I think 
that she needs some cough medicine. 
T2, T2f, H2, C5, B1, 
B1c, B3g 
apparently standing is more detrimental to ankle than 
walking is. Time to brace the damned thing – why did I not 
do this before? headslap 
T1, H2, C6, B1, 
B1b, B2, B2a, B3i 
feel like I am getting sick just in time for the weekend.  Let 
this work day end!! 
T1, H1, C8 
Medication, Franziskaner Hefe-Dunkel and burgers. Yes, I’ll 
be resting at home all weekend. Doctor’s orders. 
T1, H2, C8, B1, 
B1b, B3g, B3h 
Sick in bed T1, H2, C8 
Just woke up…feeling TONS better….doubtful I will see the 
light of day today though. Stomach doesn’t hurt anymore 
though..that;s good 
T1, H3, H5, C8 
i dont realy fell the best i wnat to go to bed but i have to do 
school work b/f they kick me out 
T1, H2, C8 
really sick today. Wish i felt better. Hope everyone else feels 
better than me. 
T1, H2, C8 
thing that sucks about being sick: once you have the strength 
to stand up, you still don’t have the strength to open jars  
T1, H2, C8 
back, that was kinda fun, kidney kinda hurts, i’ll be ok i just 
need to drink a lot of water and i forget to 
T1, H2, C9, B1, 
B1b, B3c 
also I’ve gotten a wee bit addicted to scrabulous while I have 
been home sick 
T1, H2, C8 
Have a terrible cold virus for three weeks now T1, H2, C5 
yay for headaches T1, H2, C10 
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Message Text Categories 
Today couldn’t have gone further from my expectations. 
Sick wife. Huge storm. No power (just restored). Needed 
files on office computer. Eek 
T2, T2a, H2, C8 
just had a good practice session, but boy is my brain foggy 
from these stupid sick bugs 
T1, H2, C8 
I guess all that partying on New Years caught up with me 
‘cuz now I’m sick  
T1, H2, C8, B2, 
B2a, B3i 
headache! Headache! Headache!!! T1, H2, C10 
Headed to the airport. I’ve got a feeling that my ears are not 
going to pop on this trip.  Pain… 
T1, H1, C9, B2, 
B2b, B3i 
I’m gonna take a nap. I don’t feel good. T1, H2, C8 
still not feeling up to par. Crashed on the couch for about 4 
hours 
T1, H2, C8, B1, B3h 
Helping Jeannie plan her trip to Utah for cancer follow-up. T2, T2a, H2, C2, 
B1, B1b, B3f 
A coworker has bronchitis. He said my symptoms sound like 
his. Do not want! 
T1, T2, T2a, H2, C5 
im feeling like a stress storm coming on here. I hate that. 
One thing goes bad, and its a domino effect- Stop it already 
T1, H2, C14 
Just pulling into NYC. Guy finally stopped yapping about 
being sick. Can’t wait to get of train. Too stuffy and warm. 
T2, T2c, H2, C8 
poll update: @amandarie is twittering to me that she is sick 
too. 
T2, T2b, H2, C8 
OH MY GOD cold/flu season is a BITCH!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
Would GA legislation mandate that all kids wear latex 
gloves and surgical masks … 
T3, H2, C5, B1, 
B1c, B3i 
Dealing with way more wrist pain than there should be after 
over a week off from work. 
T1, H2, C6, B1, 
B1a, B3h 
Been sleeping on and off for 4 hours in the car. My mouth 
taste like old people, and my neck is killing me. 
T1, H2, C6, C9, B2, 
B2a, B3i 
Sick from the weather for the first time in like three winters 
 … gonna get some sleep and some good meds – might 
feel better tonight. 
T1, H2, H4, C8, B1, 
B1b, B3g, B3h 
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Headed to emergency acupuncture appointment. Coughing 
up green stuff. I have GOT to stop getting sick. 
T1, H2, C5, B1, 
B1b, B3b 
my wrist hurts. NOT a good sign 4 days before castoff T1, H2, C9 
Home. Gonna jump in the hot tub and try to relax. Arthritis 
& stress = hot tub. Glub glub 
T1, H2, C9, C14, 
B1, B1a, B3i 
My mucous membranes are NOT appreciating this weather.  
I’m sure you all wanted to know that. 
T1, H2, C1 
laziness trumps hunger, once again. Ow, stomach acids! T1, H2, C4 
Still so hungover after food and 10 water bottles. WHY ME T1, H2, C12, B1, 
B1a, B3c, B3d 
watching soaps with my mother…...oh boy….i couldnt be 
moe excited….being sick sucks ass big time…im bored hit 
me up or message me 
T1, H2, C8 
thanks!  Don’t drown! T2, T2b, H1, C7 
Getting sick + dealing with seniors who think they know 
everything (though they’re in ‘tard English) = headache. 
T1, H2, C8 
Getting better … Work Tylenol Cold Rapid Release, work! T1, H2, H3, H5, C5, 
B1, B1a, B3g 
I am sick again. Nothing is on tv except for ‘hackers’. Tribe 
is down again. With the weather this is quite a sucky day 
T1, H2, C8 
looking at clip with the Britney drama. I hope she will get 
better and that she find some peace and equilibrium. 
T2, T2e, H2, H4, 
C14 
took Saab in for muffler fix (finally). Had a good talk with 
Sherri. Feeling better. ☺ 
T1, H3, H5, C14 
my top-secret migraine remedy: 2 extra-strength Excedrin, a 
can of Coke (not diet), and a Snickers bar, followed by a 30 
minute nap. 
T3, B1, B1c, B3b, 
B3g, B3h 
If you have a heart condition, I’d recommend not driving on 
280 today. That is some scary-ass rain. 
T2, T2d, H2, C9, 
B2, B3h 
Nose, please stop running. I can’t keep up. T1, H2, C5 
Four days into 2008 and there’ve been three murders in the 
city. They’re falling behind! But the day is young. 
T2, T2e, H3, C7 
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is still sick; staying home from school. T1, H2, C8 
Got the green light from the doctor… I get to go home ☺ T1, H3, C8 
I can feel the angst  /  @dangerfan is way too stressed  /  
Think he needs a beer 
T2, T2b, H2, C14, 
B1, B1c, B3a 
Gave up on venture out.  Sitting here feeling vaguely 
naseous instead.  Damn Healthy Choice meals. 
T1, H2, C4, B1, 
B1a, B2, B3d, B3h 
darn cough --- please go away T1, H2, C5 
Off 2 santa 299lichéd 4 goals retreat. Windy. Heavy rain. 
Trees down. Sinus pressure. Feeling drugged fm 299lichéd. 
T1, H2, C5, B1, 
B1a, B3g 
Headache! Suffered various degrees of ‘caffeine hangover’ 
during the holiday season! More water and less Pepsi for 
me! 
T1, H2, C10, B1, 
B1b, B2, B2a, B3c, 
B3i 
my biggest fear is getting cancer MariaSHoward T1, H1, C2 
Britney Spears hospitalized! http://tinyurl.com/26635d T2, T2e, H2 
Found out that I am allergic to roses today, i feel like hell. T1, H2, C1, B2, 
B2a, B3i 
sick at home, which is to say, still job hunting T1, H2, C8 
I think I might be getting an Intercostal spasm. T1, H2, C9 
Still working through horrendous flu. Urghhh. T1, H2, C5 
K has just forced me to go purchase hard liquor to make my 
cold better. Scarily enough it seems to be working. 
T1, H2, C5, B1, 
B1a, B3a 
is caught again by another little bit of depression, but he’s 
not able to understand why. 
T1, H2, C14 
Only 1 week left until the Winter Series running races start. 
Currently very sore from training! But it’s a good pain. 
T1, H2, C9, B2, 
B2a, B3e 
wondering when Britney Spears is going to die.  She is 
almost getting to the point of being too nuts to live. 
T2, T2e, H1, H2, 
C7, C14 
sniffling, sneezing, coughing, aching, stuffy head, fever… 
you get the idea 
T1, H2, C5 
I called in sick this morning then went back to bed for 5 
more hours.  Apparently I needed that. 
T1, H2, C8, B1, 
B1a, B3h 
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My healthy eating plan for 2008 is being derailed by the 
cookies 1-800-Flowers sent me for the holidays. Better 
distribute this weekend 
T1, B1, B1b, B2, 
B2a, B3d 
my eye infection makes me look like I got in a brawl. Viral 
too so it’ll take a few weeks :/ 
T1, H2, C3 
sigh. Sinus infection. And a four-wife birthday party to put 
together. Polygamy is hard when you’re sick. 
T1, H2, C5 
coughing & sneezing – colds are yucky! T1, H2, C5 
Don’t know how I made it through my workout I feel like 
death 
T1, H2, C8 
Marci is looking forward to the big party tomorrow. 
Hopefully the kids don’t get sick! 
T2, T2a, H1, C8 
I HATE the after-taste of a multi vitamin…uggghh gagging T1, B1, B1a, B3b 
Going to meet Sara and the kiddos at McDonalds for some 
unhealthy chow. But it’s on gift cards, so w00t! 
T1, B2, B2b, B3d 
is sick at home with the flu T1, H2, C5 
Done something mysterious and really quite painful to my 
left heel. Net result is that I can barely walk at the moment. 
 
T1, H2, C6 
Why am I still ill? Bored of it now! T1, H2, C8 
back at the hospital, I have a dentist appt in 2 hours, enough 
with doctors already. 
T1, B1, B1b, B3f 
this has just become heartbreaking. I remember feeling 
contempt for her as a teenager- now i fear for  her life!! 
http://tinyurl.com/3dd76p 
T2, T2e, H1, C7 
I need white out, Advil, and for it to be 4:00. T1, H2, C5, B1, B3g 
Playing with my new OLPC. Finally feeling human again! 
That cold really knocked me around! 
T1, H3, C5 
Going to the drugstore.  Officially killed another box of 
tissue.  Anyone need anything? 
T1, H2, C8 
i hate the flu! T1, H2, C5 
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injury toll: whanged my left elbow in two places, whanged 
my left knee and right ankle, scraped my knuckles. 
301lichéd take me away 
T1, H2, C6, B1, B2, 
B2a, B3g, B3i 
Back in the saddle and now have a cold!  What a way to start 
the year.  Catching up on Digg and PR Blog.  Some made 
good use of New Year! 
T1, H2, C5 
bad episode/reaction to OTC meds – can’t wait to be 100% - 
still sick of being sick 
T1, H2, H4, C8, B1, 
B1a, B2, B3g 
i hate colds. T1, H2, C5 
Not a good morning. I’m tired as hell and have a sore throat. 
Yay for 3.5 hours of stats then work immediately after. I’m 
thinking quizn … 
T1, H2, C5 
Wow, sounds like Britney Spears has officially joined the 
nut house. 
T2, T2e, H2, C14 
working from home all day today. Felt ill this morning; 
slightly less ill now, but shivering. Have I told you how 
much I hate winter? 
T1, H2, H3, H5, C5 
Pre-operation appointment complete. Prepared to play with 
the frickin’ lasers on Monday. Kidney stone, say ‘allo to my 
little frien! 
T1, H2, C9, B1, 
B1b, B3f 
catching up after what seems like eons away – some of us 
are feeling ill – some of us need to start that fitness regime… 
T1, H2, C8 
it’s raining….really badly…..i’m scared…brings back bad 
memories… 
T1, H2, C14 
Good Lord what a LONG night. Both girls were throwing up 
until 5:00 am 
T2, T2a, H2, C4 
Hmm, not as sore as I thought I’d be. (From the gym, you 
pervs.) But we’ll see how the day goes, DOMS will come on 
soon enough. 
T1, H5 
Friday morning.  Hobbitt has a upper respitory infection, and 
I am suffering from a bad cold….lots of sitting at the house 
this weekend. 
T1, T2, T2a, H2, C5 
Very sad news. Learned Henri Chopin died last night. T2, T2e, H3, C7 
his fever has come down to 102.6 now at least. T2, T2a, H2, H3, 
H5, C5 
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One of my co-workers has mono…fabulous T2, T2a, H2, C9 
waiting for the pain to stop T1, H2, C8 
holding a pencil while blowing one’s nose is dangerous… T3, B2, B3i 
Poor little guy is running a high fever 103.  They almost 
always hit on Friday; makes wait and see a hard choice. 
T2, T2a, H2, C5 
Cold-Eeze seems to be helping, but am still REALLY tired T1, H2, H3, H5, C5, 
B1, B1a, B3g 
Working from home due to Jess’ sickness. Her near 104 
fever at 4:30 AM was not a good thing. I think she’s better 
now. Sleeping, at least. 
T2, T2a, H2, H3, 
H5, C5 
Cranberry Apple Zinger, I think I love you. I know my raw 
throat and my aching bronchial tubes do. 
T1, H2, C5, B1, 
B1a, B3b 
wishing she could cheer up her best friend who is broken 
into tiny little pieces 
T2, T2a, H2, C14 
i had better luck sleeping tonight. Thanks to 302lichéd pm T1, H3, C8, B1, 
B1a, B3g 
submitting to the fact that i will catch some percentage of 
my patients’ colds  & flus this winter, and there’s nothing i 
can do about it 
T1, H1, C5 
Starting today in the same building and floor where I once 
had a miserable job. The last guy who sat in my cube died. 
Are these bad omens? 
T2, T2c, H3, C7 
Detox Detox…  Get out of my body you Holiday demons!  
You are no longer welcome here! 
T1, H2, C8, B1, 
B1b, B3b 
Pleased to find that Cyst-hole 2: Electric Boogaloo stopped 
bleeding sometime during the night. In less gross news, Go 
Obama Go! 
T1, H3, H5 
Too ill to work… Not ill enough to surf… Want my bed so 
bad right now. 
T1, H2, C8 
reading some photography blog to de-stress before I leave 
for the day 
T1, H2, C14, B1, 
B1a, B3i 
Sneezy. It’s the COLDS season again, I guess. T1, H2, C5 
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Good morning all… glad its Friday. Not feeling too well, not 
sure if its a cold, stress or what. Hopefully its not or what. 
T1, H2, C5, C14 
Well after a really bad night I’m finally on my way home. 
My prayers go out to the family of the kid who died. 
Goodnight everyone. 
T2, T2e, H3, C7 
Ooops! Podcamp for me is a a haze of excitement, pain and 
panadol 
T1, H2, C8, B1, 
B1a, B3g 
First Friday morning in 4 years I haven’t taken mom to 
dialysis. Never thought I would miss doing that. Small 
unexpected things are hardest. 
T2, T2a, H3, C7, C9 
This shoulder pain is moving slowly up into my neck…I 
guess I am going to try and sleep for a bit… 
T1, H2, C9 
heading home to take Amy back to hospital – her 24 hr ECG 
comes off this afternoon. 
T2, T2a, H2, C8, 
B1, B1a, B3f 
Britney Spears in Hospital http://tinyurl.com/29k68m T2, T2e, H2 
it burns now. Must get back on track with medicine. This is 
why i take it. To avoid this flare up. M 
T1, H2, C8, B1, 
B1b, B3g 
Watching that trainwreck Britney in an ambulance. The 
monsters we create in affluent societies… 
T2, T2e, H2, C8 
Get well soon Barb! T2, T2b, H2, H4, C8 
Finally at home with corticoids & antibiotics  T1, H2, C8, B1, 
B1a, B3g 
done with the pills. T1, H3, C8, B1, 
B1a, B3g 
My prediction: less than 1 year before Brittney Spears dies 
of an OD of something. 
T2, T2e, H1, C7, 
B2, B3i 
Waiting anxiously for my chair massage at 2:40 after waking 
up feeling like I’d broken my back 
T1, H2, C6, B1, 
B1b, B3b 
going to grab something healthy to eat.. and lay down for 
12minutes…. 
T1, B1, B1b, B3d, 
B3h 
I wanna go home!!still sick, thank 303lichéd303’ monster 
that’s Friday 
T1, H2, C8 
All this worrying is going to kill me T1, H2, C14 
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Mental breakdown? Britney rushed to hospital. Let this be a 
lesson to all you stage mums out there…. 
T2, T2e, H2, C14 
Honey and lemon is just the thing for this painful wheezing. T1, H2, C5, B1, B3b 
David sleeping through earache. T2, T2a, H2, C9 
INSOMNIA!!!  T1, H2, C13 
damnit my heart hurts tonight. Too many lovers, not enough 
friends. Ashamed that i’m still clinging to hope. Afraid to 
move. 
T1, H2, C14 
uh-oh. Some little girl died as a result of copying Go Diego 
Go. Its all gone a bit crazy here.. 
T2, T2e, H3, C7, 
B2, B2a, B3i 
midol does NOT work. Worst cramps ever. Goodnight. T1, H2, C9, B1, 
B1a, B3g 
at home with stinking cold and have little boy with stinking 
cold, if I felt better I’d play snap 
T1, T2, T2a, H2, C5 
will study later.. I’m not really feeling good today. It’s a 
headspin. 
T1, H2, C8 
is it wrong of me to want to die before my mom…i dont 
think i can handle it…i cant handle my dad’s passing.. 
T1, T2, T2a, H1, 
H3, C7 
Canøt sleep, feeling sick and restless. :-l T1, H2, C8, C13 
Lil’ Matt has a fever. T2, T2a, H2, C5 
is feeling fucking stressed today. Time for some OMFO! T1, H2, C14 
on MySpace, and MyYearbook and Snapvine! Right now. 
Couldnt sleep, now i feel sick. =( 
T1, H2, C8, C13 
I’ve heard a few peeps predict her death in 08. T2, T2e, H1, C7 
i’ve just come back from hospital ☺ feel a bit weak now. T1, H2, C8 
Feeling shaky and unsatisfied. Like I could spend three 
lifetimes just trying to catch up on what I missed out on in 
this one. 
T1, H2, C14 
Just took a shower, my feet are sore from running around all 
day. Good night. 
T1, H2, C9, B2, 
B2a, B3i 
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See, here I was, minding my own business, having dreams 
about looking at a friend’s Flickr pictures when suddenly I 
awoke in horrible pain. 
T1, H2, C8 
Hah, you doubters!  Britney Spears officially flies over the 
cookoo’s nest! 
T2, T2e, H2, C14 
The bit in Obama’s speech about ‘hope’ (in the 11th minute) 
could apply just as equally to what I do with congenital heart 
defects! 
T2, T2a, H2, C9 
Ever have that feeling when you’re sick you wanna hurl, and 
it’s like 90% at that hurling point of no return yet never 
comes? My life now… 
T1, H2, C4 
Medicated, drama queen, picture perfect, numb belligerence T1, H2, C8, B1, 
B1a, B3g 
Going to have Dr. Hannaford help me with my knee ache. 
The knee is the only reason I don’t go for full marathon. 
T1, H2, C9, B1, 
B1b, B3f 
Didn’t feel well to go to work this morning. Now I’m 
hunting for apartments in Boni ave… is luck a ninja skill? 
T1, H2, C8 
Just hot back from the ER, they put a painkiller in me, I am 
due back there at 9 to see a surgeon, don’t pray but wish me 
luck, and hope … 
T1, H2, C8, B1, 
B1a, B3f, B3g 
happy new year, my eyes hurt T1, H2, C3 
My throat hurts like hell, my head weighs a ton, my nose 
feels like oh well, like a nose …happy Friday 
T1, H2, C5 
OMG – Britney has officially gone mad. Get that girl some 
therapy ASAP! 
T2, T2e, H2, C14, 
B1, B1c, B3f 
Soooooooo close to posting the Beta of my map.  My eyes 
are starting to hurt. 
T1, H2, C3 
Watching 305lichéd getting carted off to hospital. 
http://media.myfoxla.com/live/2/ 
T2, T2e, H2, C8 
eyes burning…sleepless night… T1, H2, C3 
feeling a bit light-headed after spraying without a mask.. 
beer will surely fix that.. to the 305liché!  ☺ 
T1, H2, C11, B2, 
B2a, B3i 
Damn I really need to stop staying up so late. This can’t be 
good for me at all. 
T1, B1, B1b, B2, 
B2a, B3i 
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Writing email … not feeling all depressed after quite awhile.  
WTF me? 
T1, H3, H5, C14 
Feeling a bit better.  Totally sucked at pool.  Ah well, can’t 
win every time.  LOVE my new washer & dryer!!!! 
T1, H2, H3, H5, C8 
Despite my mom’s health concern, I feel steadied on my 
path, having none of the new year’s anxieties left to vex me 
as drunks croon tonight. 
T2, T2a, H2, C8 
Guaranteed headache recipe: 1 Iced Mocha, `Bros` on repeat 
for two hours. Ulgh, I’m lying down for a while… 
T1, H2, C10, B1, 
B1b, B2, B2a, B3d, 
B3h 
I think I overdid it and caught spinal bifida in class tonight. I 
think I might need to look into medical marijuana. 
T1, H2, C9, B1, 
B1b, B2, B2a, B3e, 
B3g 
Sitting at school clinical lab,taking care of my sick 
friend,jinghui. 
T2, T2a, H2, C8 
This fucking cold snap is bad for all my muscles that already 
are always complaining. I’m so glad the worst is over 
tomorrow. 
T1, H2, C9 
Head Hurts, and I am about to start crying if it dose not go 
away! 
T1, H2, C10 
Getting sick sucks. T1, H2, C8 
Quick update: Confirmed that mom has meningitis, but 
treatment going well. Now to see if any of us caught it. 
Seems doubtful though. 
T1, T2, T2a, H1, 
H2, C9, B1, B1a, 
B3f 
breaking my fever T1, H2, H3, H5, C5 
Out sick today. It’s about 9:30pm… I just woke up from 
sleeping all day. Hate wasting a good day. Grr! 
T1, H2, C8 
My psoriasis is for some reason, really slowing down. 
Haven’t used my prescriptions for days. I hope this trend 
keeps up. 
T1, H2, H3, H4, H5, 
C9 
About to go home hope the members show went great and 
you had lots of and watcher is feeling better love u hugs and 
kisses Diamond 
T2, T2a, H3, H5, C8 
Ted’s anesthesia has worn off  T2, T2a, H2, B1, 
B1a, B3f 
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Sick-nothing to post-just sick of sick. T1, H2, C8 
headache T1, H2, C10 
Sick as a dog, I’ll be taking it easy for a few days. T1, H2, C8, B1, 
B1b, B3h 
Think ive got food poisoning. So painful. I hope i can still go 
swimming tomorow. Ow. Ow. 
T1, H2, C4, B2, 
B2a, B3d 
Because of that, @spanishmanners, I wouldn’t count out that 
ticket just yet. Especially since Elizabeth looked healthy 
tonight. 
T2, T2a, H5 
Finally getting over my New Year’s Cold. Hurrah! T1, H2, H3, H5, C5 
Sick baby == very little sleep. She’s still dang cute though. T2, T2a, H2, C8 
Why am I more productive when slightly feverish and a little 
sleep deprived instead of completely rested?  My whole 
philosophy is at risk! 
T1, H2, C5 
One more day to the weekend, weather is reeking havoc with 
my sinuses 
T1, H2, C1 
Having drive test with hw ppl. Constant looking at laptop 
makes me dizzy. –Puke- 
T1, H2, B2, B2a, 
B3i 
very cold and less than happy with her immune system T1, H2, C8 
Day 3: 307lichéd307. Hm. Water is def. Not my element to 
be in. Arms hurt like hell ☺ 
T1, H2, C9, B2, 
B2a, B3i 
Learning to play the guitar again. Fingers are hurting like 
they used to. 
T1, H2, C9, B2, 
B2a, B3i 
I hope no one laughs at me when I go out tomorrow night, 
Dads 50th & H.H., I’m starting to get swelling in my cheeks. 
&lt;3 the Chipmunk 
T1, H2, C9 
My back feels like a 10 ton elephant just stepped on it. Not 
good. I think I’m dying. 
T1, H2, C9 
waiting on news of my grandfather.  He’s not expected to 
make it through the night. 
T2, T2a, H1, C7 
I’m gonna go to bed I guess. There’s nothing else to do and I 
need the rest. My sinuses suck. 
T1, H2, C1, B1, 
B1b, B3h 
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Back from Olean. Good shopping trip, got good, healthy 
food. Yum. Now I will drink a Dark and Dry 
Woodchuck(YUM!) and relax. 
T3, B1, B1a, B3d 
so tired from practice and still sick.. back to the grind 
tomorrow 
T1, H2, C8 
ok did my 20 minutes about an hour and a half ago.  Got it 
in!  If @mobasoft can quit smoking, I can do 20 min on the 
treadmill daily. 
T1, T2, T2b, B1, 
B1a, B3e 
Oh yeah @darkgracie I got the mean nasty sick on Xmas 
morning…. yuck, glad thats over… Are you feeling better 
now? 
T1, H3, H5, C8 
Languishing with a baaad headache. Happy about Obama 
results in Iowa. 
T1, H2, C10 
Forgot to take my medicine again, very very tired. T1, H2, C8, B2, 
B2a, B3i 
Took Coma In A Bottle (Herbal MD w/ 8 different herbal 
sedatives) so hopefully I’ll be sleeping soon. 
T1, H2, H4, C13, 
B1, B1a, B3b 
feeling a lil ill T1, H2, C8 
twitter poll: i have a cold and so do @kemics and 
@danavictoria. Anyone else feeling ill?? 
T1, T2, T2b, H2, C5 
dammit, why do i have to get Rock Band invites when i’m 
still recovering from being sick? Curse you, bad timing!   
Tip: Don’t get sick 
T1, H2, C8 
Britney visitation suspended. She’s still under observation 
for being insane and out of control. Is she Joan of Arc? 
T2, T2e, H2, C14 
minutes to pull myself together, My arthritis meds have me 
wondering about operating heavy machinery yet this am. I 
should wait just a bit. 
T1, H2, C9, B1, 
B1b, B3g, B3h 
can’t sit in front of the PC because his legs ache. They stop 
aching when he walks through the room. 
T1, H2, C9, B1, 
B1a, B2, B2a, B3i 
Head is dizzy.. might look at a serie from my bad… Except I 
dunno how for the moment cause I don’t have a TV in the 
bedroom…  
T1, H2, C11 
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1.1 They’re able to jump up onto them, the beds are 
probably too high for them to jump  off  of safely. 
I think today they knew something was wrong 
with their daddy, though, and were worried.) 
He said he’d see how he was feeling tomorrow 
and decide then whether he needed to see a 
doctor or anything. 
T2, T2a, H2, C8, 
B1, B3f,  
1.2 Funny story: Dad told me today, `Don’t ever hurt 
your back; it’s not fun.` I had to ask him, `again?` 
because I had a bit of an injury of my own not 
long ago. 
Back in April, I decided I need to exercise more, 
so I would take up rollerblading because I used to 
do it as a kid. I went skating while Mom walked 
the dogs, and I was still pretty rusty at first but it 
was fun. 
One fateful day, a few weeks later, Mom, Dad 
and I were heading out the front door after I’d 
just put on my pads and skates. I managed to get 
to the curb before I slipped somehow and fell and 
hit my back on it. 
...So I had to immediately go back inside and take 
off all the stuff I just put on. 
It hurt for about a week (I could barely move the 
first couple days) but after that I was fine. Now 
it’s an entertaining story to tell.  
T1, H3, H1, C6, 
B2, B2a, B3i,  
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2 do  NOT TAKE TRIMSPA X32&nbsp;&nbsp; 
idunno if anyone’s been reading my posts about 
when I first started but, I lost 1.5 pounds the first 
day and I acutlaly consumed more cals than 
usual.&nbsp; day 2 I shit probably everything in 
my intestines ouuut that morning.&nbsp; soo I 
only took 2 pills instead of 3.&nbsp; and today, 
day 3, I only took one pill at 1030 AM this 
morning.&nbsp; I had a hard time swallowing it 
so I consumed like, 10 glasses of water 
throughout the day &amp;&amp; ate right after 
taking it in hopes of pushing it down.&nbsp; but 
now, 13 hours later, my throat is starting to 
hurt.&nbsp; I I know if it is swollen from the pill 
or what.&nbsp; I have never had a I taking any 
pills before ( and ive taken large pills every 
morning for my 310liché ).&nbsp; but I am 
literally freaking out right now.&nbsp; im 
nervous that the pill has 310lichéd310 been in my 
throat all day and is now going to block my 
esophagous if I fall asleep.&nbsp; I am sooo 
scared right now, its ridiculous.&nbsp; I told my 
friend about it and I told her to keep her fone near 
her in case I call in the middle of the night 
needing to go to the hospital, I am SO 
TERRIFIED. 
T1, H2, H1, C9, 
B1, B2, B1a, 
B2a, B3g, B3d, 
B3f, B3c,  
3 I don’t know what to do... Is there anything to 
do? I tried talking to her and I gave her my IM’s. 
I hope she contacts me. I am really worried. 
People don’t know anything. They think it was 
because of some LJ drama, but it was so much 
more. I could tell from her messages to me. I 
hope she is ok, that someone stops her, that she 
decides not to go through with it. Anything. I 
tried to send her some healing energy, but I don’t 
know how it worked, if it did at all. 
Angelis_grace please be alright. Even though it 
doesn’t seem like it, you are loved. I hope to hear 
from you soon, and if I don’t you will still be in 
my heart. Just in case you didn’t get my last 
message here are my IM’s again. They will only 
be posted for a while (about 24 hours or so), I 
hope you decide to message me. 
T2, T2a, H2, H1, 
C7, C14, B1, 
B1a, B3i,  
4.1 I have a cold.  T1, H2, C5, B2, 
B2a, B3d,  
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4.2 Thursday I had food poisoning, which was 
awesome. I puked in my car on the way home 
from work, which was even BETTER. 
T1, H3,  
5 It’s not fun to be addicted to nicotine and so 
broke that all the old tobacco at the bottom of 
your purse has already been smoked.  
T1, H2, C15, 
B2, B2a, B3l,  
6 I don’t really feel like doing much of anything, 
lately, and I’m not sure if it’s the chemical 
influencing the physical or the physical 
influencing the chemical – probably both, 
311lichéd311’ into a vicious cycle that eventually 
ends with me sitting in the same spot for the 
better part of a day without an ounce of 
productivity to show for it. 
T1, H2, C14,  
7 Quaint historical fact: in 1913 coal miners in 
Colorado went on strike to protest abhorrent 
working conditions and unfair treatment. Here’s 
how management replied: `On April 20, 1914, 
troops stationed near Ludlow, north of Trinidad, 
opened fire on the tent colony where striking 
miners and their families had spent the winter. 
Four men, three women, and eleven children 
were killed in Ludlow that day.` This and one 
other massacre in 1926 helped to allow labor 
unions into the state, and now there engenders the 
risk of all this... for nothing, because people are 
too fucking self-absorbed to look at the world 
about them and have the sudden fucking 
epiphany that, `holy shit! I’m a part of this thing 
too!`. 
T2, T2e, H3, C7,  
8.1 we did our show, I was super tired, and I sucked. 
My ankle has been hurting like heck, but I 
haven’t sat out or anything. My dad and Frank 
noticed I was limping. 
T1, H2, H3, C6,  
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8.2 It was around this time that my ankle reached a 
new level of pain. Luckily, we did music warm 
up immediately after doing like ten minutes of 
some drill. It was just as I was thinking of sitting 
out. We warmed up and Brad, usually the bad 
cop of the brass staff, decided we had been 
punished enough. During the brass warm up I 
went to go pick up the tuba water, a huge 3 gallon 
jug. 
 
I pushed through the last two hours of rehearsal 
and the run through. I was seriously considering 
explaining to Daphne, (vis caption head) about 
my ankle, but I didn’t. 
T1, H3, C6,  
9 Then I went home to find that a friend from HS 
had sent me an email. One of my childhood 
friends died in a car wreck. I hadn’t spoken to 
him since HS, and we were mostly friends in 
gradeschool. Still sad though. His Dad was my 
favorite English teacher in HS too. He died the 
year after I graduated.  
T2, T2a, H3, C7, 
B2, B2a, B3i,  
10  Amy Winehouse was singing for Nelson 
Mandela’s birthday party.  
 
1st off- whose idea was this? Everyone knows she 
has MAJOR issues- she’s not your average daily 
pot user. Her addiction (to things much much 
worse than pot) has crested at pulling her teeth 
out of her own mouth and being dubbed a crazy 
person by the world press.  
T2, T2e, H2, 
C15, B2, B2a, 
B3i,  
11 STOP GIVING ME CANCER ;A; 
 
shakes fist at UV-index  
T1, H1, C2, B2, 
B2a, B3k,  
12 next step: find out if I really have lost the last two 
years of being happy and have to work my way 
back up again.                                                           
 
I’m not sure I want to, if it just evaporates over 
and over.  
 
Depression.  When your brain chemistry wants to 
f*ck your life over.  
T1, H2, H6, 
C14,  
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13 Sorry thus post is so long, I needed to get it out to 
try to avoid having a panic attack. I started 
getting dizzy after my mom told me she refused 
to change my flight. Also, I’m on a cell phone 
and I don’t know how to do a cut. Maybe I 
should just take some Ativan and go to bed.  
T1, H2, C14, 
B1, B1b, B3g, 
B3h,  
14  The gun had originally belonged to my dad, but 
when he died, my mom gave it to his brother.  
When my uncle died last year after suffering 
from cardiac arrest, his wife gave it plus a banjo 
uke also belonging to my bad back to me. 
T2, T2a, H3, C7, 
C9,  
15.1  We were inside Tues and Weds, so there was no 
need to set up the tent.  I finally sucked it up and 
got some work – I was so sore!  
T1, H3, C9, B2, 
B2a, B3e,  
15.2    I didn’t have to be back at work until Tuesday, 
and after 7 days of `get up early, drive to site, set 
up tent, find a place to shower, be on my feet for 
10 to 12 hours, then pack everything up, get back 
in the car and drive to next site and find a place to 
sleep, then pack everything up and start over` my 
ankles, legs and feet were so swollen that it was 
hard to fit them in my sandles.  I did sleep with 
my feet uphill slightly, which seemed to help 
enormously  
T1, H3, C9, B1, 
B2, B1a, B2a, 
B3e, B3i,  
16 I want to be more like my aunts and great-aunt 
Alice and Grandmama, so I’m glad they’re all 
with me when I could be giving birth any day 
now. I should be seeing an obstetrician regularly, 
that’s what I know, but I’m not     I have great-
uncle Robert and a paramedic named Zach who’s 
married to Heidi who is great-aunt Alice’s niece 
by marriage which makes him sort of related to 
me somehow here, though. And Robert delivered 
Robbie in the house, so I guess it’s okay. I 
wanted a water birth. Maybe we can still do that 
here. The house is huge. I’ve written maybe too 
many times.  
   
 I’m trying not to think about how much a home 
birth actually scares me. I know nothing can go 
wrong and she’s not supposed to be sick, but still. 
I know Robert’s the best with pain management 
ever apparently, but  still .   
T1, T2, H1, H5, 
C9, B1, B2, 
B1b, B2a, B2b, 
B3f, B3i,  
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17.1 You can even get sick off of water, this is an odd 
fact but it is true. Its all about your body, your 
body is composed of mostly water, but if you get 
enough water in your system it becomes more 
than harmful and you can eventually die from 
water. 
Pollution is one factor that can help our system 
fight off other bacteria and harmful objects that 
want to enter our perfect organic bodies. Not all 
pollution is bad, but even still who wants to risk 
our bodies not fighting off even the nonharmful 
pollution.  But if we don’t risk it then our bodies 
become unimmuned and we can die sooner and 
faster. Isn’t that nice? 
T3, C8, B2, B3c,  
17.2 Onto another subject, Cancer.  Many people say 
Cancer comes from many things, mostly 
everything and if I true then why is everyone so 
scared of it? The medicine given to the cancer 
patients is the thing that makes you feel sick, 
makes you feel horrible. In 314lichéd society 
everyone has had a family member, friend, or 
someone they know effected by cancer, shouldn’t 
we embrace it if it is given to us by nature and 
makes us like everyone else. Cancer is the one 
thing that makes people feel most connected with 
people on the other side of the world, and most 
importantly cancer is not a racist, or a sexist and 
it most certainly does not discriminate. Shouldn’t 
we be more like cancer?  
T2, T2d, H2, C2, 
B1, B2, B1a, 
B2a, B3g,  
18 Kevin is so out of it–he’s just laying on the 
couch. He got 4 stitches in his arm today from the 
doctor removing a mole. 
T2, T2a, H2, C2, 
B1, B2, B1a, 
B2a, B3f,  
19    ‘ve been feeling so ugh lately. My sister, bless 
her heart, had la sobrehueso (I think it’s called flu 
in English). Guess who she passed it to? Me. 
So now I got the fever, and the migraines, and the 
sore throat,and my chest hurts, and every single 
bone in body hurts too. 
 
It’s summer. What the fuck am I doing getting 
the flu in summer? ;_;  
T1, T2, T2a, H2, 
H3, C5, C10,  
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20  I didn’t spend enough time or energy on my 
mom, and now she’s gone.  I’ll never have the 
opportunity to fix any of the stuff I messed up, 
I’ll never be able to ask her to forgive me, or tell 
her that I love her (now, then and always).  I 
wonder, what time did I waste on other people 
when I could have spent it with her?  And the 
time I spent with her, how much of it was I 
resentful of, wishing I was spending it with 
someone else.  Was that person worth it?  Worth 
precious moments with my mom, never again to 
return?  Probably not.  Life is fleeting.  Love is 
slippery.  I’ve seen both slide through my fingers.  
I don’t want that to happen anymore.  I desire to 
live a purposeful life, where I set my mind to 
appreciate the people who contribute to me, and I 
to them.  A where I set my mind to becoming the 
person my mom always saw me as; the person I 
rarely was while she was alive.  It’s a tall order, I 
know.  But wherever she might be, whatever the 
afterlife holds for us (if anything), I want her to 
be proud of me.    
T2, T2a, H3, C7,  
21    My stomach is killing me.  It’s been sore all 
day. 
 
I feel like I could turn my body inside out and 
crap it out.  S...sorry for the mental image.  I hope 
you weren’t eating anything while you read that 
sentence. 
T1, H2, C4,  
22 M is a generous bartender, and I was an idiot and 
mixed beer, martinis and smoked for the first 
time in ages.  End result? Puking in the chip bowl 
later that night. 
T1, H3, C4, B2, 
B2a, B3a, B3l,  
23 Wow. Just, wow. When I finished reading about 
the part about your mom somewhat (in my 
opinion) provoking your sister to commit suicide, 
the song No Pity For a Coward was repeadetly 
playing in my head throughout the entire entry. It 
just fit way too well, the whole situation and the 
whole theme and lyrics to the SS song. I just.....I 
don’t know. I wish I could take the pain away. 
Somehow. 
T2, T2f, H3, C7, 
B2, B3i,  
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24 I was striked with fever, migraine and heatiness. 
It struck suddenly and the reason is simple.. I 
think too much. Yea.. I got I of things to think 
nowadays compare to when I was away and over 
at my guy house. There I only have to think of his 
mum being emotional but here its like I think I of 
conditions that are coming up my way or will be 
coming up my ass. You may think its normal but 
to me its not. I endure every emotion I have with 
his help. Yes. He does help me along the way.. 
Especially to pull myself back together. When I 
had to think of my 316lichéd316, I had to think 
of my financial being. Since I was stub up my ass 
with beautiful horrified words, I was fallen again. 
Stumble every words that I heard given by my 
stepmom. So now I’m stuck again. I felt like 
running away again and again but unless 
someone provide me shelter. I’m a thinker and 
when I do that, I think of so many possible chains 
that link to it. That’s why I always have migraine. 
Haha.. 
T1, H2, H3, C5, 
C10, B2, B2a, 
B3i,  
25 This evening I went for a bike ride for the first 
time using clip in shoes...and contrary to my best 
educated guess, knowing myself and my hopeless 
klutziness, I lived to type this post. Not only did I 
live to type this post, but I managed not to fall or 
injure myself in any way. 
T1, H5, C7, C6, 
B2, B2a, B3e,  
26 I am learning I about the afterlife most of which 
is a refresher of stuff I already knew but some 
things I did not. Like no one ever dies alone, 
there is always those that have passed on that 
gather. Like there is no pain at death.  
 
And it all made me remember how wonderful 
death is and how much I wish that I could kill 
myself out of this prison of misery but I don’t 
believe in doing that.  
 
Nevertheless, I cannot wait to die. I so look 
forward to it. It’s the best thing that could ever 
happen to anyone.  
T1, H2, H1, C7, 
C14,  
27.1  Stumble upon tells me 33 health benefits of 
drinking tea.  In other words; tea is MAGICAL. 
Yeah I’m kind of addicted to Stumble Upon now.  
T3, B1, B3d,  
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27.2  I think I’m developing some major social 
anxiety; yaaay! 
T1, H2, H1, 
C14,  
27.3 I feel like I’m in a creative funk. It’s not that I 
don’t have any ideas, I’m just not finding myself 
getting around to executing them. My recent 
energy levels haven’t been helping out either. 
Then again I haven’t been overly energetic in a 
long time. Perhaps once of these days I should 
substitute my exercise routine for some creative 
time. Hmmmm..  
T1, H2, C14, 
B1, B1a, B3e,  
28 I’ve warned her that I will be getting her up early 
so she’s at least up, dressed, and at the table for 
breakfast before I leave for my eye appointment.  
Bill’s warned everybody at the shop that he’s 
driving me to said appointment, so he won’t be in 
until later.  Thank gawd; I hate trying to drive 
with one eye dilated.   
T1, H2, C3, B1, 
B1b, B3f,  
29.1  
Mom’s doing better now, she had 2 things, one if 
which was caused by stress because she worries 
way too much about way too many things.  
T2, T2a, H2, H3, 
H5, B2, B2a, 
B3f, B3i,  
29.2 Iris scared us yesterday though. She said she was 
in the shower when all of the sudded, she started 
bleeding. Like, oozing blood down there. She 
called the doctor, freaking out, and he got scared 
and told her to figure out where the blood came 
from (she has a bad case of hemorrhoids) because 
if it was where they cut her (they cut her open 3 
times so they baby could come out) when she 
gave birth it was very dangerous and she could 
die. Thankfully, it was her hemorrhoids. Her cut 
did get infected though, it was oozing puss. 
Yuck. She went to the doctor today so he could 
clean it and stuff and check her because her feet 
are still swollen. Ugh.  At least Jacob is doing 
well, he had his first doctor’s appointment on 
Saturday and everything was fine. He lost a bit of 
weight but apparently that’s normal. He didn’t 
like my sister’s milk and we couldn’t figure out 
why until we found out her cut was infected, that 
was causing her milk to tasted bad. Poor baby. 
T2, T2a, H2, H3, 
H1, H5, C7, C9, 
B1, B2, B1a, 
B3i,  
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30 I didn’t go to school today because I’m actually 
down with a cold (there was a virus spreading 
during Empower U...). 
I fall sick too often. My mom is going to dump 
loads of Vitamin C and fruits and vegetables 
soon. She says I don’t eat a lot of vegetables but 
on the contrary I actually do. 
T1, H2, C5, B1, 
B1a, B1b, B3d,  
31 For my entire life until my grandfather died, I 
considered his wife to be my grandmother.  
T2, T2a, H3, C7,  
32.1 My surgery went well...I took off my bandages 
today. Gnarly incision lemme tell ya....and I 
started walking. Hurts pretty bad but the bone 
spurs are gone so it feel better as I am walking 
hahaha. A bit of a trade.  
 
T1, H2, H3, H5, 
H4, C9, B1, B2, 
B1a, B1b, B2a, 
B2b, B3i,  
32.2 I have my breast reduction in 28 days. Now I am 
nervous as FUCK for that. Can you guys 
believe...my boobs...arent gunna be the size of 
toddler heads anymore!! Haha. I should only 
need like 2 weeks recovery. Im hoping. Im pretty 
much gunna be pushin it haha. School starts the 
25th of August...or somewhere around there.  
T1, H1, H5, H4, 
B1, B2, B1b, 
B2b, B3i,  
33   ‘t all bleedy and red, but it also 318lich all white 
and scabby 
T3, H2, H5, C9,  
34.1   Monday June 16th I had to go to a fellow 
student’s house to work on a project.  She 
mentioned to me that her husband was at work, 
and sick (had it `coming from both ends`).  
T2, T2a, H3, H5, 
C4, B1, B1a, 
B2a, B3h,  
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34.2  Around 4:00am Wednesday morning I woke up 
feeling like death... never felt like I had to vomit 
so bad in my life.  My stomach hurt like hell, etc.  
To make it worse I was extremely tired so all I 
wanted to do was lay down, but my stomach 
wouldn’t allow it.  This went on for a couple 
hours until I finally made myself vomit because I 
couldn’t stand it any longer.  That was followed 
by many more vomits over the next few hours.  I 
later woke up to the pleasure of discovering that 
now not only did I need a puke bucket next to me 
at all times, but I had to hold it while I was on the 
toilet.  This went on all day, so, I had to skip my 
Wednesday night class.  I wrote my professor for 
my Thursday morning class to tell him that I 
thought I had the stomach flu and that I wasn’t 
sure if I would make it to class the next day;  as 
my luck would have it, it was one of two days in 
the term that my teacher said was mandatory 
because it was a workshop day.  Luckily he was 
understanding and set it up so I could make up 
the workshop through e-mail with two of my 
classmates.  Thursday morning I woke up around 
7:00am feeling better than I was, but still not that 
great, so I went back to bed.  I then woke up 
around 2:00pm and felt terrific;  it was so great to 
have energy and feel like eating again, that I 
wanted to run laps around the apartment (but of 
course I didn’t).  So, I was able to make it to my 
Thursday night class which left me with only two 
classes to make up.  Over just that day and a half 
though I lost five pounds from all the vomiting 
and not being able to eat anything but crackers.       
Saturday June 21st Timmy woke up for work, and 
when I was trying to fall back asleep I heard him 
in the bathroom vomiting.  Immediately I thought 
`Oh no!` and went to ask him if he thought he 
had what I had had, and he did.  He was worried 
about missing work because he was already on 
his last warning about his absenteeism from 
getting the regular flu once or twice earlier in the 
year/late last year.  I suggested that maybe if he 
found someone who had the day off that would 
be willing to trade days with him, then he 
wouldn’t get in trouble for missing work;  so, 
Timmy called all his coworkers that he had phone 
numbers for, and even got a few extra numbers of 
other coworkers to try.  Mind you, he was doing 
most of this from the bathroom where he was 
having to try to hold back on vomiting as he 
talked.  Unfortunately Timmy couldn’t get 
anyone to work for him, and since he had the 
thi I h d j t tt ( hi h t
T1, H3, H6, C4, 
B1, B1a, B3h,  
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35   `hot flashes,` headaches, dizzy, stomach pain, 
achy extremities). 
 
Of course I had to get sick while on 
vacation/moving/getting ready for AX. 
 
Fan-fricking-tastic.  
T1, H2, C5, 
C10, C4,  
36   Don’t know why. It can’t be the food I had at 
alumni. Mayb its just my stomach. It hasn’t been 
feeling good lately. Im pretty scared coz I 
320lichéd been eating right these days due to my 
packed schedule. -.- Sigh. I seriously need to 
puke but I don’t wanna puke. The thought of it is 
making me all grossed out. DAMMIT ASS! 
sheeeesshh 
T1, H2, C4, B2, 
B2a, B3d,  
37.1    hello!didnt blog for days.hahas..i’m sick 
lar.having flu.how    irritating it is , it cause me to 
have a painful nose.. 
T1, H2, C5,  
37.2 I’m sick! I’m really unwell..till here,I’m going to 
rest now.bye! 
T1, H2, C8, B1, 
B1b, B3h,  
38 today at work, one of the cashiers had a nasty 
looking cut on her leg. I asked her what 
happened. She said that a dog had bit her. I asked 
if she had gotten the name of the owner. Nope. I 
asked if she called to report the dog. Nope. I 
asked if she had gone to the hospital to have it 
looked at. Nope. I then told her that she could get 
a number of infections from a dog bite, and that 
she needed to go to the hospital to have it 
checked out and report it to the humane socity for 
follow up. She said she didn’t want to worry 
herself anymore about it. Fine, I said, but if your 
leg turns black and falls of, or you think that 
water is acid, you’re dead in the water hun. 
Sometimes I like being the daughter of a nurse, I 
have the knowlage to scare the living hell out of 
some of the stupid people. 
T2, T2a, H2, H1, 
C6, C9, B1, B1c, 
B3f,  
39 Gah. Now I feel sick. I think my brain turns off 
during the summer. I literally have to read a 
question at least twice before I understand what 
it’s saying. 
T1, H2, C8,  
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40   ‘s not going to be much of a post today, I’m 
afraid – I’ve left the tel early, feeling unwell. 
 
Which is too bad.  That lumpy feature we saw 
yesterday seems to be resolving itself into a 
second apsal wall; there’s also a suspicious 
looking lump that might become a bit of statuary 
in the coming days.  Ah, well.  Maybe I’ll feel 
better tomorrow.  
T1, H2, H4, C8,  
41 It’s strange, but other’s people misery can help 
lift you out of depression. I went to Long Drugs 
to buy groceries and by the stand there was a 
`clicking` sound that sounded like a hamster 
going in circles. The guy told me it had been 
going on for a week.Sure, some people have 
better paying jobs, but some of them have to 
drive 2 hours, be stuck in meetings, have to work 
with others, be under the constant threat of losing 
their jobs, and have to deal with bad co-workers 
and idiot bosses. I don’t have to deal with that. I 
think the trick to defeating bad memories is that 
you simply have to `replace` it. Currently I have a 
image right now in my head that is very 
321lichéd321’s and somewhat gross. But it takes 
away bad memories, so maybe it’s helpful.I was 
reading this one guide...`I love this game. I’m 
proud I paid $80 of my hard-earned Wal-Mart 
paycheckto buy this game’s Collector’s Edition.` 
and I thought, well, at least I don’t work at Wal-
mart. I’m not addicted to drugs (only Dr. Pepper). 
My family is proud of me because I do work 
hard. It’s just that ... I guess everybody in life 
feels that way no 321liché what their 
circumstances are... I mean, millionaries and 
people who are very popular go through bouts of 
depression...  
T1, T2, T2d, H2, 
H3, H5, C14, 
B1, B1a, B3i,  
42.1 My extended family has a couple of plots at the 
city&#39;s cemetery – which happens to be 2 
blocks from our house – and my uncle, 
grandparents and father have been laid to rest 
there.&#160;  
T2, T2a, H3, C7,  
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42.2  Ten long years went by before my 322lichéd322 
finally passed – after many years of suffering 
from Parkinson&#39;s, dementia, and (most of 
all) a broken heart.&#160;  
T2, T2a, H3, C7, 
C9, C14,  
43 My sleep schedual has been fucked ever since 
Matt kept me up by vomiting in my bathroom for 
hours and so I attempted to reset my internal 
clock by staying up for 24 hours. 
T1, T2, T2f, H2, 
H3, C4, C13, 
B1, B1a,  
44  Couldn’t even see any people once I’d got past 
the group of teens holding their friend’s hair as 
she vomited over the wall into someone’s garden.  
T2, T2c, H3, C4,  
45.1 Had early morning insomnia.  Gave up on getting 
back to sleep. 
T1, H3, C13,  
45.2 Went for a jog in the sunshine on a whim.  
Maybe I should do that more often (and not get 
so out of breath). 
T1, H2, C9, B1, 
B1a, B1b,  
46 I’m sure everyone’s heard about the suicide in 
Dela Costa Hall, so I won’t go into that out of 
respect for the family. Ran around doing 
administrative things. Met up with       miyachan    
and       darthlaurian    that day and basically shot 
the breeze. On that note, I’ve started the load 
revision rounds for Gothic Lit... I’ve decided that 
I really ought to drop the class. It saddens me and 
all, but my health’s at stake. 
T1, T2, T2f, H3, 
H1, C7, B1, 
B1b, B3h,  
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47   ‘s a lie of omission? What if no one ever asked 
any questions remotely having to do with the 
topic? Does that count to? I can’t wait until the 
end of this month. I hate my intuition. It’s leaving 
me uneasy – not comforted and that’s basically 
because I’m fighting things as they are opposed 
to embracing them and growing from them. sigh 
You know I go boom when I don’t vent regularly. 
I’ve been booming a lot. LOL! I don’t want to be 
judged – I don’t want to be misunderstood or 
misinterpreted. And I really DO NOT want 
people thinking they know what I mean by 
reading some sentences and the form their own 
opinions. Fuck, why do I even care? I’m not 
supposed to right now. NOW is supposed to be 
all about me and then my kids. Really truly I am 
do those two things. Others just don’t like how or 
why. They are me though. I feel so sick right 
now. I have all morning. The upset to being this 
stressed? I’m loosing weight without trying at all. 
I need to take the time to face my pain and gain 
from it what I can you know? Just take the gash, 
let it heal into a scar and then know I’m as whole 
as I’m gonna get for the time being. SO many 
things I thought I’d already done, so many other 
things I didn’t mean to let happen. They both 
hurt...lol. Crying is good right ? I’m not numb? 
It’s really fucked up to feel like the last 4-5 years 
of my life haven’t been all real. If it weren’t for 
my kids I’d feel like............... 
 
 
oh fuck it... I don’t even want to try venting 
anymore right now. 
T1, H2, C8, 
C14, B1, B1b, 
B3h,  
48 Didn’t even work. It hurts my skin more than it 
helps. So much pain right now.  
T1, H2, C8, B1, 
B2, B1a, B2a, 
B3i,  
49.1 Because it is filled with stupid people. And 
because I’ve been home on sick leave 48 hours, 
and I already want to shoot myself.  
T1, H2, C8,  
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49.2 2) Some aggressive asshole beat the crap out of 
his gf’s two year old son. The beating was so bad 
that doctors believe the baby won’t make it. 
Some people do not deserve motherhood, some 
people don’t even deserve to go near any child, 
ever. 
T2, T2e, H2, H1, 
C7, C6, B2, B2a, 
B3i,  
50 so I can’t really sleep this week. At least not for 
long, and not without the aid of some type of pill.  
Then, when I do finally get knocked out, I keep 
having these really uncomfortable dreams. I 
rarely remember my dreams, but it’s happening 
every time I doze.  I blame the pills. Supposedly 
melatonin can cause more vivid dreams, and I’ve 
been taking much more than the recommended 
dosage, so... 
T1, H2, C13, 
C9, B1, B2, B1a, 
B2a, B3g,  
51.1 There’s appointments that I need before I leave 
the country. (The eye doctor’s today was so 
unpleasant – though that’s a whole other story 
about uncentered nurses and the total disinterest 
of medical practitioners. I sat in thought for 
fifteen minutes contemplating how many 
mistakes with patients were made per day, the 
way I sometimes burnt the coffee at Ex Libris.) 
T1, H2, C3, B1, 
B1a, B3f,  
51.2 It’s 2:30, and I’m unable to sleep. T1, H2, C13,  
52 The other day I was chatting away in an advice 
forum. I like giving advice. I like helping people. 
It brings me joy. But occasionally people come, 
usually young teenagers, and make the most 
dramatic exaggeration possible. And it’s always 
the same. They’re always complaining they’re 
ugly, their life always sucks because they don’t 
get everything their little heart desires, and they 
plan on committing suicide because of it. Suicide 
is a serious thing. However most of the time these 
kids don’t plan on doing any such thing and are 
just fishing for people to compliment them and 
shower them with praise. You can usually tell 
because the minute the praise stops coming or the 
minute someone says anything that equates to 
calling them a normal, everyday human being, 
they start going on about suicide again.  
T2, T2d, H2, 
H1, C7, C14,  
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53 When I last saw my friend, she skinny, sickly, 
and she just seemed physically worn out. She was 
talking about not wanting to really be with 
anyone ‘cause she wasn’t sure how long she was 
going to be alive This encounter was a lot 
different. She was a lot more healthy looking 
than the last time I saw her, she got married and 
also has a boyfriend (who was there with her) 
who was as cool a person as she’d described, and 
she seemed a lot happier. She still has some 
issues in her life and I offered my support if she 
needs it, but it was so good to see her life having 
improved since we last met. She’s a wonderful 
person who’s lived a hard life. She deserves all 
the good things coming her way. 
T2, T2a, H3, H5, 
C8,  
54 So, I’m having a conversation with a friend the 
other day after seeing a guy tearing down the 
freeway on a Harley without a helmet on. Where 
I’m from, it’s illegal to ride a motorbike without 
a helmet, for what I should think are fairly 
obvious reasons. When I asked, I found out that 
this wasn’t the case here, and this lead to a debate 
about whether or not wearing a helmet should be 
law. 
 
I thought it should be. My friend insisted it 
shouldn’t, stating that ‘they’ are taking our 
freedoms away and free will should dictate our 
safety habits. I said that our actions affect other 
people and not just ourselves and if we’re too 
dumb to protect ourselves then maybe we should 
be made to, and anyway, is whether or not you 
have to wear a helmet really a freedom worth 
protecting just to prove a point?  
 
At this point my friend brought forth the idea that 
free will, freedom, and the ability to make 
decisions and indeed mistakes must take 
precedence over the safety of selves or others. 
`We have to be able to do our own thing and 
make mistakes,` he insisted. `That’s what God 
did. He doesn’t like law. He wants us to be free.` 
T2, T2c, T2d, 
H1, C6, B1, 
B1c, B3i,  
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55 at some point I ate something that made me sick 
because I woke up in the middle of the night 
feeling like I was going to die and proceeded to 
barf my guts out. Six times. It was pretty terrible. 
Vron drove me home and I was so tired/sick, I 
couldn’t even stay awake for the euro 2008 
finals. I hear germany didn’t win.  sadness. I 
slept from about 4pm to noon today. I woke up a 
couple of times, incoherently stumbled around 
and went back to bed. Got out of work, due to my 
deathly illness, went back to sleep. 326lich came 
over around 7:30 and kidnapped me to go to the 
movies. We saw wanted. Whoever said it looked 
bad is a moron because it was faaaabulous. I ate a 
cheeseburger because I thought I was not sick 
anymore, but I think that was a mistake. I haven’t 
barfed, but my tummy is all garbledy. Maybe I’m 
just starvish. Who knows. Since I barfed all the 
food I ate Saturday, technically that’s the only 
thing I’ve eaten in three days. Due to all my 
barfing, I have lost 10 pounds in the past 2 days. 
Niiiice. 
T1, H2, H3, C4, 
B1, B2, B1a, 
B2a, B3h, B3d,  
56 Cause see I loved my dad more than anything 
despite our many differences and he died and in 
an instant my whole world was upside down and 
he was gone forever.  It was strange I didn’t start 
to feel the pain of his death until a year and a half 
after it happened.  I guess you could say I was in 
denial but I don’t even really know.  All I know 
is a fell in love with a boy my freshman year of 
high school and being with him made me feel 
vulnerable and that feeling was so unsettling to 
me that I ran away and let him go. Losing him 
reminded me of the lose of my dad and finally the 
pain of my dad hit me like a brick wave just like 
that right in that moment.   
T2, T2a, H3, C7,  
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57 I’ve noticed that several residents have gone into 
a comatose again.. Please, everyone, be careful... 
This leads me to wonder why this epidemic has 
occurred once more in this world. There doesn’t 
seem to be a visible nor distinct pattern on all 
those who have been affected. It seems 
haphazard; however, I may be blindly ignorant to 
the real reason. Zeit, what are your intentions? 
What cruel game are you trying to pull? 
 
 Mao-kun, please be careful  
T2, T2f, T2d, 
H2, H1, C9,  
58.1  I’ve decided in would be healthier for me to start 
taking my lunch to work rather than eating the 
super-salty soup everyday. But rather than brown 
bag it, I’m gonna cave into my desire to shove 
cute food into a small compartment and buy a 
bento. I found one that’s two-tier and ridiculously 
cute. It’s pink and white with strawberries on the 
box and bag. I also got some little sauce 
containers since I’m sure I’ll be wanting some 
soy with my rice. Speaking of rice, I think I’ll get 
brown rice this time. It’s seemingly better for you 
than bleached white. It also tastes better I think. 
T1, B1, B2, B1b, 
B2a, B3d,  
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58.2 I’m also going to cut back on my salt 
consumption and try to take a daily potassium 
supplement. Dad suggested I start doing some 
light cardio to help strengthen my heart and for 
overall endurance. It’s pretty gross out for 
walking, but perhaps I could do it when the sun is 
setting or just before. I’m also going to be seeing 
if they make a chewable version of the heart-
healthy Centrum. I figured keeping cholestrol 
down would be a good idea. I need a strong, as-
healthy-as-I-can-get-it heart. It’ll help to regulate 
my electrolytes and make me healthier in general. 
My body might be broken in some spots, but 
nothing’s stopping me from developing the okay 
bits. Though I really hope my left arm and 
fingertips start feeling better once I work more. 
Course, agreeing to ten hours wasn’t the best 
idea, considering. I mean, my heart crapped out 
on me when I did a simple eight hour shift at 
Borders the first month. Thankfully it’s not as 
bad now, but still. Precaution is a good idea.  
 
I really need to right my sleeping schedule, not 
that it matters at the moment, but if I’m going to 
be doing earlier shifts than I’d originally thought, 
I’m gonna have to be semi-stable. At least once 
Thursday and Friday roll around, anyway. I just 
found I preferred it better when it was busier. Too 
boring otherwise. I also don’t much like closing 
there. I’d rather go in, do my job, and leave. 
Mmmm, limited responsibility. Nice.  
 
For now I’m afraid I must thieve more of 
Serena’s ibuprofen since my arm is aching like 
whoa right now. I can never sleep when a limb 
hurts. I’m not tired, but I also don’t really have 
much to do right now. I’d draw, but I can’t really 
concentrate on it when my arm hurts. Just glad 
it’s the left and not the right, least for 
functionality’s sake. My poor body. Such a mess.  
T1, H2, H3, H1, 
H5, H4, C9, B1, 
B2, B1b, B2a, 
B3d, B3e, B3i,  
59 I was still feeling ill but the sun and the 
chardonnay were deliciously medicinal. 
T1, H3, C8, B1, 
B1a, B3a, B3k,  
60 I’m up at 4:30 in the morning, and have had a 
stomach attack already this week, this must mean 
that the wedding is looming closer.  
T1, H2, C4,  
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61 I 329liché ridden a bike in a long time, much less 
around such a beautiful place. Haha afterwords 
some of us got itchy tho. Our faces/eyes were 
itchy. Mustve been the pollen or something. 
T1, T2, T2a, H3, 
C1, B2, B2a, 
B3i,  
62 I’ve become secretly obsessed with my stutter.  
 
I guess its somewhat because I never talk about 
it. Most of my friends say they don’t even notice 
it, which has to be a somewhat lie, but... 
 
Three different parts of the whole bit. 
 
1. The usual, repetition `dis-dis-dis-discontent` 
2. The uncontrollable pause, `He was---`  
3. Avoiding. When I begin to speak I can feel a 
stutter or block coming on for a certain word, and 
I’ll change my word to something less effective 
just so I can get it out. This is a horrible constant 
battle that I could never vocalize.  
4. The fillers. The `um` `ah` `and ah` `you know` 
`and like`  
Maybe this is why I’ve found a talent in writing? 
Or, well, it’s convenient that I do. 
 
I stutter when I’m on the telephone. When I talk 
to my best friends. Ugh, school presentations... 
 
I’ve been stuttering for almost ten years, I don’t 
know why I haven’t thought about this part of me 
for any great length of time. No one really teases 
me about it except for 11-year-olds who don’t 
know any better and M. but that’s just because 
he’s like that.  
 
I don’t really think it’s cute, like how some 
people have told me. I also don’t really think it’s 
a big part of me. It’s just unexplored. And like 
my allergies, it is going to remain uncured.  
 
Just be patient with me.  
T1, H2, H4, C9,  
63 I feel miserable and this stomach pain 329lich 
going away 
T1, H2, H1, C4,  
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64 I’ve been screwing up left and right, it seems. I 
lost my biteplate that keeps me from grinding my 
teeth at night. It costs $580 to replace, and my 
mom expects me to replace it with my job which 
pays me approximately $50 a week. 
T1, H2, C9, B1, 
B1a, B1b, B3f,  
65.1 Couldn’t get a huge amount of sleep for various 
reasons, from insomnia to babies... but how do 
you cope?? 
T1, H2, C13,  
65.2 So I’ve had roughly three hours of broken sleep. I 
can barely keep my head off the desk. Hoping 
that a workmate who was off sick yesterday will 
be back today, in which case I’ll take a half day 
holiday. I feel completely fuzzy and unable to 
think straight.  
T1, T2, T2a, H2, 
H3, H4, C8, 
C13,  
66 I’ve been enlightened with much more than I 
have for quite a while now. Touching on 
friendships, family &amp; personal issues. Felt 
like a whole new birth for me, minus the blood 
and amniotic fluid, all the while nursing a very 
upset stomach and a splitting headache. Felt like 
what I imagined Ghandi to feel when he had that 
moment of revelation. 
 
But I feel ignored. And I still have this splitting 
headache. I want murukuuuuuuuuu.  
T1, H2, H3, 
C10, C4,  
67 Recently, a college student died here, pulled 
under by the current.  This has happened many 
times and controversy rages – officially, there’s 
no swimming allowed.  But every hot day brings 
scads of folks to the falls, jumping from cliffs, 
swimming, wading.  Many are teens and college 
kids who have that high 330liché-invincibility 
quotient. 
T2, T2e, T2d, 
H3, H1, C7, C6, 
B2, B2a, B3i,  
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68   `dam, I think I’m going to die sooner then I 
thought` due to the fact I’m skinny. I look at my 
body and thought of why am I so picky with my 
food. Food is food but I don’t know which food 
is which meaning that I believe I might not be 
healthy after eating THAT. Its looks odd. The 
food I see is asian food that I can’t even believe 
thought of that food going down in to my 
stomach and living tomorrow. LOL.  
T1, H2, H1, C7, 
B2, B2a, B3d,  
69.1 I haven’t eaten that much today and I’m soooo 
tired cuz I only had less than 4 hours of sleep last 
night and I’m super sunburnt so I’m not gunna do 
anything more than that. Ya...I only had one oreo, 
a few of my friend’s fries (barely any...trust me), 
a few almonds, 2 large double doubles, and a 
bowl of tuna. I know that couldn’t have been 
more than 500 calories (am I over-estimating 
maybe?...I need to get this calorie stuff 
straightened out) and I’m pretty sure I burned 
more calories than that today since I was out in 
the sun all day and drank lots of water so my 
metabolism stayed up 
T1, H2, C9, B1, 
B2, B1a, B2a, 
B3d, B3c, B3k,  
69.2 Tonight by best friend’s family were setting off 
fireworks and one somehow managed to turn 
sideways and started shooting at everyone. 
Nobody got hurt but her cousin got burnt and part 
of the firework that wasn’t smoldering anymore 
hit me in the leg...that’s about it. It was scary...if 
it was any worse people could have seriously 
been hurt. But it’s kinda funny now to think 
about it...my friend’s instinct was to grab her 
mom and use her like a shield while her auntie’s 
instinct was to run...not even caring about her 6 
year old daughter:P hahaha It was funny but 
scary at the same time. 
T1, T2, T2a, H1, 
C6, B2, B2a, 
B3i,  
70 We went to the Clarendon for dinner and lots of 
wine and beer and pool and jukebox. Lots of fun. 
Seriously lovely time. 
Then home.. he felt sick so we had to go to sleep. 
T2, T2a, H3, C8,  
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71     I passed! I passed, you guys!    
 
  not as good as I had hoped for (as always), but I 
passed! 
I was so sick the whole last week, because I 
could have gotten the results last week already, 
but I simply was too afraid to call… 
T1, H3, C8, B2, 
B2a, B3i,  
72 we ate lot of unhealthy food, for example one 
chip bag, two candy bags, two big bottles of fanta 
lemonade, two bar of chocolate etc..  
T1, T2, T2a, B2, 
B2a, B3d,  
73 Yesterday I was putting up shelves and one 
collapsed on top of my hand. I was lucky no 
bones were broken. I ended up sobbing – not the 
pain, but the images from Saturday night that 
came into my mind. I’d bottled up all that 
emotion until that moment. 
T1, H3, C6, B2, 
B2a, B3i,  
74.1 Well... Thursday night I was supposed to be 
meeting Dwayne at Chermside but he messaged 
me at 5.30pm saying that he    was sick and 
couldnnnnt make itttt [honestly I think that it was 
bullshit, as explained further down]. 
T2, T2a, H3, C8,  
74.2 I then tried Danielle and she was at Strathpine so 
I went out to Westfield Strathpine and met up 
with her. She asked what I was doing there and 
told her the story and it so happens that she was 
meant to meet up with Dwayne a few weeks ago 
but he called it off as he was    feeling sickkkk 
again. 
T2, T2a, H3, C8,  
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75   I’m depressed.  I’m not sure if there’s a specific 
reason, other than my life. 
 
I keep telling myself that I need to get out more, 
spend more time with friends, maybe even try 
and date.  My life feels dry and emptied.  Also, I 
spend too much time on 4chan, which probably 
doesn’t help, though I don’t know that it 
contributes, either. 
 
I don’t know what I’m doing with my life.  I’m 
stuck.  Long about now, I would be itching to 
leave, fly away to Seattle or something, but all I 
really want is something resembling a real life 
HERE. 
 
I wonder if I’ll ever make enough money to move 
out. 
I wonder if I’ll ever get over my issues enough to 
make a move towards finding love. 
I wonder if anyone, ever again, will call me their 
best friend. 
 
I want to be someone else.  Anyone else.  I can’t 
run, escape, or overcome the sense I’ve had most 
of my life that I’m not a person worth knowing, 
loving, or listening to.  I feel like a shadow, a 
half-person.  Always a fraction, never a whole. 
 
Everyone around me has grown up to one extent 
or another (well, except for Rob :-P).  When will 
it be my turn?  
T1, H2, C14, 
B1, B1c, B3i,  
76 yesterday, I had my blood pressure tested. 
the result ain’t that good. 
I’m having low blood pressure from what the 
machine told me. 
ohgawd luh! 
it’s not good to have low blood pressure. 
oh well… 
T1, H2, C9,  
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77.1 Ill post a full con report when my asshole doesn’t 
feel like someone tried to drive a garbage truck 
up it, and my head doesn’t feel like someone tries 
to nosefuck me with an elephant dick.  Yeah, I 
feel that trashed.  Thankfully it’ll be better by 
tonight, I know myself.On the plus side, where I 
smoked so much, and made myself sick from it, 
literally, I have like NO desire to smoke, and as I 
promised a few others, and myself, I’m going to 
give it up, finally, and forever, because it’s 
costing me too much money, and health. 
T1, H2, C12, 
B1, B2, B1b, 
B2a, B3a, B3i, 
B3l,  
77.2   It’s Tuesday morning, I feel like shit, prefect 
sign of a good time.   
T1, H2, C8, 
C12, B2, B2a, 
B3a,  
78  We ventured into this homeware store that sells 
anything and everything household from canned 
food to bath pillow and padded toilet seats.  We 
had a good laugh when we saw the pillow and 
padded seats.  I think its rare to see anyone using 
such things in Sg.   Busy Sgreans may not be able 
to afford time to soak so long in the tub till they 
need a bathtub pillow.  Plus, with our hot 
weather, one can imagine how fast the germs on 
the padded toilet seat will multiply if we use that.  
It makes more sense for them to use it in the 
winter as a bog warmer.... haha, if not their asses 
will freeze! 
T1, T2, T2d, H1, 
C9, B2, B3i,  
79 And I’m desperately trying to gain some weight. 
I’m too skinny, and I think I look very unhealthy. 
Boo-hoo. Maybe I should wear fully cotton-
padded 334lichéd334’s from head-to-toe to make 
me look healthier instead of looking at a stick-
man trotting around the island.  
T1, H2, C8, B1, 
B2, B1b, B3d,  
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80 I finally managed to put myself in bed at a semi-
healthy hour last night (read: midnight), but I 
woke up at around 5am this morning when 
Stephanie rolled around in bed and I realized she 
had actually made it home from partying last 
night.I want to sleep, I really do, but I’m really 
stressing about my training. This stupid cyst that 
I had but didn’t know I had got inflamed from my 
training on Monday, and I had to have surgery on 
Friday, as the antibiotic they placed me on made 
it worse before it made it better. I get the stitches 
out on Wednesday, but I can’t go full-contact 
Muay Thai during the healing process. 
T1, H2, H3, H5, 
C13, C9, B1, 
B2, B1a, B1b, 
B2a, B3g, B3h, 
B3i,  
81 7) I keep asking myself: If I die tomorrow, how 
would I be remembered? Isaac imagined the 
scene at my funeral. Someone would be at the 
podium doing the eulogy: Alessa, was the 
strangest friend we all ever knew.. And before the 
speaker would be able to complete the sentence, 
I’d suddenly sit up in my coffin and shout: Shut 
up bitch!!!! And then return to eternal rest. He 
thought he was really funny and couldn’t stop 
laughing after that. I wouldn’t be surprised if that 
happened though. On a more serious note though, 
I’ve been asking myself that for a while and I 
don’t know why I can’t stop posing the question 
to myself. It’s one of those 335lichéd ‘life-
inspiring’ quotes that’s supposed to evoke some 
sort of awakening within yourself. Meh. 
T1, H1, C7,  
82 I’m about to sneeze my nose off. It’s fucking 
irritating and I wonder why I’m ‘bestowed’ with 
such germs. Hate it to the max. Migraine, 
sensitive eyes, sinus, what else?! Can’t sleep but 
eyes are clearly becoming slits. Thanks nose. 
T1, H2, C5, 
C10, C3, C13,  
  
336 
Entry/unit Entry Text Coding 
83 What bothers me about my workplace is that 
people seem to have NO CLUE about diets. 
Our users, particulary those with CP, shouldn’t 
have milk at all (slimy and hard to digest), not 
meat either, since their stomachs are basically 
paralyzed. 
We have a young man with Down’s that is being 
fed milk, eggs and meat – all the things people 
with Down’s syndrome should avoid. This guy 
should be a vegetarian, but no, too hard. 
T2, T2a, T2d, 
H2, C9, B2, 
B2a, B3d,  
84   I’m Newra, and I have recently injured my knee. 
It has redered me completely unable to do 
anything, meaning I have an awful lot of time on 
my hands... unwanted time...  
T1, H2, C6,  
85 Why oh why must I think so much? I have a 
stomachache. I’m not sure if it’s from all the over 
thinking and anxiety or if it’s a real and genuine 
symptom. Suppose there’s no way I can know 
either. 
T1, H2, C4, 
C14, B2, B2a, 
B3i,  
86 Yuck. I could cope with hangovers if they just 
gave me groggy headaches, but they make me 
really sick. It sounds stupid, but I actually have a 
very ickle fear of being sick. 
T1, H2, H1, C8, 
C10, B2, B2a, 
B3a,  
87 I should have just got Brad to do all the moving 
and pointed to places here and there as I spent 
most of yesterday out of action! 
 
I’ve suffered for years with a bad back after 
getting something called `Scheuermann’s 
Disease.`  It is supposed to have gone by the time 
you’re in the 20’s but unfortunately I’m one of 
those people (typical really) who will be 
suffering with it for life.  I’ve only ever actually 
met one other person with it and she was more 
severe than I am.  Mine only flares up if I do too 
much! 
 
Well over the weekend I did too much! 
 
Thankfully lots of painkillers, a hot bath and an 
average nights sleep seems to have made it a bit 
better but it’s still not great!  It takes me a little 
while to stand up or to get down into a chair but 
once I’m there I’m fine! 
T1, T2, T2f, 
T2d, H2, H1, 
H5, C9, B1, B2, 
B1a, B2a, B3g, 
B3h, B3i,  
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88   Don’t know how I feel yet. I didn’t sleep well, 
was up several times. I have to go to my pdoc’s 
today, which in a way I’m looking forward to and 
in a way I’m dreading because I’m afraid that she 
won’t change up my meds and I believe that they 
need to be changed up in some way. I also see my 
therapist today for 2 hours before I see my pdoc. 
He always makes me laugh. But all of this means 
I have to take a shower and get ready. I don’t 
even think I have pants to wear. Plus I don’t have 
the energy to get ready, which makes me want to 
call and cancel both appointments. But I know 
that I need to keep them. 
T1, H2, C8, B1, 
B1a, B1b, B3g, 
B3f,  
89.1     I didn’t run 2.4km today, Cause my toe hurts! T1, H2, C6, B1, 
B1a, B3h,  
89.2 Went home to bath then went to Lower Delta 
there to ‘tui’ my ankle. But, The person didn’t 
want to ‘tui’ cause it might be fractured!  Went to 
the East Shore Hospital to do X-Ray then they 
bandange my ankle there.  Thank God that I 
didn’t fractured my ankle! :D   
T1, H2, C6, B1, 
B1a, B3f,  
90  I need to start taking my medicine. Obvious 
reasons. 
T1, H2, C8, B1, 
B1b, B3g,  
91 So my life as I am learning and working hard on 
has to focus on me and taking care of me and 
living for me. I tho still have much trouble being 
alone by myself too much especially when I am 
hurting over some guy or feel rejected or scared 
of being alone or depressed or anxious. I do 
suffer from depression and sometimes despite my 
wanting it not to..it does take hold of me. I was a 
lil upset with myself for spending Sat crying and 
laying on the couch just watching movies and tv 
dvds. I kept telling myself get up get up but I just 
couldn’t. I did paint my nails and do my dishes. I 
texted three friends cause I was sad and  they all 
answered and one called me and another texted 
me back and another my dear friend       fuschia    
chatted with me which was grounding and 
validating. The next day       millari    also was 
very grounding and affirming. It is good to see 
that some of my friends can see I am handling 
these situations better than I used to. 
T1, H3, H1, H5, 
C14,  
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92   `psychedelic` day due to cough syrup. 
During the night its fine, it helps me to sleep (this 
particular brand anyway), but its very strong. 
When daytime comes...why people pay to feel 
like this is beyond me. 
At least it helped to eliminate the terrible bout of 
coughing (for a little), but now my voice is 
missing! 
T1, H2, H3, H5, 
C8, C5, C13, 
B1, B2, B1a, 
B2a, B3g,  
93 ...I just passed out.  Flat passed out.  Brains gone 
asleep.  I’d had to wake up ridiculously early 
from sleep that didn’t do much, haul a bunch of 
stuff around, and walk up and down four flights 
of stairs and apparently this doesn’t make me 
sore or achey but it did do a number on my 
energy level and yeah.  Passy outy time. 
 
Sorry.  
T1, H2, C8, B2, 
B2a, B3i,  
94 I’m experiencing a midlife crisis and I only just 
got my life back!  The last time I remember my 
body being alive, I was twenty-five.  Now I’m 
thirty-nine.  And does my body take into account 
the time I was dead, or am I actually twenty-five 
again, just...thirty-nine in spirit?  Or do I really 
only have forty years left?  This damn experience 
doesn’t come with an owner’s manual.  And 
since forty years is as long as I have existed, it 
doesn’t seem that long at all when I was looking 
at eternity before.  And I know I’ll have the 
eternity again but that’s when it’s all creepy 
again.  And I get so tired now.  And I pulled a 
muscle with Mary and thought I actually broke 
my...well anyway...  And I start to obsess and 
worry...  What if I get cancer.  What if I get 
typoid?  What if I die of consumption because I 
have no immune system?!  And then my heart 
starts to beat faster and I panic because what if 
it’s a heart attack?! 
T1, H2, H1, C7, 
C6, C2, C9, 
C14,  
95 It’s petty to feel sorry for myself, ...  
but morning sickness isn’t particularly an 
enjoyable thing waking up to.  
T1, H2, C4,  
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96   ‘ll be exhausted all day.  Didn’t really fall asleep 
till about 2.  Jordan is so sick and it sounds like 
we can’t do anything about it till the docs know 
more.They sent him home on an additional 
epilepsy medication and every night, about 2 hrs 
after taking his meds he’s been dizzy and 
nauseous.  LAST night however, he was 
miserable.  Could barely walk and threw up about 
6 times within an hr.So I called UW Madison and 
had the neurologist on call gimme a call back.  
He’s pretty sure Jordan is toxic on two of his 
meds (they actually interact with each other in 
higher doses creating an even higher dose in the 
blood) but he wasn’t able to give us any direction 
as to how much to lower until he knows how 
much is in his bloodstream.  So his request: find a 
clinic to check his blood levels and call with the 
info ASAP.So I get to call the clinic here at 9 am 
to see if they can do it.  I don’t know if they’re 
even capable of checking the levels here and we 
may have to take a trip to the hospital.  Ugh.I just 
want him to feel better   It’s not fair to be 
enjoying no seizures but pay for it by being 
incapacitated.  
T1, T2, T2a, H2, 
H3, H1, H5, H4, 
C4, C13, C11, 
C9, B1, B2, B1a, 
B1b, B2a, B3g, 
B3f,  
97 spinning a bottle of asprin around with her finger, 
has already taken a couple to try to get rid of her 
headache after she inhaled the gas – looks ready 
to cry, nothing worked and she’s a little 
frightened of its affect on her 
T1, H2, H1, C8, 
C10, B1, B2, 
B1a, B2a, B3g, 
B3i,  
98  I was almost going to go to the chiropractor by 
accident this morning.   
T1, B1, B3b,  
99  I don’t quite know why, but insomnia is hitting 
me hard.. Again.. I can sometimes sleep but there 
are also times I just can’t.. I’ve read somewhere 
that you get insomnia when something’s really 
bothering you and the stress from it prevents you 
from actually sleeping..  
T1, H2, C13,  
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100    and if you wanna cut yourself remember that I 
LOVE YOU  and if you wanna kill yourself 
remember that I LOVE YOU  call me up before 
your dead, we can make some plans instead  send 
me an IM, I’ll be your friend    
T2, T2a, H2, H1, 
C7, C9, C14, 
B1, B1c, B3i,  
101  And I don’t know what I did to my neck/right 
shoulder... but I am in some serious pain. Just 
sitting here typing.... it aches like hell. And the 
pain runs down my arm to my wrist. Ugh! 
Sleeping is not easy. I think it means I’m old.  
T1, H2, C6,  
102  The good news is, we’re a lot healthier. We even 
got in a 50 mile bike ride this weekend AND I 
was able to walk the next day.  It has been 12 
years since we have ridden that far.  My eyes are 
also appreciating that I don’t spend 10 hours at a 
time at the screen. Working in smaller chunks is a 
lot healthier but the transition to a more sensible 
DAILY balance (as opposed to an overall weekly 
balance) is taking some getting used to.   
     
    We’re eating better, too (thanks in part to  
Farmer John’s  vegetables). In fact, dealing with 
a very tasty and wonderful but FULL ¾ bushel of 
veggies every week is also a time commitment.  
T1, T2, T2a, H5, 
C3, C9, B1, B2, 
B1a, B1b, B2a, 
B3d, B3e, B3i,  
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103  So yesterday I went to meet my surgeon... and 
we just talked there. He actually explained to me 
about condylar resorption, well from what I’ve 
read this is a controversial issue, so I guess not 
every patient experience such. But from what my 
surgeon had experienced over the past decades 
from his patients, condylar resorption does 
happen. So what is condylar resorption... ?? I will 
not try to explain it medically (besides I don’t 
know how) so basically, condylar resorption 
happens when a bone is surgically cut and after a 
few years or so the bone undergoes resorption. So 
when this happen, it may lead to an open bite or 
not... but what is obvious is that the appearance 
of the patient would somehow change... mostly in 
the chin area...in lower jaw surgeries, for 
example, the lower jaw would set back a little 
more. And so because of that my surgeon 
explained to me that he only moved my jaw 5 
mm. If you will look on my past post, I think my 
third, my orthognathic measurements indicates 
that I had an 8mm underbite. Anyway, my 
surgeon said that he wants a long term benefit 
rather than just a few months. So he said after a 
year or two my jaw’s appearance would just look 
better. So there, that’s just what he wants me to 
understand..that I will definitely look better as the 
years go by. ;p    Another thing, I asked him 
about the loosening of plates and screws, well he 
said it does happens, but with his experience, no 
patient had ever complained about it. And he also 
said it’s just a matter of a surgeon’s skill. 
Okay..... he is confident..i get it. :p But im very 
much relieved to hear that.     And through out 
the whole conversation he kept mentioning about 
getting a nose lift. Haha. No thanks.... 
uhmm...maybe after a year or two... uh... 
nevermind ;p lol    
T1, H2, H3, H5, 
H4, C9, B1, 
B1a, B1b, B3i,  
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104  I have reasons to turn it into a paper back diary 
to stop people reading how I go from Happy 
crazy Inno to Depressed Bitch to meeeeeeeh.  
   
 It annoys me a lot having people read this, I must 
admit. Annoys me for the pure reason I do 
change my mood a lot. With Stress, Hormones 
and Idon’tknowwhatelse I just change my mood a 
lot. 
T1, H2, H3, H1, 
C14,  
105  Also also, my pain threshold is as low as ever, 
getting tattooed really hurts!  
T1, H3, C9, B2, 
B2a, B3i,  
106  Because of my arthritic thumbs, Allan sprayed 
the  Dif Gel , then he would say, `Set your timer!`  
T1, H2, C9,  
107  hmm now my upper arms are a bit tanned, and 
burnt too. 
T1, H2, C9, B2, 
B2a, B3k,  
108 So, back to wallpapering. Which means that I 
need to clear out my cupboards, and I’ve been 
taking my time with it, because I am still sick. 
But I’m getting there.  
T1, H2, C8,  
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109  My mother went to the emergency room 
yesterday with chest pains, though all the tests 
showed no sign of a heart attack.  I got the call 
from my brother, but not until after it was all 
over.  Its my brother’s way of not worrying 
someone about something until he has as much 
information as he can get.  I’d rather know when 
crisis start, so I can be prepared...instead of when 
crisis end so I just get information.  I like to feel 
involved, but there’s seriously nothing I can do 
from over an hour from home, but leave work 
and sit with her in the ER, which I’d happily do.  
I was very calm at the time, and for several hours 
later, but broke down sometime around 9:30 or 
so.  Its my typical freak out long after a situation 
is stable.  
   
 The ER doc said there’s a type of esophagus 
disease that can give you sharp chest pains and 
make you feel as though you are having a heart 
attack.  She’s had a number of ailments over the 
last several years that deal with all things 
digestive, including emergency gall bladder 
removal a few years back.  It wouldn’t surprise 
me if she had some kind of random ailment of the 
esophagus as well.  She’ll have more tests today, 
but as of now, I’m told to stay my rear in Atlanta 
and not worry.  (Yeah, me...not worry.)  
T2, T2a, H2, H3, 
C4, C9, B1, B1a, 
B1b, B3f, B3i,  
110 In other news, I am now 6 days since my last 
decongestant and 2 and a half days since my last 
anti-histamine.  I look like I’ve been crying for a 
week.  Other than that I’m using a few more 
tissues but it isn’t that bad.  Let’s see how long I 
can keep this up.  And let’s hope my eyes start 
reacting better soon.  
T1, H2, H3, H5, 
H4, C5, B1, 
B1a, B3g,  
111 Friends, I’m depressed. It’s not shaking. I’ve 
been working on it for several days. Everything is 
bad and wrong. I’d say get me out here, but there 
doesn’t seem any better, not to mention the costs 
of travel these days.  
T1, H2, C14,  
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112  It is obvious that they can’t be `healed` save for 
castration.     Should we punish people simply for 
being pedophiles regardless of whether they 
actually committed child abuse?   
T2, T2d, H2, 
H1, C9,  
113.1  So, yeah, yesterday I felt SO shitty. I was like 
falling asleep and panting and my body just felt 
like it was going to completely shut down on me. 
Some people from work were concerned and kept 
saying I was super pale.  
T1, H3, C8,  
113.2   I think maneuvering around Dustin on his shitty 
futon really did a number on me...I’m sore 
EVERYWHERE. Yesterday it wasn’t too bad but 
today it’s practically unbearable.  
T1, H2, H6, C9, 
B2, B2a, B3i,  
114  Sadly, Mike Turner lost his 5 year battle with 
cancer on Friday night. He was a young 37 years 
old. He had suffered from Chondrosarcoma, a 
bone cancer that over time had cost him his right 
hip and a fair amount of bone around his pelvis.  
T2, T2e, H3, C7, 
C2,  
115  I smoked cigarettes like I use to in 2006 (ok 
not&#160;as much).  
     
 But I think that&#39;s going to be it.   
     
 I don&#39;t like to smell of cigarettes all the 
time.   
     
 It grosses me out when I smell like an ashtray.   
     
 I tried to drink, but I was upset.   
     
 The logic in my head tells me not to take a 
depressent when you are upset.   
     
 So I didn&#39;t. But blackening my lungs was 
logical.  
     
 Who knows.   
T1, H2, C9, B2, 
B2a, B3l,  
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116 my contact lenses finally arrived! But the 
optician is only free next mon, so I when I will 
finally get to collect them :/ Although specs is 
way more comfortable then lenses, it makes me 
look a tad nerdy haha.  
T1, H2, C3, B1, 
B1b, B3f,  
117      
 After I found out he had passed, 9 years ago 
today, I listened to this song over and over again 
in the car on the way home to my parent’s house. 
And every July 1, I let myself wallow in it until I 
can’t stand it any more. I tend to listen to it for 
about an hour non-stop and just weep 
uncontrollably. And think about how my pap 
wasn’t there to give me away at my wedding. Or 
how he missed the birth of my children, and how 
much he’d love them. I miss what a total smart 
ass he was.   
   
 Time to go wallow a bit more before I lock it all 
away for another July 1st.  
T2, T2a, H3, C7,  
118  And to top that off I spent last night not sleeping 
and my phone was on vibrate so my alarm didn’t 
go off and so no driver’s ed for me today. 
T1, H3, C13,  
119  I just wanted to go ahead and say this out loud to 
everyone at once now that it’s all official and I’ve 
got the lab work and this isn’t going to bite me in 
the ass later.  I wanted to say this before, but 
absent real evidence, I held my peace.  
   
 It’s not cancer.  
   
 I’m still in the running for a few other interesting 
maladies, but as of yesterday I’m officially not 
anemic, cancerous nor a half-dozen other bad 
things.  We don’t know wtf is going on, there will 
be more tests, but I’m scurrying around trying to 
get ready to come back into the world.  
T1, H2, H4, C8, 
C2, C9, B1, B1a, 
B3f,  
120  I have sore wrists from weights, pushups, and 
bike riding, my ass and legs are killing me, Im 
tired, my stomach hurts(the hernia is straining), 
and I am not losing any weight. In fact Im 
GAINING!!!! DAMNIT!  
T1, H2, C9, B1, 
B2, B1a, B2a, 
B3e,  
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Appendix B: Study 5: Parameter Estimates (Final Model) and Observed 
Correlations 
Table B1 
Estimated regression weights for the final model of Study 5 
Regression Weights Estimate 
(standardised)  
S.E. 
(standardised)  
p 
Happy T1 <-- Affect T1 1.00# (.68)  (.05)   
Tense T1 <-- Affect T1 -1.36a (-.75) 0.12 (.04)  < .001 
Calm T1 <-- Affect T1 1.45
b (.82) 0.11 (.04)  < .001 
Relaxed T1 <-- Affect T1 1.58c (.86)  0.11 (.03)  < .001 
Happy T2 <-- Affect T1 1.00# (.68)  (.05)  
Tense T2 <-- Affect T1 -1.36a (-.74) 0.12 (.04)  < .001 
Calm T2 <-- Affect T1 1.45
b (.85) 0.11 (.03)  < .001 
Relaxed T2 <-- Affect T1 1.58c (.88)  0.11 (.03)  < .001 
HappyT1 <-- Affect Change 1.00# (.19)  (.06)  
TenseT1 <-- Affect Change -1.36a (-.21) 0.12 (.06)  < .001 
CalmT1 <-- Affect Change 1.45
b (.24) 0.11 (.06) < .001 
RelaxedT1 <-- Affect Change 1.58c (.25)  0.11 (.06) < .001 
Visual Analogue Scale <-- Perceived 
Risk 
1.00# (.84) (.03)  
Verbal Scale <-- Perceived Risk 0.01 (.92)  0.001 (.03) < .001 
Percentage Estimate <-- Perceived 
Risk 
0.28 (.96) 0.01 (.02) < .001 
Affect Change <-- Perceived Risk -0.59 (-.27)  0.02 (.06) .008 
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Note: Fixed parameters are marked with a hash (#). Parameters constrained to be 
time invariant (i.e., equal) have the same superscript. Standardised parameters are in 
parentheses, unstandardised ones are not.  
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Table B2 
Estimated covariances for the final model of Study 5 
Covariances Estimate 
(standardised)  
S.E. 
(standardised)  
p 
Happy T1 (error)  <--> Happy T2 (error) 746.88 (.29) 323.97 (.06) .02 
Tense T1 (error)  <--> Tense T2 (error) 1407.04 (.46) 324.41 (.06) < .001 
Calm T1 (error)  <--> Calm T2 (error) 3902.81 (.74) 492.78 (.04) < .001 
Relaxed T1 (error)  <--> Relaxed T2 (error) 3368.80 (.78) 390.59 (.04) < .001 
Affect T1 < -- > BFI Neuroticism -210.09 (-.50) 34.33 (.06) < .001 
Perceived Risk < -- > BFI Neuroticism 122.34 (.22) 33.78 (.06) < .001 
Note: Fixed parameters are marked with a hash (#). Parameters constrained to be 
time invariant (i.e., equal) have the same superscript. Standardised parameters are in 
parentheses, unstandardised ones are not.  
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Table B3 
Estimated intercepts for the final model of Study 5 
Intercepts Estimate  S.E.  p 
Happy T1 250.63d 5.77 < .001 
Tense T1 169.57e 7.12 < .001 
Calm T1 246.06f 6.69 < .001 
Relaxed T1 226.36g 6.98 < .001 
Happy T2 250.63d 5.77 < .001 
Tense T2 169.57e 7.12 < .001 
Calm T2 246.06f 6.69 < .001 
Relaxed T2 226.36g 6.98 < .001 
Visual Analogue Scale 152.83 6.155 < .001 
Verbal Scale 3.14 0.07 < .001 
Percentage Estimate 28.88 1.50 < .001 
Note: Fixed parameters are marked with a hash (#). Parameters constrained to be 
time invariant (i.e., equal) have the same superscript. Standardised parameters are in 
parentheses, unstandardised ones are not.  
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